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1 OPENING AND SHAPING THE FUTURE 
Thinking about the future implies imagining it in ways it might, might not, should or should not 
come into being – and working towards it in ways we perceive to be best. But is the future still 
negotiable? Or is it already occupied by political visions, economic interests and the 
advancement of technology?  
Is the future open or is it already decided? The immediate answer to this question is clearly 
neither one nor the other; rather, it depends on the context in which we frame the question. We 
need to ask: What future? And equally important: Whose future? Today‟s politicians face 
problems that have to be solved in order for some, many or all of us to have a future. People, 
organisations, businesses, political parties and interest groups spend their time describing 
possible futures and explaining their choices on the basis of the futures they perceive. Such 
future scenarios may be short-term – for instance, concerning immediate changes in next year‟s 
budget based on the prospects on the financial market. They may be medium-term, as political 
parties tailor their programmes to the envisaged needs of society in the next round of elections; 
or else they may be much longer-term, as climate change experts predict what awaits us in the 
next century. Today‟s society has been characterised as being the most future-oriented society 
that has ever been (Giddens 1998). On an individual, organisational, national and global scale we 
envision, negotiate and decide upon the future on a daily basis. Thinking about the nearer or the 
longer-term future is thus nothing outstanding or particularly special. It is the most common way 
of relating to time in modern society (Adam and Groves 2007).  
This thesis is the outcome of an interest in organised thinking about the future in the public 
sector. Rather than studying documents, speeches or political programmes that address the 
future, my studies have focused on projects which involve stakeholders, users or citizens 
engaging in future-oriented activities. I am interested in how ideas, visions and scenarios about 
the future are created collectively, in the conditions that form these stories, in how they take 
shape and in what effects they produce in politics and public institutions. It is here that new 
knowledge and new perspectives about an uncertain future emerge under specific political and 
institutional conditions. This thesis seeks to contribute to understanding the present possibilities 
for producing collective futures. 
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1.1 My theoretical approach 
Through my background in literature and language studies, specifically my study of science 
fiction, I have been interested in stories about the future for a long time, both thematically and in 
terms of how they work as texts. When studying collective future orientation, however, I do not 
interpret finished stories but instead follow the process of their creation. In earlier studies I 
discussed the influence of organisers (Jenssen 2007), the inclusion of stakeholders in municipal 
visioning (Jenssen 2009) and the possibilities and limits of reflexive governance in municipal 
long-term planning (Jenssen, 2010). In this thesis I explore collective future orientation in the 
context of national research policy. The role of research policy institutions in shaping national 
priorities in science, technology and innovation is gradually being redefined to meet the demand 
for more open and inclusive planning processes (Arnold et al. 2001). This thesis discusses how 
policy institutions try to meet this challenge by using foresight. Foresight is a comprehensive 
term for collective and systematic approaches used to think about, debate and shape the future 
(Von Schomberg et al. 2005). It is increasingly applied across various fields of policy-making 
and in the strategic development of organisations. The objectives of foresight can be to collect 
information regarding policy priorities, to inform decision-making or to increase cooperation 
between actors (Georghiou 2001).1 I will discuss the characteristics and challenges of foresight 
below. 
The foresight project I studied was conducted by Norway‟s most important public research 
funding agency – the Research Council of Norway (RCN). The RCN is the principal adviser on 
research policy issues to the Norwegian government and parliament, which are, in turn, 
responsible for formulating objectives, establishing the framework and assigning overall 
priorities for Norwegian research activities (Erawatch 2009).2 The RCN coordinates generic and 
basic research as well as applied research and innovation. It is also responsible for the entire 
                                                 
1
 See also FOR-LEARN online foresight guide. (2005–7). 
2 „The Norwegian research system is often described as being divided into three levels: a research policy level, a 
research strategy level and a research-performing level. The research policy level comprises the Storting (Norwegian 
national assembly), the government and the ministries. The Research Council of Norway serves as the key 
institution at the research strategy level, although universities and colleges also have important functions in strategic 
research planning. The research-performing level consists of the higher education and independent institute sectors 
as well as the industrial sector‟ (The Norwegian research system, RCN 2007). 
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range of research fields and meant to foster knowledge development within all sectors of society 
and industry (Dietz and Forfang 2003).3 
Between 2002 and 2005 the RCN conducted a comprehensive foresight project called 
„CREATE‟ to renew existing ways of thinking about the future of research from a national 
perspective. 4 It was in this particular setting that I studied the design, use and evaluation of 
foresight. I learned how foresight is used to induce change, particularly change in approaches to 
policy and research programme development. I also increasingly realised how foresight is 
affected by the specific setting in which it is conducted. These empirical and ethnographic 
experiences were informed and consequently shaped by my theoretical approach towards the 
case study. 
My main theoretical perspective in studying foresight in practice is derived from the relatively 
new academic field of science and technology studies (STS). According to Jasanoff (Frodeman 
et al., forthcoming) the roots of STS emerged in the interwar period, continuing into the start of 
the Cold War. By the end of the 1960s, the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), one of the 
most important sources for the development of STS, represented a new approach to social studies 
of science, in which „scientific facts were seen as products of scientists' socially conditioned 
investigations rather than as objective representations of nature‟ (ibid).5 Today, STS has become 
an interdisciplinary field that is creating an „integrative understanding of the origins, dynamics, 
and consequences of science and technology‟ (Hackett et al. 2007). 6  
My approach is informed by versions of STS which emerged from social studies of 
technology from the early to mid-1980s (Bijker et al. 1987). One direction within these studies 
was based on an understanding of technology as socially constructed.7 Here, artifacts, practices 
                                                 
3 The Ministry of Education and Research and the Ministry of Trade and Industry are the most important 
contributors to the RCN‟s budget, channelling almost 30% of public research funding into universities, institutes and 
industry (RCN 2008a). The Ministry of Education and Research also directly funds the core institutional activities of 
higher education institutions (Erawatch 2009). The remaining funding is provided by other ministries such as trade 
and industry, fisheries and petroleum and energy (RCN 2008a). The RCN is thus the largest public body funding 
Norwegian R&D. 
4
 RCN (2005a, in Norwegian). There is little information in English about the foresight project CREATE, but see 
the report on „Aquaculture 2020: transcending the barriers‟ (RCN 2005c, 40-42). 
5 Jasanoff (ibid) cites Thomas Kuhn's classic 1962 study The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as the best 
known product of this interest. 
6
 For an overview of STS and the major issues addressed see Thygesen (2009, 20–51). On how STS influences 
the research policy arena, see Hackett et al (2007) and Webster (2007).  
7
 See Elvebakk (2003, Chapter 2) for an in-depth discussion of constructivism in STS. 
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or technologies were seen as the „constructions of individuals and collectivities that belong to 
social groups‟ (Law 1987, 111). This direction in STS investigated controversies over 
technological developments and explained the resolution of these controversies as social 
settlements, often through powerful groups imposing their interests on other parties involved 
(ibid). A second direction did argue that the social is not especially privileged in determining the 
outcome of such processes. Instead its proponents saw socio-technical change as the effect of the 
interaction of many elements, including material, natural, economic or technical (ibid, 113). This 
approach developed during the late 1980s and early 1990s into actor-network theory (ANT). 
ANT became both renowned and criticised for assuming equal possibilities for agency of human 
actors and artifacts.8 This specific direction in STS has inspired me not so much because of its 
disputed symmetrical approach towards the human and non-human, but rather because of its 
attention to detail and the fact that it allows many different elements to be considered as equally 
influential in the outcome of processes (Callon 1986, Law 1987, Callon 1991, Law 1994, Latour 
1995). 
While early ANT informed my overall perspective on collective future orientation as 
heterogeneous practice, my particular theoretical inspirations have been more recent studies 
developed through and after ANT which have addressed the materialities of language, writing, 
accounting, calculation and evaluation. These studies, inspired by feminist engagements with 
STS, have contributed with a critical perspective on the role of strong actors in determining 
social, scientific and technological developments. Law (2003b) and Moser and Law (2006), for 
example, turn the focus towards resistance to change in accounting and medical practice. Moser 
and Law (1999) investigate the technical and bodily materialities of writing, Law (2000) looks at 
different ways of telling technological stories and Dugdale (1999) and Callon (2002) examine 
the complex distribution of collective writing. What these studies have in common is a much 
broader concern than in earlier ANT for who and what is able to influence socio-technical 
development and who is affected by change, and how. This is also a concern with values, as for 
example in medical care and the possibilities for agency of disabled people (Mol 2002, Moser 
2003, and Thygesen 2009). These studies were important for my analysis of the collective 
                                                 
8
 „The development of early ANT is most closely associated with Madeleine Akrich, Michel Callon, Bruno 
Latour and John Law‟ (Thygesen, 2009, 36). For a critique of ANT see for example Amsterdamska (1990) and 
Whittle and Spicer (2008). 
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creation of future scenarios and how scenario writing is evaluated in the context of research 
policy organisations. Finally the discussions on how calculation is achieved (Callon and Muniesa 
2005) and how we can talk about what cannot be calculated (Callon and Muniesa 2003, Callon 
and Law 2005) informed my analysis of the relationship between foresight methods and 
uncertainty. In this thesis I investigate especially how the concept of non-calculation (Callon and 
Law 2005) can produce new insights into processes which use uncertainty to produce creativity. 
I will discuss several of these aspects in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Thus recent STS and ANT have influenced my perspective on foresight not as a pre-
fabricated and fixed tool which can be applied to a process but rather as an instrument that is 
created and recreated through practice involving not only social, but also material, technical and 
methodical elements.9 I will explain how ANT and several other perspectives inspired my use of 
the term „collective‟ in more detail below. 
A second theoretical inspiration has been a growing number of social science studies which 
investigate how different kinds of expectations about the future influence developments in 
science, technology and innovation. Some of these studies address explicitly how future 
narratives influence technological and scientific creation processes and how, for example, 
breakthrough motifs, stories of promise and foresight organise the future (Van Lente 1993, 
Brown 2000, Deuten and Rip 2000, de Laat 2000). From a number of studies and growing 
networks of researchers interested in these dynamics a „sociology of expectations‟ has evolved, 
which draws on a wide range of perspectives, including STS, history, economics and innovation 
studies (Borup et al. 2006). Looking at scientific and technological expectations as central factors 
in future-oriented activities has proved to be a fruitful approach, since these expectations address 
both the possible and desirable futures and (implicitly) the unlikely and undesirable ones. The 
scholars contend that scientific innovation and technology do not „pre-exist themselves except 
and only in terms of the imaginings, expectations and visions that have shaped their potential‟ 
(Borup et al.. 2006, 285). The sociology of expectations provided me with a fruitful conceptual 
                                                 
9
 For early ANT studies involving the concepts ‟scenarios‟ and ‟scripts‟ see Callon (1987) and Akrich (1992). 
Akrich‟s notion of „scripts‟ focuses on how designers inscribe their vision of the world into a new technical object 
(ibid, 206-7). In Callon‟s study of the development of an electric car (VEL) in France in the early 1970s a scenario 
becomes a place where society is shaped to give space for technological development (Sataøen 2008). The collective 
scenario process I have studied differs from these understandings in several ways; see especially Chapter 3, 
subchapter 3.2. and Michael (2002, 22). 
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understanding of the future within the framework of a single case study.
10
 I will discuss this 
theoretical resource and its relevance for my study in more detail in Chapter 3. 
My approach to foresight is complemented by concepts of coordination and evaluation used in 
convention theory, which informed my understanding of coordination between actors under 
conditions of uncertainty. Here, rather than drawing on the different perspectives within 
convention theory, I have used the works of political sociologist Laurent Thévenot as my 
primary resource. His discussions of concepts such as convention, value, responsibility and 
engagement (Thévenot 2002a) have helped to address how actors work to enable both 
stakeholder participation and institutional relevance. In applying these concepts to a study of 
foresight I seek to draw special attention to coordination in processes where uncertainty is met 
with different forms of evaluation and calculation (Stark 2000, Thévenot 2001b, Callon and Law 
2005, and Thévenot 2006).  
I have chosen to use theories and concepts deriving from these fields because they help me 
address questions that I find in foresight processes and because they in various ways give me 
concepts that I find necessary to explore. They also resonate in different ways with concerns 
which became important through the empirical investigation. Of particular importance for my 
choice of theories are the ways these theoretical directions help me study the specific contexts 
and locations which are both influenced by foresight and redefine how it is used. Among these 
concepts two have been the most influential on my discussion: convention and non-calculation. I 
will explain my approach towards these concepts and the different perspectives related to them 
further in Chapter 3. 
 
1.2 Foresight practice 
Foresight is linked to the human desire to look into the future, and to be prudent about the 
future, in other words, to have sufficient foresight to make provision for the future. It is a way to 
address both the possibilities the future offers and the potential risks awaiting us. Those who 
practise and write about foresight today ground their arguments in the human drive to 
                                                 
10
 Contributions to the sociology of expectations that informed my perspective on future orientation include also 
Brown, Rappert and Webster (eds) (2000), Sanz-Menéndez and Cabello (2000), Brown and Michael (2003), Brown 
(2005), Borup, Brown, Konrad and van Lente (2006), Konrad (2006) and Berkhout (2006).  
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„understand and reveal the future‟, which is „almost as ancient as human history and human 
inquiry itself‟ (Johnston 2008, 18). Neumann and Øverland (2004, 259) contend that future 
orientation as institutional practice can be found „in urban planning from the seventeenth century 
onwards‟.  
Foresight as a specific term emerged in US military strategic planning after the Second World 
War. During the 1960s and 1970s foresight, and especially scenario planning, were introduced 
into corporate strategy, and became renowned as strategic tools at Royal Dutch Shell during the 
first economic oil crisis in 1973 (Van Notten 2005, 5).
 
 
For several decades foresight has been used to enable longer-term strategic thinking in the 
private and the public sector in the United States, Japan and Europe. 11 Only towards the end of 
the twentieth century, however, did it become an important national policy instrument „not only 
in science and technology policy, but also in relation to sustainability and other long-term, risk-
prone issues‟ (Weber 2006, 197).12 With the growing strategic importance of science and 
technology and public funding constraints that are probably here to stay, governments need to 
identify the areas of research that might yield the greatest economic and social benefits (Martin 
2001). During the last two decades national foresight studies designed to inform strategic 
research policy have been carried out with regard to science, technology and innovation all over 
Europe.
 13
 They have been conducted by organisations responsible for the development of 
national research priorities such as government departments or research advisory bodies 
(Johnston 2008). Foresight has thus become a widely used research policy tool viewed as an 
appropriate response to widespread uncertainty about the future.   
Yet what is foresight in practice? In the recently published Handbook of technology foresight: 
concepts and practice (Georghiou et al. 2008), innovation scholar and foresight practitioner 
Rafael Popper (2008) suggests five complementary phases which most current foresight 
activities have in common. These start with the pre-foresight or design phase in which sponsors 
and project-owners define „the rationales and objectives, assemble the project team and design 
                                                 
11
 Foresight is used extensively in policy development in the form of national foresight programmes in Europe 
and Japan, whereas foresight in the United States is directed at corporate strategy development mostly in the form of 
scenario planning (Selin 2008, 1880). 
12
 Martin and Irvine's 1989 publication Research foresight is considered to have effectively „launched the 
modern foresight era‟ (Johnston, 2002, 1). 
13
 See, for example, Brown et al (1999), Rappert (1999), Brown et al (2001), Böhle (2003a and b) and Cuhls and 
Georghiou (2004). 
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the methodology‟ (ibid, 45). During the recruitment phase the core team (administrative 
coordinators and methodological experts) supply the team with additional members, such as 
facilitators and expert panel members, and identify key stakeholders who can contribute to and 
support the process. The third phase, called generation, is considered „the heart of the process‟ 
(ibid, 47). Here new and existing knowledge is combined and „new visions and images of the 
future are created‟. 14 The action phase then involves „prioritisation and decision-making‟. As 
Popper writes: „This may involve moving directly forward to promoting or transferring particular 
strategies, technologies or policy instruments‟ (ibid, 48). Finally the renewal phase involves 
„constant monitoring and evaluation in order to assess whether the foresight process has helped 
to achieve its original objectives and how far results are being acted on‟ (Popper 2008, 49). 
Foresight therefore „should only be undertaken when it is possible to make use of the outcomes‟ 
(ibid). The whole five-phase process is depicted as a circle; implying that action and renewal can 
lead to new foresight activities. 
In this respect, foresight is not identical with the production of alternative future narratives but 
rather is supposed to „go beyond the presentation of scenarios [...] and beyond the preparation of 
plans. What is crucial is the elaboration of a guiding strategic vision, to which there can be a 
shared sense of commitment‟ (Georghiou et al. 2008, 12). According to these writers, the value 
of foresight lies not in the depiction of alternative futures but in how it informs concrete 
decision- making processes and creates a sense of shared ownership and responsibility in relation 
to present and future challenges. 
The five phases of foresight presented above can be seen as generic descriptions of activities 
most foresight projects have in common. Yet the concrete methods and practices used in these 
different phases can differ substantially. Popper (2008, 50-1) identifies 33 different qualitative 
and quantitative methods used in different phases of foresight activities. Research and strategy 
management scholar Bastiaan De Laat (2000, 179) argues that „terms are not so precise and that 
depending on the situation, methods which should clearly be separated in the eyes of one author 
intermingle and interact for another [...] formal definitions might exist, but in practice different 
labels are used for a variety of foresight activities, in an even greater variety of combinations‟. In 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Uotila, T. and H. Melkas (2007) and Karlsen and Karlsen (2007) on the production of shared 
knowledge in foresight processes.  
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fact it appears easier to agree on what foresight is not. According to Georghiou et al. (2008, 14), 
foresight differs from other forms of future orientation in only two respects: It is not „only 
forecasting (let alone prediction)‟, and it is not „ivory tower‟ future studies, in which an expert 
academic or consultant group produces its vision of the future or of alternative futures‟. Most 
writers on foresight today draw a distinction between forecasting as a way to predict the future 
and foresight as exploring alternative futures within a specific policy context including relevant 
stakeholders and interest groups. Instead of seeing variations in the definition and application of 
foresight methods as „immense definitional confusion‟ (ibid, 8) they might contribute to keeping 
foresight adaptable to local needs. Foresight can thus be seen as a „boundary object‟ used in 
different ways by different communities but with enough immutable content to maintain 
integrity.
15
 
From the diversity and wide application of foresight presented above, we see that it can be an 
influential policy tool that helps policy-makers look into the future and helps them collect, 
structure, systematise and represent various kinds of knowledge, expectations and texts. My 
study focuses on a foresight project conducted by a research policy institution and is hence 
closely linked to practice. When following foresight in practice I increasingly came to regard 
five features of foresight as part of its „immutable content‟ which enables foresight practice to 
travel between different contexts and locations. In the following I will present these five features 
which in combination distinguish foresight as a particular policy tool. I want to argue that these 
features become relevant in a study of foresight practice since they are both prominent in the 
discussions referred to above and emerged in the process I observed. 
 
1.3 Five features of foresight 
Foresight practice does not only deal with present and future challenges. It also raises social, 
political or organisational issues. Its application shapes collective activities, which, in turn, 
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 See the definition of boundary objects, Star and Griesemer (1989, 393). On the other hand, one can also 
consider the different methods used to address the future, such as scenario development, expert or citizens panels, or 
trend extrapolation (see Popper 2008) as relatively stable and durable methods, having existed in different forms for 
more than half a century. This may lead us to view foresight simply as a fashionable term that may be replaced with 
a new one when policy politics shift back, for example, to expert predictions of the future (Staton 2008). Following 
the upsurge in the popularity of the term over the past two decades many activities have been relabelled as 
„foresight‟ to make them more appealing to policy-makers.  
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produce specific realities. Researchers of „prospective techno-science‟ have therefore argued that 
foresight and other future-oriented practices should be studied closely to explore how they are 
performed instead of merely evaluating them as improvable tools for more prudent strategic 
decision-making. They have termed this focus on the ways foresight is enacted as looking at the 
future. Looking at the future explores how the future „as a temporal abstraction is constructed 
and managed, by whom and under what conditions‟ (Brown et al. 2000, 4).  
According to proponents of the sociology of expectations, looking at the future instead of into 
the future can also offer „observations about the less strategic and formalised way in which 
futures and expectations are enacted and performed‟ (Borup et al. 2006, 296). My approach 
follows this line of thinking. In looking at the practice of foresight my main interest was in five 
features which distinguish foresight from other policy tools and which became relevant in my 
study of the Research Council of Norway project. They do not represent an exhaustive catalogue 
of foresight features. Rather they highlight important challenges in applying foresight as a 
strategic policy tool. 
First, foresight requires competence about how to make sense of the future (Chia 2004, Miller 
2007). This expertise in thinking about the future – represented by facilitators, project groups or 
consultants – must be included in foresight processes. However, what this competence means in 
practice and how it influences the process and outcome of foresight projects is a matter for 
empirical investigation. This thesis will look into the practice of „making meaning of looking 
ahead‟ (Fuller 1999) by discussing how this specific competence becomes articulated. 
Second, among advocates and users of foresight the common understanding is that it is above 
all a systematic way of thinking about the future. Foresight has been described as „systematic 
attempts to look into the longer-term future of science, technology, the economy, the 
environment and society...‟ (Martin 1995, 140). According to a website describing foresight in 
the Research Council of Norway, the „systematic consideration‟ enabled by foresight „addresses 
the complex and uncertain realities to come and helps to identify, discuss and handle emerging 
challenges in different areas of society‟ (RCN 2008b). Making foresight systematic by defining it 
as systematic ascribes an immediately accessible value to foresight in research policy 
development. „Systematic‟ has connotations with a scientific approach, co-ordinated procedures 
and taxonomy. Foresight is thus presented and formulated as a coherent body of ideas and 
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principles that are methodical in their procedure and plan.
16
 My point is not to question whether 
foresight is systematic, but to explore what systematic means in practice. 
A third understanding regards foresight not only as forward-looking, but also as forward-
acting. In definitions produced by trans-national foresight communities, such as the European 
Commission‟s Joint Research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (JRC-
IPTS), foresight becomes an instrument directed at action in the present: „Foresight is a 
systematic, participatory, future intelligence-gathering and medium- to long-term vision-building 
process aimed at enabling present-day decisions and mobilising joint actions‟.17 This is 
undoubtedly an ideal concept of foresight as a process in which progress values meet values of 
reflexive governance (Voß et al. 2006). This comprehensive definition addresses the most 
elusive aspect of foresight, which is the relationship between foresight‟s collective future-
orientation and the politics of today’s decision-making, such as in policy issues, research funding 
and scientific and technological development. In this thesis this relationship will be discussed 
specifically in the context of decision-making in research policy and programme development. 
A fourth feature of foresight is the willingness to consider unintended effects of foresight in 
addition to evaluating its utility in terms of whether it achieves its original objectives. Brown et 
al. (1999) argue that foresight draws on a heritage linking it to technology forecasting and the 
rationale of long-term planning procedures. In this respect foresight practice is still connected to 
traditional ideas about predictable and plannable futures. However, as Brown et al. (2001, 24) 
argue, attempts to get actors with diverse interests to coordinate collective responses to future 
uncertainty may also potentially produce different effects from those resulting from conventional 
policy processes. Because of its relatively short history, foresight could be seen as part of a range 
of „new policy tools [which] may induce unintended effects which can be worthwhile to maintain 
or even to elaborate instead of or in addition to the original objectives‟ (ibid). Rather than 
responding exclusively to predetermined objectives foresight can open and renew policy 
processes in unexpected ways. In this thesis intended and unintended effects are discussed as 
products of concrete coordination processes between different actors in the foresight project.  
                                                 
16 See the definition of „systematic‟ at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/systematic. For a discussion 
of the importance of system thinking in foresight see Loveridge (2009). 
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 This definition can be found in the For-Learn Online Foresight Guide (2005-2007).  
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The fifth feature deals with the relationship between social priorities and technological 
possibilities. Inviting stakeholders from different industrial and technological fields to discuss 
future research priorities can be challenging given their wide range of interests. Brown et al. 
(2001, 82) argue that „given the complication given by sectoral variation, it might well be more 
sensible for foresight initiatives to focus less on technological and more on social priorities 
which can be served by appropriate technologies, or conversely, inhibited by factors not wholly 
technical‟. Similarly, the idea of „third generation foresight‟ (Georghiou 2001, Georghiou et al. 
2008) proposes a shift from technological expert forecasting via a second generation of 
participation from science and industry towards thematic foresight including social stakeholders 
(Warnke and Heimeriks 2008). Recent discussions of foresight have become increasingly 
reflective about the importance of social priorities vis-à-vis technological options.
18
 Yet given 
the role of economic priorities in the development of national research strategies, technological 
and scientific possibilities and expert views are still seen as more important than the participation 
of social stakeholders (Georghiou and Harper 2008). In this thesis I will discuss how this 
challenge was approached in developing scenarios to inform national research policy. 
I do not associate these five features with foresight processes in a linear way, by, for example, 
linking each of them to the five phases of foresight described by Popper (2008) above. Rather 
they are seen as operating simultaneously throughout a foresight process and may reinforce, 
cooperate or collide with, or even exclude one another.  
By looking at the microphysics of the interactions between these features in a case study I 
address how foresight is used to steer, govern and shape the future through a systematic 
approach, the focus on forward-acting, and the use of specific knowledge and expertise on how 
to approach the future. I also analyse how foresight opens political processes by including 
stakeholders and weighing technological potential against social needs. In this respect I see 
foresight as part of a wide range of so-called political technologies. As STS scholars Asdal, 
Borch and Moser (2008, 6) argue: „Political technologies are not to be understood in a context of 
the microphysics of power, as techniques of domination exclusively, but as tools for public 
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 See for example Warnke and Heimeriks‟ (2008) discussion of the influence of STS on technology foresight 
and Barré and Keenan‟s (2008) suggestions about reconceptualising technology foresight with the help of the social 
sciences and the humanities. See also evaluations of foresight in S&T policy in the context of reflexivity (Grunwald 
2004, Voß and Kemp 2006) and sustainability (Konrad and Voß 2006). 
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involvement, for democratization, or deliberation, as well‟.19 By adapting this perspective to my 
study I propose research that approaches foresight as a social and political technology rather than 
as a policy tool in need of constant improvement to match today‟s challenges. Studying foresight 
practice can thus reveal issues of social, political and technological development related to future 
orientation and thus broaden the range of analytical approaches in social science.20  
 
1.4 Case study, two central concerns and two research questions 
The foresight project CREATE was initiated as a response to an international evaluation of 
the RCN a year earlier, which had highlighted the need for renewal in a changing research policy 
landscape (Technopolis evaluation, Arnold et al. 2001). The evaluation had pointed to several 
shortcomings in the way the RCN conducted policy and questioned how research priorities were 
arrived at, debates organised and power distributed (Jenssen 2007, 409). It recommended that the 
Research Council initiate national or sectoral foresight exercises to cope with „a lack of 
institutional responsibility for strategically oriented innovation policies‟ (Arnold et al. 2001, 40). 
It said this responsibility should not be assumed alone, but should include a wider group of 
stakeholders outside the research funding institution. The Technopolis evaluation suggested: 
„The RCN should champion and initiate an open foresight process; inviting a wider than normal 
debate about priorities and empowering more parts of society in relation to the national research 
agenda‟ (ibid, 118, italics added). Foresight was presented as an enabler of dialogue between 
research communities, the Research Council and the public about the future of research, and thus 
also as a democratic instrument, reflecting on and potentially changing the existing debate on 
research priorities. The evaluation also argued that using foresight could help align the RCN with 
similar European organisations already employing foresight as a strategy tool. The use of 
foresight was thus not presented as a „radical break from existing practices‟ (Rappert 1999, 533), 
but as a way to strengthen the RCN‟s public legitimacy as an important national advisory body. 
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 The relationship between foresight and deliberation is also discussed by Von Schomberg, Guimarães Pereira 
and Funtowicz (2005). For a different perspective on political technologies see Barry (2001) who demonstrates the 
way in which technology is increasingly written into the conduct of politics. 
20
 See, for example, Callon (1987, 83) who proposes a similiar approach to the study of technology, seeing it not 
as a problem which has to be fixed, but as a ‟tool for sociological analysis, which „would enlarge the methodological 
range of the social sciences‟ and „facilitate the understanding of technological development‟. Such work has been 
commenced by Brown et al (2000) using STS, organisation studies, as well as innovation studies, economics and 
sociology as starting points for studies of future orientation. 
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This recommendation led to the initiation of the „Foresight project CREATE‟ in the autumn 
of 2002 (RCN 2005a).
 The project was described as a „development and strategy project‟ with 
both „theoretical and method-oriented objectives‟ (RCN 2006a). It was part of a larger 
organisational process designed to serve as a new way of informing strategy processes and to 
help detect possible new research areas of crucial interest to the RCN and to national research 
development (ibid). Foresight was thus meant to make rational planning processes more 
reflexive and inclusive, by involving stakeholders and creating new networks between industry, 
academia and government institutions.
21
   
One of the concerns of my study is to explore how the participation of stakeholders was 
translated into practice.  Foresight expert Denis Loveridge and management researcher Penny 
Street (2005, 47) describe stakeholders as „individuals or groups who can be affected by and/or 
affect an organisation and its activities‟. I studied coordinating activities which aimed to include 
the multiple perspectives of a range of stakeholders and thus to open the future by including the 
unexpected and creative.  
Science policy scholar Andrew Stirling (2006, 258) argues that there are three rationales for 
interactive engagement (stakeholder participation) in foresight and strategy development. The 
„normative democratic point of view‟ establishes participation as the „right thing to do 
irrespective of the outcomes‟, while the „instrumental rationale‟ employs participation to ensure 
„support for particular decisions‟. The third argument for participation is the „substantive‟ one, in 
which the aim is to „establish a broader knowledge base and more effective social learning in 
order to achieve better outcomes‟ (ibid). The normative, instrumental and substantive approaches 
are thus associated with different ways of opening and shaping the future and address, as Stirling 
states, „the prevailing distribution of political, institutional and economic power‟ (ibid). In the 
case of the RCN the normative view had been expressed in the international evaluation 
recommending empowering more sectors of society. I became interested in exploring whether, 
and if so, how, the instrumental and substantive rationales for engagement emerged in the 
project. Based on this interest I formulated the following research questions: 
                                                 
21
 In innovation studies foresight is often associated with the „Triple Helix model‟, which is a description of 
networks between the three institutions of government, university and industry (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz 1998). 
Because of its participative approach, foresight has been described „as a way of catalysing the multidisciplinary 
relationships among the three different spheres of the Triple Helix model‟ (Ughetto, 2007).  
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How does the interaction between stakeholder involvement and the need for a result useful to 
the organisation produce future stories? To what degree are participants‟ contributions to a 
particular story about the future an effect of coordination?22  
These two questions address both process and effects of foresight practice. The first question, 
focusing on the „how‟, allows me to regard the production of scenarios not as a predetermined 
development but dependent on the instant interactions of different elements coming together to 
produce a material outcome. These elements can be human actors, documents related to the 
foresight project, methods used during the process and the unpredictable substantiations of 
scenario ideas. Following an actor-network approach none of these elements has any 
predetermined explanatory power for the specific outcome of the process. In this respect 
studying the process with the help of this question addresses especially how this process became 
„substantive‟ (Stirling 2006) and whether it established a broader knowledge base and social 
learning.  
The second question however, relativates this approach. It addresses the fact that that the 
foresight project was conducted based on specific intentions expressed by the project organisers 
prior to the foresight process. Here the „instrumental rationale‟ to employ participation to ensure 
support for particular decisions is addressed. That includes that there were specific decisions 
made prior to the project which also shaped the outcome of the project and in certain ways 
affected contributions. Thus the second research question connects my interest in participation 
with studying how relevance of the foresight project was achieved in relation to research policy 
development.
23
 The foresight project was meant to „detect possible new research areas of crucial 
interest to the RCN and to national research development‟ (RCN 2006a). Hence, anything 
considered both new and of interest to the Research Council and national research policy was 
deemed to be relevant.  
Gradually I realised that a discussion of relevance needed to consider how the results of the 
project was were evaluated outside the framework of the foresight project. Therefore my study 
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 I prefer the term „coordinating‟ to „organising‟, even though their meanings are quite similar. However, to 
coordinate means to put in the same order or rank, to bring into a common action, movement or condition, while to 
organise means to develop an organic structure, a functioning whole or coherent unit (www.meriam-webster.com). 
Based on this difference in meaning I associate coordinating with a more open outcome than organising. 
23
 On the relationship between participatory foresight processes and their results see also Keenan and Uyarra 
(2002). 
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includes material related to the development of the large ICT research programme VERDIKT 
which was to be informed by the foresight project (RCN 2009b, 2008c). 24  It was through the 
study of processes firmly embedded in the institutional and organisational procedures of research 
programme development that the idea to use concepts dealing with convention suggested itself. It 
inspired me to discuss coordination in the foresight project from the perspective of convention 
theory (Thévenot 2002b), choosing concepts which would bring out similarities as well as 
differences between foresight and research programme development. These concepts which 
originally belong to economic sociology were thus used to highlight issues of participation and 
relevance in research policy foresight. 
 
1.5 Emerging issues: responsibility, value and uncertainty 
The foresight project CREATE was a first attempt to use a participatory approach by 
involving a large number of stakeholders representing research and industry. Five separate 
foresight projects were organised, covering the areas of aquaculture, clean energy systems, 
material technology (nanotechnology), biotechnology and ICT. Between thirty and forty external 
participants were invited to participate in each of the five projects. The projects were headed by 
foresight project groups consisting of ten to fourteen members, which were responsible for the 
design, conduct and results of the projects. They included both RCN staff and representatives of 
research institutes, universities and private companies invited by virtue of their professional 
backgrounds, experience and perspectives.25 Responsibility for the projects was thus distributed 
among different actors within and associated with the RCN. The five project groups had to report 
to the line management of the three divisions of the RCN and received guidance from a cross-
divisional management group. The CREATE project was also required to meet the expectations 
of three boards overseeing the three divisions (Jenssen 2007, 411).  
My original research plan had been to conduct a comparative study of two of the projects 
conducted under the CREATE umbrella project.  However, for reasons I will explain further in 
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 VERDIKT was founded as one of a series of „large-scale programmes‟ designed by the Research Council of 
Norway as a „special funding instrument [...]to build long-term knowledge in order to encourage innovation and 
enhance value creation as well as to help find solutions to important challenges facing society‟ (RCN 2008c).  
25
 An overview of the participating stakeholders, the five project groups and the umbrella foresight group 
responsible for the foresight project CREATE can be found on the project website (RCN 2005a). 
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Chapter 2, I decided instead to study the foresight project on Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT), called „UTSIKT‟ in Norwegian (RCN 2004b). 26  
As I observed the process of producing scenarios and evaluating them for research 
programme development in the RCN three issues became empirically important. These issues on 
their own as well as the way they work together became meaningful not least because they 
combined empirical observation with theoretical perspectives. They might be seen as my own 
interpretative angle in this thesis, although this does not mean that they necessarily exclude other 
important issues. Nevertheless, I see them as relevant to both users of and researchers on 
foresight and other ways of engaging with the future. In my opinion they offer a specific 
perspective on the practice of foresight in relation to a policy context.  
The first issue is closely linked to how foresight is coordinated – namely, involving 
stakeholders and delivering results useful to the project owners. These activities raise questions 
about responsibility. Responsibility is first and foremost an issue for actors who are busy 
coordinating the process. However, in accordance with my theoretical approach I will discuss 
further in Chapter 3, I see responsibility not exclusively as an issue of accountability of central 
actors. In this thesis responsibility is associated with engagement (Thévenot 2002a). Drawing on 
both Thévenot and ANT resources I understand engagement as threefold: engaging in a process 
by showing interest and investing time and competence; engaging with heterogeneous material, 
that is writing devices, competences, rhetoric, methods and approaches in the process; and being 
engaged through a limited contract such as an invitation to a process, which coordinates 
collective actions under specific conditions. 27 By linking responsibility to engagement I question 
the understanding of responsibility as being divided into public accountability and private 
responsibility.28  
The second issue is the question of value. Here I was inspired by Thévenot‟s argument that 
value can be explored by studying how evaluation is coordinated (ibid). I specify this approach 
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 UTSIKT means „outlook‟ in English. For an overview over attended meetings in the ICT foresight project see 
appendix 9.1. Until 2009 I intended to include a case of visioning in municipal long-term planning in this thesis but 
eventually decided to discuss the findings of this case study elsewhere (Jenssen 2007, 2009, 2010). 
27 In a footnote to his text, Thévenot (2002a, 81) explains the extended meaning of „engagement‟ in French, which 
ascribes a coordinating and binding quality to the term: „In French, the word „engagement‟ works better still because 
the notion of both material and moral engagement is highly developed. The key is „engaged‟ in the lock, just as two 
parties are „engaged‟ in a contract (and not just when they are married).‟ 
28
 A STS perspective on the relationship between private responsibility and public accountability is discussed in 
Singleton (2007). 
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by looking at how value is assessed in participatory processes through the collective and 
dynamic evaluation of relevance. This approach was also inspired by the work of STS scholars 
on future values (Brown 2005), calculation (Callon and Muniesa 2005) and non-calculation 
(Callon and Law 2005). I will discuss value in more detail in Chapter 3. 
The third issue this thesis deals with is uncertainty. However, rather than exploring the 
„conditions of uncertainty‟ (Rappert 1999, Stirling 2006) which foresight is meant to be a 
response to, I study how uncertainty contributes to shaping a foresight process during concrete 
interactions between participants. Organisers of foresight use uncertainty actively, rather than 
reducing it to calculations of possible risks. In this respect uncertainty enables the inclusion of 
many perspectives on possible futures. This, however, also increases complexity in the face of a 
need for rational decisions about preferred solutions (Rask 2008).  
My thesis is thus concerned with the dynamics between participation and relevance, and in a 
broader sense with studying how the future is opened and shaped in collective foresight 
processes. Following the activities of foresight facilitators, RCN employees and invited 
participants I became increasingly interested in the interactions between the three issues 
responsibility, uncertainty and value. My contribution to existing studies of foresight is to 
discuss these issues and concerns with the help of two guiding research questions. Thus I want to 
yield a perspective on foresight‟s „rhetorics and the complexities of its practical implications‟ 
(Brown et al. 1999, 3) which allows me to explore present possibilities for producing collective 
futures. 
 
1.6 A word on the collective  
The future stories developed in the foresight project by the RCN were not based on either 
individual or organisational action, but produced collectively by organisers and stakeholders. 
Unlike individual fictional accounts, the stories were informed by multiple perspectives, specific 
methods and approaches and the context of research policy development. In this thesis there are 
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four reasons why I employ the concept of „collective‟ as a specific description of the foresight 
project I have studied.29  
My understanding of the collective is first and foremost inspired by actor-network theory. 
Science anthropologist Bruno Latour, a central figure in STS and ANT, argues for the term 
„collective‟ to take the place of the term „social‟. The collective, he argues, always „collects 
different types of forces‟, involving not only humans, but also non-human elements (Latour 
2005, 74-5). Sociologist, STS and ANT scholar John Law writes: „... left to their own devices 
human actions and words do not spread very far at all ... Other materials, such as texts and 
technologies, surely form a crucial part of any ordering‟ (Law 1994, 24). The collective 
processes I studied were made up of groups, meeting procedures, competencies, routines, texts, 
screens, writing devices as well as language and nonverbal communication.30 The „non-human 
elements‟ such as writing tools and computer screens were part of the coordinating processes I 
observed. However, this study will not single out the importance of non-human elements in the 
process but rather show how different materials and actors produce effects together. STS scholar 
Ingunn Moser (2003, 299) writes that the „conditions of possibility […] have to be arranged and 
ordered, take effort and work, and are precarious and fragile. And so the realities enacted remain 
open precisely because they need to be enacted anew in every instance‟. This idea of a 
continuous opening and shaping of realities informed my approach. It presupposes that the 
collective is heterogeneous, forms anew in each new setting, and always produces different 
effects. 
The foresight project in the Research Council of Norway is symptomatic of this hybrid and 
dynamic understanding of the collective. Here previously untried approaches and methods were 
used and people were assembled who had not come together in such a setting before. The field 
work material suggests that the RCN employees involved in the project expressed and enacted 
interests and agendas related to concepts and objectives captured in the RCN‟s strategy papers 
and planning documents. In this respect they acted as employees of their organisation. Their 
activities, however, were also influenced by their individual positions, skills and experience, and 
with regard to this particular foresight project by their understanding about how to approach the 
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 See Schwandt and Gorman (2004, 78) for a concept of the collective in foresight related to business 
management. 
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 See also Hayles (2002) on the technologies of writing. 
25 
 
future. In this respect, their actions always reflected something more than the officially published 
objectives of the organisation. So a second reason why I use the word „collective‟ is to 
distinguish it from „organisational‟ and to draw attention to the interdependency of individual 
and organisational agency.  
Third, I want to highlight the fact that actors – both organisers and stakeholders – always have 
various possibilities for influencing the outcome. Some perspectives on participation use 
descriptions like „collaborative‟, „communicative‟ or „cooperative‟, which imply a sense of 
presupposed mutual understanding. Urban planning theorist John Pløger (2001) offers a critique 
of „communicative planning processes‟ questioning the use of the term „communicative‟ on the 
basis that these processes are always related to power. I use the term „collective‟ to avoid 
descriptions which already imply more predefined perspectives on participatory processes 
assuming equal influence on the results and are therefore in this respect already normatively 
defined.  
Finally, my perspective on the collective draws also on studies inspired by the sociology of 
expectation. Here the „collective‟ is used to describe expectations shared by many different 
actors about developments, in biotechnology or telecommunications, for instance. As sociologist 
and innovation scholar Kornelia Konrad (2006) argues, even though expectations about certain 
technological developments can be „widely shared‟, this does not necessarily mean that the 
actors have the same interests in seeing these expectations materialise (Konrad 2006, Truffer et 
al. 2008). This specific meaning of collective is useful for this study because it underlines that a 
collective foresight process can involve people who, although they might share expectations 
about the future, express different, though not necessarily opposing interests. Hence collective 
does not always mean consensus-driven interaction.31  
It is thus this particular understanding of the term „collective‟ that I use to investigate how 
methodical elements, organising strategies, people and writing devices interacted  were 
assembled together, how perspectives were expressed and discussed, and how different, or 
opposite interests were negotiated. 
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 Sociologist and STS scholar Anni Dugdale (1999) discusses the question of consensus from an actor-network 
theory perspective in a study of collective writing of a policy document on women‟s health choices. On the problem 
of consensus in foresight and scenario development see also Van‟t Klooster and Van Asselt (2006). 
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1.7 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 is concerned 
with establishing the context of the case study and my ethnographic approach. I explain how 
foresight was introduced in the Research Council of Norway and what expectations about 
organisational renewal and relevant knowledge accompanied it. I then introduce my 
methodological approach to fieldwork and to the interpretation of empirical material based on a 
discussion of studying the project as a collection of ethnographic moments. 
In Chapter 3 I develop my theoretical perspective. I outline aspects of the sociology of 
expectations that inspired my approach but also show in which respects my work differs from 
and might contribute to this research. Then I discuss the theoretical perspectives of my thesis, 
beginning with the question of value and its relation to uncertainty. Finally I discuss my main 
concepts: convention and non-calculation.  
Chapter 4 to 7 follow the foresight project as it was conducted. Chapter 4, Collective Scenario 
Creation, starts with an overview of important aspects of scenario development today, stating its 
ambitions, variety of uses and relationship to strategy development. I then discuss the invitation 
of stakeholders to the foresight project and the collective production of driving forces, scenario 
ideas, scenario axes and drafts. The starting point for this discussion is the argument that 
scenarios are not „discovered‟ but created, and that, since they are mostly produced by more than 
one writer, they are also collective socio-material constructions. Thus, following the process of 
producing scenarios can provide insight into the coordination of participation and relevance in 
policy processes. In this chapter I concentrate on how openness was coordinated and how 
responsibility for collective scenario creation was assigned. The empirical findings are connected 
to issues of value, calculation and uncertainty.  
Chapter 5 deals with collective scenario writing. The argument in this chapter is that writing 
scenarios is geared towards a concrete textual product which has to be completed in a certain 
timespan and that it is here that the relevance of scenarios for other strategic processes is 
determined. There are, to my knowledge, no ethnographic case studies which concentrate on the 
writing process in participatory foresight, and this stage has been characterised as an area which 
deserves more academic attention. I first discuss how scenario writing relates to issues of 
authorship and then approach the writing process as a contract which binds different actors 
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together, but which is based on a limited agreement about the distribution of competence, 
responsibility and ownership. I then describe how scenario ideas were ordered, negotiated and 
evaluated. Here questions of scenario credibility raised challenges regarding the role of 
technology in the scenarios and the competence and responsibility of the participants. I show 
how this process can be seen as creating equivalences across contexts to ensure relevance in 
relation to research programme development.  
Chapter 6 relates scenario writing to the development of research programmes. I start by 
discussing the value of foresight and scenarios in relation to the development of research 
priorities. Both processes are geared to producing specific texts which have to be relevant in 
various contexts and involve complex coordination of competences, methods and involvement. 
In the case studied here the two processes progressed almost simultaneously and were 
coordinated by one responsible project group, who had involved additional competencies in the 
process of writing scenarios. The argument here is that writing a research programme proposal 
does not only rest on creating equivalences across contexts but also involves negotiating what is 
considered irrelevant. I then show how the scenarios were evaluated in relation to research 
programme development. It is this evaluative operation which both expresses but also recreates 
conventions, i.e. common forms of evaluation in research policy.  
In Chapter 7 I follow the collective evaluation of scenarios in the final participatory workshop 
in which the participants were to develop strategic recommendations for future ICT research 
based on the finished scenarios. Here openness and a multitude of perspectives produced 
evaluations different from the former attempts to create equivalences across contexts and to 
evaluate what is irrelevant. Then I describe how the scenarios were finally evaluated within the 
foresight project group as relevant for writing a research programme proposal. I discuss the 
negotiation of the value of scenarios as a question of change versus progress. 
In the eighth and concluding chapter I reassess my theoretical and methodological approach. I 
highlight some of the arguments made in this thesis and speculate on questions which it might be 
valuable to pursue further. 
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2 STUDYING FORESIGHT PRACTICE 
The methods and approaches for shaping the future are broad and complex. Future thinking, 
future methods and the creation of texts about the future are naturally wide areas of activity 
within organisations dealing with decisions about future issues, such as business organisations, 
public institutions or governmental authorities. Thinking about the future finds expression in 
planning documents, strategy papers and organisational visions. Various methods for negotiating 
and shaping the future can also be found in planning processes and budget procedures, such as 
trend extrapolation and statistical predictions. While foresight has a shorter history than long-
term planning does, in the context of planning in research development, foresight can be seen as 
a specific approach that aims at being inclusive, socially oriented and ready to include new 
thoughts and ideas.32  
The organisational context of this study is the Research Council of Norway, a national 
research funding institution which had chosen to use foresight as a new method of long-term 
strategic development. In the first part of this chapter I explain the RCN‟s role as the main 
initiator of the foresight project, illustrating my account with official documents, online 
presentations and interviews. I do not attempt to provide a comprehensive description of the 
RCN‟s role as a complex organisation engaged in developing national research policy but instead 
focus on published material related to the RCN‟s foresight project in which the concepts, 
arguments for and context of the project are outlined. In other words I present the RCN as the 
initiator of large-scale foresight in terms of the areas of interest in this thesis.33 The latter form 
                                                 
32
 In Norge2030: Fem scenarier om offentlig sektors framtid (Norway 2030: five scenarios about the future of 
the public sector, Øverland et al. (2000) present an  introduction to socialeconomic planning and  a short history of 
scenario planning in Norway. According to the authors, public sector planning had been dominated by social 
economists since the early 1950s. They were considered experts in planning which was defined as „a system of 
strategic decisions and institutional frameworks applied to shape future action‟(ibid, 15). This kind of expert work 
was mainly embedded in the ministry of trade and  the ministry of finance and influenced the work on the national 
budget. This kind of future thinking and planning has been described by political scientist Øyvind Østerud as a form 
of „orienteering‟ in which the planner tried to find the shortest way between two points, the present and the future. 
The turn towards foresight does in this respect present a more inclusive approach towards planning and strategic 
thinking. 
33
 See Law (1994, 33-4) on avoiding definitions of „the formal organisation‟. He argues that even if in some 
instances an organisation can represent itself as a homogeneous actor, usually organisations are „many different 
things at once‟ (Morgan (1986, 339) quoted in Law (ibid)). 
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the subject of the second part of this chapter. Here I describe the methodology used and discuss 
the kind of data that helped to elucidate issues and concerns.  
 
2.1 A short history of long-term planning in the RCN 
In her article on „The Research Council and the Power of Knowledge‟34 STS scholar and 
historian Kristin Asdal (2002) discusses the introduction of long-term planning in the Royal 
Norwegian Council for Scientific and Technical Research (NTNF). The NTNF was one of five 
research councils responsible for scientific and industrial research development in the early 
1970s and a precursor to today‟s Research Council of Norway.35 The NTNF issued guidelines for 
how long-term programmes should be introduced and used and for how to justify their 
introduction. In these guidelines, the authors wrote:  
Through systematic evaluation of future possibilities the Council wanted to 
promote research programmes which could contribute to creating the social 
conditions and industrial possibilities „we wish to establish‟ (ibid). 
 
Asdal describes the NTNF‟s system for long-term planning as a concrete technology36 which 
„built in “the social” in the form of expectations about the future and about different knowledge 
producers as well as the users‟ priorities about what real research would be in the years to come‟ 
(ibid, 112). However, Asdal argues, planning was not to intervene too much in research, which 
was seen as free by nature. Therefore the guidelines specified: 
One needs to ensure, without losing the advantages ensuing from firm planning 
and evaluation, that room is provided for flexibility in the system, to enable 
new systems and new thoughts to be considered continuously and to influence 
the evaluation of priorities and plans (ibid). 
 
Planning in research policy was here already described as a way to control development while 
remaining open to new ideas and new ways of looking at the future, much as foresight has been 
promoted as a way to consider new ideas and influence research priorities. However, „new 
systems and new thoughts‟ were not related to the inclusion of stakeholders from outside the 
                                                 
34
 Title in Norwegian: „Norsk Forskningsråd og kunnskapsmakt‟, translated by the author.  
35
 According to Asdal (2002, 114) the introduction of long-term programmes was the result of cooperation 
between the NTNF and Professor Brian Quinn at Dartmouth College in the USA. 
36
 See also Asdal, Borch and Moser (2008) on political technologies, Chapter 1, subchapter 1.3. 
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research council‟s planning context. Thus Asdal asks: „Who was to write their priorities into this 
planning technology? Which priorities should come first? And who was to gather all the different 
parts of planning into one whole? The new long-term planning approach in the NTNF was to 
ensure that research would concentrate on the areas and questions which are the most important 
for our national goals‟ (ibid, 115). These national goals were not, however, to be decided by the 
NTNF itself but by representatives of organisations „which first and foremost work on these 
questions‟. Public authorities and industrial organisations were considered the „relevant and 
competent agencies to evaluate and prioritise the profile and research areas of the NTNF‟. Asdal 
argues that public authorities and industrial organisations became „the national interest‟ in a 
concrete way. She continues: „Therefore these organisations were not defined as users with 
special interests – but as representatives of those representing the national interest. The NTNF 
defined itself as the administrator of this national interest‟ (ibid).  
It is against this background of early long-term planning in the NTNF as one of the precursors 
of today‟s Research Council of Norway that the question of foresight as a new political 
technology becomes interesting. Apparently several characteristics of foresight were already in 
demand in the approach to long-term research policy planning in the early 1970s, such as being 
open to new thoughts and ensuring flexibility „in the system‟. Involving „relevant and competent 
agencies‟ meant in practice that public authorities and industrial institutions were the main 
parties considered interested in research policy development. Applying foresight some thirty 
years later these authorities and organisations became individualised by inviting individual 
representatives of these parties to participatory foresight workshops. How these individual 
representatives were formed into participants in the foresight project will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
 In 1993, several mergers of formally separate research councils and innovation actors led to a 
new „innovation infrastructure‟ in Norway (Arnold et al. 2001, 17). „The five existing research 
councils were merged with the Norwegian National Committee for Environmental Research to 
form the RCN‟ (ibid). Since its establishment the RCN has had three main tasks. It functions as 
an advisory body on research policy to the Norwegian government; it funds and evaluates 
research and innovation; and it is responsible for providing forums for all kinds of research 
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actors to meet.37 The RCN‟s responsibility for research and innovation policy is much broader 
than that of most other European research councils (Dannemand Andersen et al. 2007, 34). On its 
website dedicated to providing policy and strategy information the Research Council describes 
its role in the following way: 
In its role as an advisory body on research policy issues, a central task of the 
Research Council is to initiate and prepare strategic plans and policy 
documents for individual disciplines, subject areas and research topics. Such 
documents may be drawn up to stipulate specific research-policy priorities, or 
may be formulated in response to an evaluation of the relevant research 
community.38 
 
In this sense, the central task of the RCN is to produce directives for research policy. The 
texts of these directives are already future-oriented, and rather than defining the future of the 
Research Council as an organisation, they influence the future of universities and research 
institutes, research centres and R&D departments of private businesses. The main activity of the 
RCN as an organisation is thus to produce policy and strategy documents which open and shape 
the future for research areas deemed to be of national importance. In this respect it becomes 
interesting to study how collectively produced scenarios interact or even possibly intervene in 
the ongoing production of conventional policy documents. 
 
2.2 Expectations about organisational renewal 
The Technopolis evaluation (Arnold et al. 2001) had pointed to the specific strategic role of 
the RCN not only as an administrative but also as a political actor regarding research strategy. 
The Research Council was instructed by the government to develop and use new and more 
inclusive organisational work processes (Dietz and Forfang 2003, 4). In Chapter 1 I introduced 
five features of foresight that distinguish it from other policy tools and which I see as important 
in a discussion of foresight practice. These features also became relevant in the official 
documents, online presentations and interviews published by the RCN which expressed the 
expectations about the foresight project before its initiation.  
                                                 
37
 The Research Council‟s present role as policy-maker is described on the European Commission‟s information 
website on Norway‟s national and regional research system, Erawatch (2009).  
38
 RCN (2009a). 
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The main objective of the CREATE project was „to strengthen the quality of long-term 
strategic priorities in the RCN‟s areas of activity, in order to achieve enabling preconditions for 
future-oriented, broadly embedded research and innovation policies‟.39 The scenarios created in 
the five projects were to provide ideas both „new and of interest to the RCN‟ (RCN 2006a) and 
thus constituted the forward-looking element of the foresight project which eventually could 
increase the quality of long-term research priorities. This emphasis on increased quality of long-
term research priorities illustrates the recent „strategic turn‟ (Borup et al. 2006, 286) discernable 
in the development of explicit research and innovation policies as well as in funding structures in 
many countries. 
Achieving „enabling preconditions‟ could be seen as the forward-acting part of the foresight 
exercise. These preconditions could take many forms in the foresight project and beyond. They 
could be new networks between research actors and institutions, as well as new possibilities for 
research activities arising from foresight and follow-up activities. Enabling preconditions might 
finally lead to „future-oriented, broadly embedded research‟ as the final goal to be achieved. At 
the same time, reaching this goal would also imply a number of decisions to be made in the 
course of this process, especially about which strategic priorities would be considered of interest 
by the RCN. 
The second objective was to „develop a national platform for competency exchange regarding 
foresight and thus to enable Norwegian research institutions and scientific communities to use 
foresight tools‟ (Fagerheim 2003, 54). Here the role of foresight as involving specific 
competence and knowledge about how to approach the future was highlighted. The RCN 
concluded that part of its responsibility was to develop and distribute this specific competency by 
creating a national platform. Foresight was defined as a specific area of expertise highly relevant 
to future-oriented activities in research and scientific communities. 
The RCN described the CREATE project in the following way on its website: 
The objective of the CREATE project – „foresight and dialogue about priorities 
in research and innovation policy‟ – is to identify possibilities for introducing 
                                                 
39
 Fagerheim (2003, 54), translated from Norwegian by the author. According to Dietz and Forfang (2003, 7) 
strengthening the quality of priorities in the RCN involved: „a) more systematic future orientation, including a more 
long-term planning perspective, b) a more consistent use of new and interdisciplinary perspectives, c) inclusion of 
the European perspective, d) broader participation of external actors in strategy and budget processes, as well as e) a 
stronger orientation towards integrated thinking and consensus‟. 
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foresight analyses to detect bold and interesting strategic priorities in both 
thematic core areas and other areas the Research Council considers to be of 
crucial interest.
40
  
 
The description was cautious – proposing to „identify possibilities for introducing foresight 
analyses‟ rather than simply introducing foresight – suggesting an awareness of the 
organisational and political implications but also of the systematic and scientifically-oriented 
approach of the RCN‟s target audience (hence the choice of the word „analyses‟). Foresight was 
also to help „detect bold and interesting strategic priorities‟, implying that previously 
undiscovered strategic priorities of crucial interest for the organisation might exist. In other 
words, the description of the CREATE project implied that systematic foresight analyses might 
also result in unexpected effects, thus testifying to a certain fascination with the concept of 
foresight on the part of RCN. 
An internal document discussing the possible uses of foresight and scenario-based strategic 
development in the RCN stated that foresight was to address questions such as: „How can 
coherent priorities be created in a complex organisation consisting of three large and potentially 
autonomous divisions? How can constantly increasing research grants be justified and their 
usefulness proved? How can the RCN arrive at the right decisions about which new research 
areas to invest in‟ (Dietz and Forfang 2003, 5)? Following these questions the authors proposed 
that the foresight project was not only to map the possibilities for introducing foresight in the 
RCN‟s strategy work but to go „...one step further, by proposing concrete changes in budget and 
strategy processes‟ (ibid, italics added). 
Given the uncertainty about the possible effects of introducing foresight in the RCN, this was 
certainly a daring proposition. Including this objective extended the desired impact of the 
scenario activities from the qualitative side (involving social and organisational values) to the 
quantitative side, whereby budget processes determine the level of economic investment and 
(hopefully) return if the research activities are successful. Nevertheless, the aim of the foresight 
project was not to completely revamp the process of long-term planning. Rather the idea was to 
                                                 
40 Fagerheim (2003,7). The original text in Norwegian states: „Formålet med CREATE – Framsyn og dialog om 
prioriteringer i forsknings- og innovasjonspolitikken er å klarlegge mulighetene for å introdusere foresightanalyser i 
arbeidet med å finne fram til spenstige og interessante strategiske prioriteringer innenfor både tematiske 
satsningsområder og andre områder som Forskningsrådet finner vesentlig‟ (italics added). 
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change specific aspects of the RCN‟s work. As RCN employee Jan Dietz and business leader 
Helge Forfang (2003, 17) argued, the need for „more systematic investment in future methods is 
obvious‟, otherwise „there would be a risk of continuing to use traditional routines in the 
planning of large-scale programmes and long-term budgets. The strategic challenges related to 
these two instruments demand in our view a renewal of the planning processes‟. Foresight was 
thus seen as a new approach to the future which could potentially be more systematic than 
existing planning procedures. 
The authors underlined that there were important national issues connected to the strategy 
processes in the RCN. Norway needed to invest in innovation and a knowledge-intensive private 
sector to develop sustainable industries from which to obtain revenues once oil and gas resources 
were exhausted. The biggest challenge of developing large-scale programmes was how to make 
the right decisions about which new research areas the RCN should invest in. However, as the 
authors concluded, one should not overlook the problems related to introducing scenario-based 
strategy development in an organisation (ibid, 33): 
People who are in the process of change prefer established ways of thinking. 
The belief in what exists is stronger than the capacity to imagine the unknown. 
[...] On the other hand, if the method is successful, there is a danger that 
scenarios will be taken too literally. The subject-specific and method-related 
uncertainty might be overlooked, just because of the rhetorical power of 
scenarios. 
 
 
This quotation illustrates the difficulty of evaluating scenarios that emerge as a result of 
exploring future uncertainties. While a successful application of the method could lead to 
influential and convincing future scenarios, these scenarios could exude a rhetorical power which 
might take on its own dynamic. Instead of illustrating possible futures they might be understood 
as predicting the future. This could lead either to devaluating the scenarios or to giving them too 
much influence in a balanced approach to long-term planning. Therefore the foresight method 
needed to be applied from a pragmatic, non-exclusive perspective: 
We propose an open, flexible approach which does not exclude other planning 
tools. Using scenarios to organise large-scale programmes and a long-term 
budget will provide us with experience to build on (ibid). 
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This perspective recalls the calls for flexibility and openness to new ideas of those who 
introduced long-term planning in the NTNF back in the 1970s. The authors of the internal 
discussion paper could in 2003 only express hope and a good deal of uncertainty about the 
potential influence of foresight on research priority-setting in their organisation. Ultimately the 
effects of foresight would have to be evaluated and measured in terms of whether they had 
helped more „strategically prudent decisions‟ to be made about the future (Borup et al. 2006, 
296). Expectations of an improvement in the quality of research priority-setting were thus linked 
to changes in ways of working in the RCN with the aim of putting it on a par with other 
international funding authorities in the field of research policy. 
Although all five foresight projects used scenario development as their common method, the 
approach was organised slightly differently in each case. The term „foresight‟ was chosen to 
cover the varying approaches to scenario development in different projects under one collective 
heading.41 The general approach was explained in the self-evaluation report published by the 
RCN‟s project group (RCN 2006a, 19) and was outlined as follows:  
 Discuss actors and factors which will influence the sector over the next 
twenty years 
 Develop images/visions („mini-scenarios‟) about what will happen and 
how actors and factors will influence developments over the next twenty 
years 
 Develop larger scenarios based on these mini-scenarios 
 Prepare contributions for strategic recommendations  
 
The step-by-step approach to be used in all five foresight projects shows how foresight was to 
be applied as a system of similar activities that allowed the separate projects to be compared. 
This was an explicit objective of the CREATE project: the organisers of the five foresight 
projects were meant to learn from each other‟s implementation and interpretation of the general 
approach. Thus the organisational expectations about foresight within the RCN  embraced 
systematic application, specific competence about how to approach the future, being forward 
looking and forward acting and dealing with unexpected effects. The dynamics between social 
                                                 
41 The foresight project on ICT which I studied used the concept of „driving forces‟ instead of actors and factors, 
and aimed to develop scenario models and drafts instead of mini-scenarios. The driving forces were defined as 
social, technological, political, economic and environmental factors that might have an impact on the issue 
considered. I will discuss the concept of driving forces in detail in Chapter 4.   
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concerns and technological possibilities were expressed in the expectations about the creation of 
specific knowledge in the foresight project which I will present in the following. 
 
2.3 Expectations about knowledge production 
The preceding section outlined the main organisational reasons for introducing foresight in 
the RCN. However, to give a sufficient picture of the context in which the foresight project was 
conducted we must also highlight the perspectives and expectations related to the international 
policy debates on so-called „key‟, „generic‟ or „future‟ technologies. Besides organisational 
values, such as enabling dialogue and providing insight, the foresight project was also to 
generate values more closely linked with potential future research on generic technologies. Three 
core technologies had been earmarked as the most important areas of investment for future 
research: ICT, biotechnology and nanotechnology (RCN 2006a). The three foresight projects 
focusing on these areas were to deliver outcomes that would illustrate the assumed future 
importance of these particular technologies. Expectations about the CREATE project were based 
on a shared belief in the value of research on these key technologies: 
There is a broad consensus among Norwegian politicians that we have to invest 
more in innovation and a knowledge-intensive private sector, to develop 
industries on which Norway can live once oil and gas resources have been 
exhausted... There is also a consensus that research funding must be intensified 
to ensure Norway reaches the average OECD level by 2005. Despite some 
progress Norway still comes last among the Nordic countries.42 
 
In a February 2004 interview the then newly appointed director of the Department for Future 
Technologies, which is part of the Division for Strategic Priorities at the RCN, declared that the 
time was ripe to invest in generic technologies that would have important and long-term effects 
on many areas and influence society‟s development in general (RCN 2004a). She declared that 
the EU commission had already identified ICT and biotechnology in 1994 as the two most 
important future technologies and that accelerating international advancements in these areas (as 
well as nanotechnology) would force the RCN to assess Norwegian competence in these fields. 
                                                 
42
 Dietz and Forfang (2003, 4–5). This argument for engaging with foresight in Norwegian research policy is 
characteristic of a widely held perspective on why Norway needs to invest more in innovation and a knowledge-
intensive private sector. However, not all policy makers agree with this view, especially because Norway has 
successfully used innovation advantages in the marine sector. 
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Accordingly, she said, the aim of the foresight exercises led by project groups consisting of 
respected national and international experts in these fields should be to provide the RCN with the 
requisite information to decide how Norway should prioritise research in these fields.  
„Our objective is to produce an optimal knowledge base for our users, Norwegian research 
policy and society‟s needs,‟ she said. Each of the foresight projects was to produce strategic 
recommendations to be used to develop the RCN‟s strategies for each technology. 43 These 
strategic recommendations would be central to the RCN‟s priority choices. She underlined that 
the Research Council sought to present a coherent strategy concerning these three areas. 
Therefore the foresight project had to be well embedded in and respected by the organisation and 
by the various programme boards. 
An improved knowledge base for the three core technologies would contribute to enabling 
ministries and authorities to receive qualified advice concerning complex and far-reaching 
questions. This, the director contended, was the main reason why investment in core 
technologies was important now. She explained that the technologies would be evaluated from a 
broad social perspective, since each technology presented enormous possibilities, but also 
difficult dilemmas: 
Advancement should contribute to desired developments and avoid undesirable 
ones. Knowledge is decisive, so we have a big responsibility to gather 
knowledge so as to be able to influence events in the desired direction. For this 
reason we must develop knowledge communities within those areas; anything 
else would be neglecting our obligations (ibid). 
 
 
The collection of knowledge therefore constituted a major value domain within the foresight 
project.44 The director of the future technologies department evaluated foresight as an important 
framework for all three forthcoming key technology projects and specifically underlined two 
aspects of foresight that could improve knowledge production: 1) Participation – as an „exciting 
possibility to involve the RCN‟s environment in a meaningful way‟; and 2) Method – described 
as „interesting possibilities to explore future uncertainty with the help of new creative 
techniques‟ (ibid).  
                                                 
43
 Treimo (2007, 152–3) argues that a focus on specific research areas and key technologies was nothing new in 
2000. Already in 1986-87 Norwegian research policy showed an increased investment in information technology, 
biotechnology, material technology, off shore technology and marine industry. 
44
 For a discussion of knowledge in foresight see Guimaraes Pereira, Von Schomberg and Funtowicz (2007). 
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If we compare these two perspectives on the foresight project, the organisational and the 
knowledge-related, it becomes clear that RCN employees‟ expectations about the results of the 
project differed, particularly in their view of the concrete and less definable values regarding the 
context of the RCN‟s national responsibility. As the director of the future technologies 
department underlined, the foresight project was seen as a new way of delivering useful 
knowledge to influence technological development. Useful knowledge was „decisive‟ and thus 
given a concrete value in the future development of key technologies. The foresight project was 
hence expected to deliver that kind of knowledge. Seen from the perspective of strategy and 
decision-making, the departmental director expected concrete value from the project in the form 
of knowledge, which, in turn, could improve technological development strategies, address key 
technologies and map out a „desired direction‟. The director thus expressed expectations about 
quantifiable results, expecting systematic analyses from the project to result in economically 
valuable knowledge. 
The second perspective, expressed by the senior advisor centrally involved in the foresight 
project on ICT, was less definite about the delivery of concrete output. Nonetheless, his 
expectations were comprehensive. Although, as he argued, the foresight project could not 
address the question of higher quality in research, it could deliver scenarios about possible 
futures in different socio-cultural settings contributing to higher quality of research priorities. 
This implied a more comprehensive strategic role for the foresight project. The senior advisor 
expressed expectations about qualifiable results, expecting a synergy of different, method-
related factors, contributing to a renewal of long-term planning processes in the RCN.  
Amid all the uncertainty expressed in the run-up to the foresight projects, one thing was 
established as absolutely certain – namely, the future importance of the potential of technologies 
already defined as key, generic or strategic.45 Thus the foresight project about future key 
technologies was based on a certainty narrative that assumed the „inevitability of the 
development of particular technologies‟ (Brown et al. 2000, 4). This underlying certainty 
informed both organisational and knowledge-related expectations.  
                                                 
45
 For a critique of using foresight in these fields see Loveridge (2009, 7). 
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2.4 The background to this study 
In the second part of this chapter I will present the background to this study, methodological 
questions and the approach I used to research foresight in practice. I will concentrate on two 
methodical issues: 1) my approach to studying the process of scenario development conducted in 
the foresight project, and 2) the selection of specific events in the process, called „collecting 
ethnographic moments‟. My methodological starting point was, rather than approaching foresight 
thematically, to engage with both the „processual‟ and the „momentary‟ in the foresight project 
on ICT. I wanted to pay attention to how scenarios are created but also to how certain moments 
in this process are indicative of competing accounts and contested values.  
My interest in narratives about the future dates back to my earliest university study of 
language and literature, psychology and education. I later resumed my engagement with literary 
texts when I wrote a master‟s thesis on science fiction (Jenssen 1996). I was inspired by science 
fiction texts that estrange their readers from our comfortable temporal and spatial system of 
coordinates, combining spatial and temporal displacement with social, historical, technological 
and linguistic alienation. Science fiction challenges our ideas about human existence and can be 
„a laboratory for exploring alternative futures‟ (Rose 2000, 157). In science fiction literature and 
film the future becomes a vehicle for displacement, or a trading zone for ideas. It is not an object 
of negotiation. It is a place where stranger things can happen, such as „The door dilated‟.46 
This kind of ordering common signifiers into unusual combinations heightens the reader‟s 
sense of a different reality and a different materiality. According to writer, critic and theorist 
Samuel R. Delany, the linguistic distortion used in science fiction is „neither allegorical nor 
satirical in its essence‟, but the result of „random combination and orderly recomplication‟.47 The 
literary openness of the future, while sometimes estranging, also reflects upon and refers to our 
existing reality. Studies of science fiction literature provided me with the necessary curiosity 
about how the future is created in „real life‟ settings, in non-fictional co-constructions of texts 
                                                 
46
 Parrinder (1979). Non-human and otherworldly creatures such as androids, aliens, immortals, virtual reality 
riders and cyborgs present in themselves linguistic distortions which confront the reader with ideas about the 
possibilities and limitations of human life on this planet. They can be encountered in novels and short stories by 
Philipp K. Dick, Gwyneth Jones, Octavia Butler, Iain M. Banks and Ursula Le Guin, William Gibson, Pat Cadigan 
and Marge Piercy. 
47
 Quoted in Parrinder (1979).  
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which become official documents testifying to the collective negotiation of interests, meaning 
and expectations.48  
When I started my PhD in October of 2003 I had received funding to collaborate on a research 
project headed by SINTEF in cooperation with the Centre for Technology, Innovation and 
Culture (TIK) at the University of Oslo.49 This project investigated user-centred methods for the 
development of public-sector electronic services. The PhD position was part of the project and 
focused on studies of scenario and foresight methods for public-sector development. 50 
Being new to the field of future studies, I made contact with several public and private 
organisations conducting projects using future methods.51 Since I was interested in studying 
collective foresight processes I limited my search for relevant projects to organisations using 
foresight in combination with scenario development. The most interesting results of this first 
inquiry were two different accounts of what futures can mean in an organisational setting. A 
public service institution had used scenarios written by its employees to create a sense of 
community and commonly shared objectives. Here scenarios became tools used to align, at least 
officially, the organisational interests of the employees and „socialise‟ them into a common goal 
and vision.52 I did ethnographic work in this organisation, following the discussion of different 
scenarios in meetings, analysing scenario texts and conducting interviews. This was a valuable 
introduction to the field of foresight in public policy. However, the project was less interesting in 
terms of studying collective processes, since no external participants were invited. A second 
encounter with a private company working in a highly competitive area of telecommunications 
resulted in my contact‟s polite, but firm refusal to let me participate as an observer in their work 
on technological scenarios on the grounds that these needed to be kept secret from the 
competition. I would have been considered an intruder who could potentially pass on information 
about scenarios to outsiders.  
                                                 
48
 The semiotic combinations and ‟recomplications‟ of thought-provoking science fiction literature have much in 
common with the material-semiotic approach of actor-network theory and in a broader sense science and technology 
studies. Haraway (1985, 1997) has created explicit relations between feminist studies of science and (especially 
feminist) science fiction. Latour (2005) talks about the influence of literature on actor-network theory. 
49
 The SINTEF group is the largest independent research organisation in Scandinavia. More information at 
http://www.sintef.no/Home/About-us/ 
50
 See Effin (2002–2007). 
51
 I chose these cases from a comprehensive report on ongoing foresight activities in Norway, Fagerheim (2003). 
52
 On employing foresight to create a sense of commonly shared objectives in an organisation see Bood (2002). 
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These two examples highlight approaches to the future that were both different from the case I 
eventually chose to study. In both cases the focus was on internal organisational development, in 
the first instance, to strengthen the organisation itself, in the second to develop high-tech 
products which could compete on the market. The texts eventually produced by these collective 
processes aimed in the first case to shape organisational consensus and in the second case to 
present innovative technological ideas. As the second example illustrates, texts about the future 
can be highly volatile, contested objects, involving profitable and therefore competitive ideas. 
The foresight project I studied in the Research Council of Norway differs from these examples in 
two important ways: Firstly, the foresight project was designed to be participatory, inviting 
outside researchers and industry representatives not associated with the Research Council; 
secondly, the development of scenarios was meant to create alternative stories about the future of 
ICT research rather than marketable technology. 
 
2.5 Fieldwork practice in the RCN 
My thesis is based on an ethnographic study of foresight practice within a research funding 
institution, including non-participatory observations, interviews and document analysis. While 
doing fieldwork I was not involved in day-to-day operations at the Research Council over a 
longer period, as is often the case in ethnographic studies.53  Usually the researcher takes part in 
the daily activities, rituals, interactions and events of a group of people as a means of learning 
the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture (De Walt and De Walt, 2001, 
1). Yet I wanted to study a foresight project, and not the RCN as an organisation. The foresight 
project CREATE started in 2002 and was officially concluded in 2005 (RCN 2005a). I 
conducted fieldwork at the RCN between early November 2003 and late October 2004. When I 
made contact with those at the RCN responsible for the foresight project CREATE in the autumn 
of 2003, the project had already completed the phases of design and recruitment (Popper 2008, 
45). I was invited to observe the participatory workshops dedicated to the different future 
research areas.  
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 For ethnographic studies of organisations over a longer period of time see for example Law (1994). 
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My original research plan had been to conduct a comparative study of foresight activities in 
different projects under the umbrella of the CREATE project. First I took part in the workshops 
on the marine industry, which took place between November 2003 and April 2004.54 Here I 
followed the four participatory workshops, involving forty-five external participants from 
universities, research institutes and various business areas related to aquaculture and the marine 
industry. Although I was able to collect a considerable amount of material during these 
observations, I did not follow up the writing work on the different scenarios in between 
workshops. The reasons for this were threefold: First, at that stage I did not realise that the 
meetings in between those participatory events were crucial to the development of scenarios at 
the workshops. Second, I was not sure whether after only a few meetings before the actual 
workshops my presence in the internal meetings was justified. Third, this being my very first 
meeting with foresight in a research policy and key technology context, my attention was 
focussed on understanding what was going on during the participatory workshops.  
The remaining four foresight projects were conducted almost simultaneously during the 
autumn of 2004. While I had followed the foresight project on biotechnology during the major 
part of the scenario development phase, the biotechnology foresight workshops eventually 
coincided with the workshops on ICT foresight, making it impossible for me to follow both. 55 
Since my most recent professional background was in the field of ICT I decided to focus on the 
ICT project conducted between September and November 2004.56  
This time I asked to attend the meetings between the participatory workshops in which the 
scenario ideas were transformed into narratives. It was while attending these meetings on writing 
scenarios that I decided to conduct a single case study of the foresight project on ICT, because I 
realised that observing the coordinating activities involved in writing scenarios offered richer 
material for an analysis of foresight practice than just following the participatory workshops. 
Thus this time I managed to gain a better idea of developments than in the foresight project on 
marine industry, even though there were a few meetings that I did not ask to be invited to. The 
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 For an account of the foresight project on aquaculture (marine industry) see RCN (2005c). 
55
 This has been highlighted as a problem of capacity and resources in the RCN in the internal report on foresight 
initiatives (RCN, 2006a, 18). Since foresight had just been introduced in the RCN there was not enough experience 
when these projects started simultaneously to predict the amount of work the chosen scenario method would demand 
from those involved. 
56
 I had worked as a senior engineer in educational software management and as an advisor on digital learning 
from 2000 to 2003. 
43 
 
reason for this was that in some cases these meetings involved only two people and I therefore 
felt uncomfortable about being a passive observer at a meeting with only two active discussants. 
This also had to do with coming from an academic background in which studying texts was a 
much more customary way of doing research than „face-to-face interaction‟.57 Sometimes I was 
not informed about meetings at which certain developments took place. Thus I made choices – or 
in some cases the choices were made for me – about when to attend and when not. However, I 
had access to all the written material produced in these meetings and kept in continuous contact 
with the organisers of the project about the discussions which had continued outside the meeting 
rooms. 
My fieldwork is thus situated within the field of „multi-sited ethnography‟.58 The sites 
observed varied between participatory workshops involving 30-40 participants and meetings for 
different purposes and with varying numbers of participants (3-12). The activities ranged from 
collecting scenario ideas to writing scenarios, evaluating them and discussing research strategy 
to developing a new large-scale ICT research programme.59 My observations were conducted on 
an individual basis.60 Especially during the workshops involving 30–40 people my observations 
necessarily became limited to the different groups I focused on consecutively. The method of 
non-participatory observation (Wadel 1991, 48) allowed me to maintain a position as an outsider 
to the process even when observing relatively small groups engaged in discussion. 61 I collected 
the material by continuously recording (in writing) the dialogues and events going on in the 
different settings. Like other researchers interested in following processes, I wrote down almost 
all the conversations, trying to „put as much as possible on paper, uncensored‟.62  
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 On the limitations produced by reducing fieldwork accounts to the importance of face-to-face interactions, see 
Latour (2005, 201–3). 
58
 See Marcus (1995, 95–117) on the notion of „multi-sited ethnography‟ as a research programme for 
ethnographic research into the complexity of modern society. See also Hobbs and Wright (2006) on contemporary 
fieldwork and Hine (2007) on multi-sited ethnography as methodology for STS. 
59
 See appendix 9.1 for an overview of the meetings and workshops I attended. 
60
 I was accompanied to some of the meetings by a Master‟s student. However, I did not use the notes taken by 
the student in my analysis. 
61
 During the first foresight project on marine industry, my position was unclear, oscillating between active 
participation and passive observation. First, I was included as a participant expected to contribute to the process with 
knowledge about science fiction. Only gradually I became a more passive observer based on an increasing mutual 
understanding about the purpose of my study. 
62
 See Thygesen (2009, 61) for a similar approach. Eventually, over 250 pages of written material were reduced 
to 80 addressing the main areas of my study. I used the same approach when following a vision project in a 
Norwegian municipality in 2006, which I originally intended to compare with the ICT project at the RCN. I discuss 
the vision project in Jenssen (2007, 2009, and 2010). 
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I conducted relatively few structured interviews during the process, although I did use coffee 
and lunch breaks to talk to the participants about their views on it. I conducted several in-depth 
interviews with the two RCN employees central to the foresight project on ICT research, who 
either informed the process with a particular perspective or held responsibility as project leader.63 
The interviews conducted a year after the project had been concluded were especially important 
to understand the value of the project in relation to research programme development. At this 
point I was also provided with all the written material concerning meetings in which research 
programme development had been discussed and which I had been unable to attend for personal 
reasons. Thus while observations represent the main analytical material, the interviews and 
written material, such as scenario texts, meeting reports, discussion papers, email exchanges, as 
well as all official documents regarding the CREATE project contributed to a triangulation of the 
research data allowing this study to be characterised as a holistic, qualitative single case study.64  
 
2.6 Process, patterns and ethnographic moments 
The question, however, remains how an in-depth study of a scenario creation process 
conducted over the short time-span of two-and-a-half months can enable the researcher to detect 
important issues in processes? Underlying this question is an uneasy commitment to a reflexive 
perspective on research methods within the STS tradition. Uneasy in the sense that however 
reflexive a researcher attempts to be about her own approach and methods there is always the 
question of whether this approach produces a study that is relevant enough outside the text itself, 
whether the questions and discussions produced by the researcher resonate with a broader 
reality.65  
In an appendix to her dissertation on „Road Traffic Accidents: The Ordering of Subjects, 
Bodies and Disability‟ sociologist and STS scholar Ingunn Moser (2003, 307–308) discusses the 
challenge of ensuring research‟s validity by applying methods and theories to data and 
conclusions: 
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 I also interviewed or had unstructured talks with organisers of the CREATE project not directly involved in 
the foresight project on ICT. These interviews were not, however, used as fieldwork material in this study. 
64
 Beaulieu, Scharnhorst and Wouters (2007) and Flyvbjerg (2006) discuss the validity and limitations of in-
depth or single case study research. 
65
 See, for example, Law‟s (1994, 16–18) discussion of reflexivity as one of the principles of a modest sociology 
developed by Bloor (1974). 
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Method is often treated as a pre-given recipe or formula that prescribes a set of 
techniques and procedures to secure such things as the neutrality of the 
research, a connection between the research questions and the data collected, 
the representativity of the data, and so a correspondence between the data, the 
final account and reality out there.  
 
 
However, she argues: „realities, such as bacteria, illnesses and bodies – are being enacted 
together with our representations of them, and with our instruments and techniques for gaining 
knowledge of them. The realities cannot be separated from our ways of knowing them and our 
representations of them‟ (ibid). From this she concludes that methods and theories are not neutral 
but productive and performative.  
While I think this is an important perspective on research, especially research including 
ethnographic approaches, I also want to highlight that an account of research methods needs to 
deal with the local circumstances under which fieldwork is at all possible. This includes issues 
such as when and how fieldwork is conducted, depending on the project to be studied, and on the 
academic background brought into the research process. Within the work of STS scholars 
committed to reflexivity this does not mean deconstructing one‟s own writing, but rather aims to 
pinpoint some of the uncertainties that accompany any attempt to study collective processes, be 
it in organisational contexts, among social groups or, as in this case, in a participatory project.66  
John Law (1994) in his study of the Daresbury Laboratory provides several reflections on the 
problems of not belonging inside a meeting room at a meeting of top managers (ibid, 145–151) 
and discusses the problem of missing important meetings (ibid, 43–7).67 By pointing at similar 
experiences, my short account of the realities of doing fieldwork presented above is meant to 
show the interdependencies of research interests and approaches with the possibilities and 
practicalities of the local context in which the researcher tries to apply herself. Thus I try to show 
the situated conditions of doing fieldwork rather than presenting my study as linear and without 
limitations.  
How then can the researcher discuss a process meaningfully and develop an analysis of 
specific issues and concerns within a short-term project?  Here I have been inspired by 
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 For earlier discussions of reflexivity in STS see Woolgar (1988). 
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 Law emphasises that the first rule of fieldwork states that the most interesting events always happen where you 
are not. 
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discussions in organisation studies which address the problem of studying process. Management 
scholar Ann Langley (1999) discusses different approaches to process data in social studies of 
organisations and identifies the „detection of patterns in processes‟ (ibid, 692) as one strategy for 
making sense of processes. The detection of patterns in processes is however linked to the 
problem of how to distinguish between different events. Events in process data can be: „a bad 
year, a merger, a decision, a meeting, a conversation, a handshake‟ (ibid, 693). Thus there are 
different themes, different contexts and especially different durations to events. Detecting 
patterns in processes can be especially problematic when the story intends to follow the process, 
as Langley observes: „...simultaneously telling the complete story while setting the plot is a tall 
order‟ (ibid, 697).68 I therefore argue for a different strategy that makes sense of a process not by 
following certain patterns, but by „collecting ethnographic moments‟ (Van‟t Klooster and van 
Asselt 2006). Collecting ethnographic moments is not about setting the plot with the help of 
recurring patterns. It is rather about singling out moments in a process which address the 
emerging issues and concerns.  
Studies of foresight using ethnographic approaches have been conducted by researchers with 
interdisciplinary backgrounds combining science and technology studies (STS), culture studies, 
technology assessment (TA) and policy studies. Two recent ethnographic studies of foresight in 
public policy have been conducted by cultural scientists Elisabeth Dobbinga (2001) and Susan 
Van‟t Klooster (2007). Dobbinga conducted an anthropological study of a scenario process in 
which the researcher was for 2 years part of a scenario project team at the Dutch Ministry of 
Traffic and Water Affairs. Van‟t Klooster investigated the ambitions and practices of foresight 
practitioners at the Netherlands‟ Institute for Spatial Research.69 These fieldwork studies differ 
from mine in the sense that they were conducted over a longer period of time. My approach 
corresponds to some extent to foresight and risk scholar Marjolein Van Asselt and van‟t 
Klooster‟s (2006, 16) who describe their ethnographic study as „following a group of 
professional futurists involved in a qualitative scenario project‟: 
It is possible to observe a foresight culture full time for a long period, see for 
example the ethnographic research of Dobbinga [...] However, instead we have 
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 This focus on patterns resonates with the work of ANT scholars such as Law (1994) and Moser (2003). See for 
example Law (1994, 19) on the relation between stories and patterns. 
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 Both studies are published in Dutch. See also van Notten (2005) and Dobbinga and van Notten (2002) on 
foresight processes and organisational issues. 
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chosen to select ethnographic moments during the project, which provided us 
with […] the opportunity to observe more than one culture of foresight at 
different foresight institutes […]. It also prevented us from „going native‟, i.e. 
the pitfall that the researcher becomes over-socialised and thereby loosing 
„objectivity‟. Ideally, the researcher becomes an insider while remaining an 
outsider. 
 
 
The ethnographic moments I collected were not of established foresight cultures at different 
foresight institutes, but they represent the qualities which, according to social anthropologist 
Kaori O‟Connor (2004), distinguish ethnographic moments: „[These moments] are often 
indicative of dissonance, as between competing accounts, contesting values or problematic social 
changes of some kind‟. In foresight these ethnographic moments are often rendered irrelevant in 
retrospect, since evaluations and foresight reports tend to produce linear accounts (Van Asselt, 
2007). 
The ethnographic moments collected here represent negotiations concerning different, 
sometimes competing perspectives on the value of foresight across groups of actors (organisers, 
participants, decision-makers) within one project who are contributing to, organising and 
evaluating the process. To collect these moments I focused eventually not on the long and topic- 
rich dialogues among participants about possible scenario content but on the negotiations about 
scenario value between individuals or groups with different responsibilities.  
At the same time, the foresight project is also a story of certain orderings that happened 
through the coordination of scenario methods, actors‟ interests, participants‟ perspectives and the 
distribution of responsibility. These orderings followed the prescribed step-by-step approach of 
foresight based on four main events: 1) the discussion of driving forces, 2) developing mini-
scenarios, or scenario models based on driving forces, 3) developing scenarios based on these 
models, and 4) discussing the scenarios related to research strategy.70  
This is the process I followed in my study, which structures the empirical chapters of this 
thesis: four different stages of scenario production ordered by following a specific approach, 
with each stage characterised by a specific method, association of actors and underlying frames 
of reference. In this respect every situation in the creation process was different from the 
preceding one. This underlines my argument favouring an approach based on collecting 
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 See the description of the foresight project CREATE at the RCN in this chapter, subchapter 2.2 (RCN 2006a). 
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ethnographic moments, rather than detecting and imputing patterns.71 My activities as observer 
were shaped by what I encountered during observations and what I gradually became aware of. 
While at the beginning each encounter could potentially become an ethnographic moment to be 
collected and selected to be re-presented, I started increasingly to focus on ethnographic 
moments related to participation and relevance as well as the emerging issues uncertainty, 
responsibility and value. 72   
My approach thus resonates with Langley‟s (1999) suggestion to use a narrative strategy in 
the descriptions of processes.73 As Langley argues, „because of its focus on contextual detail, this 
approach works best for one or a few cases‟ (ibid, 695). Also, „this sensemaking strategy has the 
great advantage of reproducing in all its subtlety the ambiguity that exists in the situations 
observed‟(ibid). However, accurate representations have to be pushed beyond authenticity to 
„make readers feel that they learned something of wider value‟ (ibid, 697). 
Her final remark addresses the validity of single case studies. There has been much debate 
about the value of single case studies, summed up by for example Flyvbjerg (2006) and Beaulieu 
et al. (2007). In contrast to Langley (1999) who argues that narratives need to push beyond 
authenticity to obtain „wider value‟, economic geographer and urban planner Bent Flyvbjerg 
(2006, 239) warns about erasing „phenomenological detail in favour of conceptual closure‟. In 
his view, good case narratives have an „irreducible quality‟ and „narrative inquiries do not–
indeed, cannot–start from explicit theoretical assumptions. Instead, they begin with an interest in 
a particular phenomenon that is best understood narratively‟ (ibid, 240). Seeing value in both 
arguments, my approach has been to meet fieldwork with (almost no) preconceptions except for 
my background in science fiction and science and technology studies. When conducting 
fieldwork and writing the thesis, issues began to take shape and theories could be tested as to 
                                                 
71 Ordering a process is related to the concept of „modes of orderings‟ developed by Law (1994, 95ff). I do not 
use this concept in my thesis, however, since it belongs to a different level of analysis which I do not address here. 
Modes of ordering address thematic issues, like for example the normalisation of the subject (Moser 2003). My 
approach is processual, following the creation of scenarios while highlighting ethnographic moments. 
72 As ethno-methodologist Garfinkel (1967, 77–78) wrote: „…the investigator […] does not and cannot „know‟ 
what he is doing prior to or while he is doing it‟ (quoted in Law 1994, 49). According to ethnographers Hilden and 
Middlethon (2002, 2474) ethnographic research is holistic in the sense that „human experiences are meaningful in 
systematic, although not necessarily coherent ways‟ (quoted in Thygesen 2009, 57). 
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 Langley develops seven strategies for sensemaking as blueprints for theorising from process data. She draws 
on Thorngate‟s (1976) and Weick‟s (1979) categories of accuracy, generality and simplicity as points of reference 
for each strategy. 
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whether they could provide a certain conceptual understanding of the case. In this respect I have 
tried to avoid conceptual closure while at the same time following my analytical interest in the 
dynamics between opening and shaping the future with the help of foresight. In writing this text, 
I re-enact the foresight project on ICT research once more, several years after its completion, and 
by presenting it in the chosen context I hope to make my study relevant both within the field of 
foresight and within STS investigations of collective agency.  
Yet this thesis does not attempt to describe the complete socio-material reality observed. At 
times it will appear overpopulated by humans and dialogues. However, in arguing that foresight 
and scenario development belong to a range of political technologies I place the emphasis on 
interactions between people, texts, and „ways of knowing the future‟ (Fuller and de Smedt 2008) 
as not only social, but also socio-technical and material-semiotic interaction.74 Or as sociologist, 
STS scholar and foresight researcher Cynthia Lea Horn75 (2000, 4) argues:  
The „new‟ economy‟s raw materials are [...] ideas, intelligences, intangible 
skills and tacit knowledges. Perceptual technologies, such as scenario planning 
emerge to order, build, construct, filter, categorize and interpret such raw 
materials. […] These new technologies, like industrial age technologies, are not 
innocent, which is to say that they cannot be understood stripped from their 
context or solely in terms of their use.  
 
In this respect it is even more important to frame these processes as materially heterogeneous 
and as collective, not only including people, but also texts, methods, models, and routines.
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 Material-semiotic includes not only humans, non-humans and technical artifacts (material), but also „ideas, 
organisations, inequalities, scale and sizes‟(Law 2007, 2), in other words concepts (semiotic). 
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 Now Cynthia Selin. See, for example, Selin (2008). 
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3 VALUE, CONVENTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS 
This thesis is based on research using an ethnographic, non-participant observational approach 
informed by theoretical work. The latter, in turn, inspired and shaped a specific understanding of 
the foresight project on the future of ICT research and the ethnographic moments collected while 
observing the project. In the following I would like to discuss in more depth the theoretical 
approach of this thesis outlined in Chapter 1 and highlight the relevance of the concepts 
employed in Chapters 4–7 to studying foresight in the making.  
Studying foresight in research policy allows new insights into the governance of public 
funding resources in science and technology. As discussed in Chapter 2, research policy on ICT 
is based on a prevailing certainty about the future importance of specific information and 
communication technologies. This raises questions about the relationship between society and 
technology at large. Science and technology studies have contributed to this discussion by 
establishing science and technology not as „privileged forms of rationality outside of or 
transcending the social‟ but as „social practices that are shaped by and entangled with the 
complexities that make up our societies‟ (Thygesen 2009, 20). Thus science and technology are 
„inseparable parts of a tightly woven web of social, political, economic, legal and ethical 
relations‟ (ibid). Neither society nor technology dominates this relationship. Socio-technical 
change is at the same time conditioned and coincidental, in other words contingent. 
In the following I will introduce the sociology of expectations, which has explored the role of 
future orientation in this contingent socio-technical change. I will raise specific issues emerging 
from the sociology of expectations that informed my understanding of the case study I 
conducted. I will then go on to relate value, uncertainty and coordination to my study of foresight 
in practice. Finally, I will explain how convention theory informed my study and how I use the 
concept of non-calculation to describe coordinating activities in foresight.  
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3.1 The sociology of expectations 
As Brown et al. (2005, 2) argue, the sociology of expectations is related and associated with 
STS in its constructivist approach, which considers expectations as constitutive in „defining 
roles, attracting interest and building mutually binding obligations‟, particularly in the early 
stages of innovation. Thus expectations are not considered as separate from technological 
development but must be studied in terms of how they take on substance in „texts, actions, 
bodies, material, objects and machines‟ (Borup et al. 2006, 292). 
This is a rather different take on expectations from that to be found in earlier work, 
specifically in the economic literature of the 1960s. According to Brown et al. (2005, 3) a „realist 
line or distinction‟ was drawn „between people‟s expectations on the one hand and the “real” 
underlying fundamentals or worth of something on the other‟. In the sociology of expectations 
which underlines the collective, heterogeneous emergence of socio-technical change, 
expectations are „constitutive of value‟, that is „ we cannot differentiate between our expectations 
of things (biotechnologies, stem cells, nanotechnologies, etc) and what in reality those things in 
fact are, both in the present and in the future ... [Value] cannot be calculated independently from 
our expectations‟(ibid). 
Expectations thus play a distinctive role in the evaluation and calculation of future 
possibilities and values. These expectations can, if played out in an advantageous context, 
become social, technical and cultural reality. In his studies on cord blood banking sociologist and 
STS scholar Nik Brown (2005, Brown and Kraft 2006) has identified expectations relating to 
stem cells and genetics. Concerned with unstable future technologies, Brown‟s studies of bodies, 
medicine and biotechnology have brought the future dimension into STS work on values and 
ethics.
76
 Rather than attaching any essential materiality to future expectations and imaginations, 
he has highlighted a shift in thinking about scientific possibilities from present facts to future 
values. Brown describes future values such as healthy children and presently unknown cures for 
deadly diseases as „regimes of hope‟, which have both economic and emotional dimensions. He 
argues that these regimes of hope emerge in biotechnical innovations increasingly driven by a 
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 STS scholars‟ interest in the place of values, especially in the area of health and ethics, has increased over the 
last decade (Squier 1996, Mol 2002, Moser 2003, Law 2004b, Thygesen 2009). 
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„language drawn from values and aesthetics with its connections to desire, longing, the 
imagination and authenticity‟ (2005, 7).  
Expectations can thus drive technical and scientific activities and form regimes of hope, but 
they are also important for actors other than scientists and engineers. According to Borup et al. 
(2006, 286) they play „a central role in mobilising resources on the macro-level, for example in 
national policy through regulation and research patronage‟. Borup et al. connect this role of 
expectations to the „strategic turn‟ in science and technology, arguing that „technological and 
scientific investment has increasingly been tied to strategic rather than say serendipitous 
innovation‟. This strategic turn is visible in the development of „explicit research and innovation 
policies and in changes in research and education systems and their funding structures‟ (ibid).  
The RCN‟s expectations about the future importance of key technologies can be seen as such 
a mobilising effect, which provided an open space for activities within the foresight project. 
Expectations about „increased quality in research priorities‟ were an important argument used by 
RCN officials to justify starting a foresight project in key technology areas. 
Within this particular area of sociological research expectations are thus seen as drivers of 
technical and scientific activities, because of their connection with future values, and as 
mobilisers of resources in strategy and policy-making. Borup et al. argue that „analysing the 
dynamics of expectations is a key element in understanding scientific and technological change‟ 
(2006, 287). Studies have shown the „decisive role of expectations in establishing new scientific 
and technological fields‟ as diverse as membrane technology, gene therapy or nanotechnology 
(ibid) and they are hence defined as prominent factors in promising areas of science, technology 
and innovation (Deuten and Rip 2000, Borup et al. 2006, Selin 2008). 
 
3.2 Expectations, materiality and obduracy 
Besides the explicit connection between expectations and scientific and technological 
development, several scholars have studied the material production of the future substantiated 
„on paper, verbally, on the screen, or pictorially‟ (Michael 2000, Deuten and Rip 2000). Verbal 
and textual representations of a non-existent future emerge in an „unstable field of language, 
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practice and materiality‟ in which the uncertainty and complexity of the future provide rhetorical 
spaces for all kinds of actors (Brown et al. 2000, 5). 
STS scholar and sociologist Mike Michael (2000, 33–35) draws on various perspectives, 
including those of mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1964) and Latour 
(1999), when he shifts the focus from representations of the future to the textualisation of 
futures. This approach emphasises studying the process of producing future texts as a necessary 
precondition for analysing their resulting rhetoric and material effects. In this respect my study 
of the creation of future scenarios in a foresight project follows a specific textualisation of the 
future. My concern, therefore, is not just with the „paper, screen, image‟ materiality of a text, but 
also with the various other materialities, such as approaches, methods, participation, coordination 
and organisational context which lead to its creation.  
Expectations as textualisations of the future and as drivers and mediators in scientific and 
technological development have become analytical objects and are related to a multitude of 
technological and scientific contexts. As such, they affect and are affected by developments in 
the context they are located in. This agency-determined perspective on expectations, however, 
means that the sociology of expectations rarely deals with the organisational setting of public 
institutions, distributed responsibility and the resistance and obduracy of administrative and 
political structures in public organisations.77  
Social scientist Barbara Adam (2005) has highlighted some of the problems connected with 
agency and materiality in the sociology of expectations in her work on the sociology of the 
future.
78
 She argues that the contemporary approach to expectations is „cast in the active mode, 
as performing the future by mobilising it into the present, in the hope of facilitating its 
materialisation‟ (2005, 3). This can be contrasted with earlier work (Kern 1983, 89–90) which 
distinguished between an active, performative mode in which „the individual goes towards the 
future, driving into the surroundings in control of events‟ and expectations cast in the passive 
mode in which „the future comes towards the individual‟(ibid). This latter mode of relating to the 
future is rarely voiced in the sociology of expectations, which singles out the active, 
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relation to health and ethical issues. See Brown and Kraft (2006) and Koch (2006). On resistance in administrative 
and political organisations in STS see Law (2003b) and Barry (2002). 
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performative mode of expectations. Studying foresight practice in policy-making rather than in 
scientific and technological innovation must therefore be accompanied by a heightened 
sensitivity to passive modes of expectation about the future. This involves the question of how 
people relate to the future in the context of organisational identities and how individuals follow 
rules and procedures (Sanz-Menéndez and Cabello 2000).  
This underlines the importance not only of studying the agency-determined construction of 
futures, but of highlighting the less visible and under-researched areas of organisational routines 
and social conventions in future orientation. Thus the main difference between my discussion 
and analyses of the technological and scientific futures within the sociology of expectations is 
my focus on future orientation as an expression of policy-making rather than of negotiating 
specific technological developments. Michael (2000, 22) highlights this difference by arguing 
that in technological innovation the future is produced, while in policy-making the future gets 
organised. I argue that foresight practice in research policy and programme development is 
tightly linked to everyday organisational issues and the established politics of public research 
funding, in other words, the ongoing coordination and organisation of the future. By studying 
value, uncertainty and responsibility I want to draw in this interdependence between 
organisational procedures and future expectations. This is further explained in my choice of 
perspective informed by convention theory, which I will discuss below. 
 
3.3 From values to evaluation 
To follow these interests I sought inspiration in scholarship that discusses the relationship 
between the social and the technological from perspectives on economic value and social values 
as well as evaluation and conventions. Before I present this scholarship, however, I will outline 
my approach to values more broadly. Here I draw specifically on sociologist Pjotr Sztompka 
(2007) and his discussion of the relationship between facts and values throughout the history of 
sociology. 
Sztompka argues that sociology has only recently readdressed values as an „integral, 
legitimate component‟ of sociological work. During the twentieth century positivism aspired to 
„safeguard the legitimate position‟ of sociology in academic institutions, allowing values only as 
„data of social consciousness disclosed by value surveys and opinion polls, and treating them 
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with descriptive attitude‟ (Sztompka 2007, 247–8). He distinguishes three ways in which values 
have been treated in sociology: a) as a bias, b) as an ideology, and c) as a part of meaning. 
The first position treats values as personal and subjective biases that sociologists have to 
avoid because they interfere in research. They are seen as an obstacle to „objective knowledge‟. 
Here the most important influence is Max Weber‟s famous doctrine of Wertfreiheit, which 
claims that values can be studied in a value-free, scientific mode. Whereas values are important 
for the selection of problems and the shaping of hypotheses, the solving of problems must be 
entirely value-free; a „rigorous distinction between empirical knowledge and value judgments‟ 
must be maintained (Weber 1949, 54). 
Sztompka contrasts this with the perspective on values as ideology. Here values are seen as 
„cognitively beneficial and enlightening collective perspectives‟. Social knowledge is therefore 
always perspectivistic and reflects interests and values, but only certain ideologies can produce 
the best cognitive results (ibid, 249). According to Marx and Engels (1848) and Lukacs (1971), 
true socialists should therefore adopt the perspective of the proletariat. Radical sociology 
emerging during the late 1960s and early 1970s, on the other hand, called for the adoption of 
minority perspectives (Etzkowitz 1989) to enlighten the collective. 
These two opposing views on values as bias or as ideology have several common 
characteristics, which according to Sztompka (2007, 250–1) are based on some underlying 
assumptions about the dichotomy of facts and values and „categorical statements and value 
judgments‟ – for example, the assertion that no facts can ever imply values and no values can 
imply facts
79
 and the belief that the research process should be strictly separated from the subject 
of research. 
Without following the entire argument made by Sztompka, I would like to point out that 
several of his observations about how more recent tendencies in sociology have sought to 
overcome this dichotomy relate to issues in this thesis.
80
 First of all, instead of perceiving society 
as a stable system, recent sociology has turned its focus to individual and collective action as the 
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 Here it is necessary to modify Sztompka‟s argument concerning values as ideology. Socialist realism in 
Eastern Europe before 1989, rather than establishing a dichotomy between values and facts, selected facts to confirm 
the „right‟ values while the proclaimed infallibility of ideology-based values cemented particular views of the world 
as facts. 
80
 Sztompka was already arguing for this movement back in the 1960s at the time of the subjectivist turn drawing 
on, among others, on Goffman and Garfinkel. This was followed by the culturalist turn and what was later called 
„the second sociology‟ (Dawe 1970), the humanistic sociology. For an STS position on this distinction, see Moser 
(2003, 307–8) where she argues that methods and theories are not neutral but productive and performative. 
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„driving force of all social processes, with every stage seen as construction‟.81 Second, as 
Sztompka argues, reflexiveness has become a pervasive topic in sociology, as it states that 
„knowledge about society feeds back on its subject matter, directly influencing people‟s beliefs, 
their motivations and consequently their actions‟.82 Third, the attention of sociologists has shifted 
from studying macro structures to addressing agency at the micro-processual level, with the 
proclamation of the „performative turn‟ (Alexander et al. 2006).83  
According to Sztompka, sociology‟s more recent turn towards a constructivist, reflexive 
engagement in and with society has once again highlighted the importance of the value debate – 
both those values studied and those assumed by the researcher.84 Values enter my discussion of 
foresight in research policy and the approach I have chosen both as an empirical issue and as my 
academic intervention.
85
 Values inevitably inform research in its choice of topics, analyses, 
theories and methods (Ericson 2005, 368). My combination of theoretical and methodical 
underpinnings did both form and were shaped by the intervention this study seeks to make.
86
  
 
First, intervention in this case study means my focus on the micro-processes of creating 
scenarios, as in the negotiations between organisers and participants during the stages of 
collecting ideas, writing scenarios and ensuring their relevance. Second, it seeks to give insight 
into the values of those involved in the foresight process. Here the approach towards values 
expressed and performed by those studied is informed by what Sztompka has called the „new 
approach towards values in sociology‟, which terms valuations as „construction of meaning‟ 
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 Sztompka (2007, 251) mentions particularly Giddens‟ idea of structuration rather than structure, Elias‟ concept 
of figurations rather than forms and Bordieu‟s focus on practice. This coincides, for example, with the STS focus on 
organising instead of organisation and modes of ordering (Law 1994) as „an invitation to study how ordering is 
done, generated, embodied, expressed and represented in different material forms‟ (Moser 2003, 137). 
82
 For work within foresight studies related to reflexiveness and reflexivity see, for example, Salo, Könnölä, and 
Hjelt (2004), Grunwald (2004), Grin, Felix and Bos (2004), Voß, Bauknecht and Kemp (eds) (2006), Grin (2006), 
Konrad and Voß (2006), Stirling (2006). The discussion about foresight and reflexivity has not been included in this 
thesis, but see Jenssen (2010). 
83
 Actor-network theory intervenes in the distinction between macro-structure and micro-level. Instead of 
assuming two separate spheres, it raises questions about this division. See, for example, Law and Hassard (1999). 
84
 See, for example, discussions about modest approaches to research within STS (Bruun Jensen 2005, Cañellas-
Boltà and Strand 2006) which have been inspired by feminist science studies, especially Haraway (1988, 1997). 
85
 Research here refers to my own research and not „research policy‟ as the object of my study. 
86
 As already argued above within ethnography (Garfinkel 1967, 77–78) and the study of process data (Langley 
1999), selecting an approach and relevant theory is a process accompanying research and not a choice made prior to 
all other research activity, such as observation and analysis. Thus intervention is not necessarily a predetermined 
intention but is shaped gradually throughout a research process and becomes finally materialised in the finished text 
of the thesis. 
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(2007, 255). From the point of view of humanist, anti-positivist sociology, „people endow their 
actions, situations, institutions with meaning‟. This meaning is „drawn from various sources, 
such as tradition, religion, mass media, etc‟. Sztompka argues that meaning is shaped during 
dialogue, both directly through conversation and indirectly through, for example, the influence of 
media. This perspective sees values as a way for people to make sense of and impute meaning to 
their actions. Based on how meaning is constructed Sztompka reasons that there are several 
important roles sociology should play in modern society (ibid).  
 
I will not follow Sztompka‟s argument here and discuss normative aspects in sociology such 
as how sociologists should engage with the world and with the future based on the question: 
What is desirable? This question has been taken up within foresight and the sociology of the 
future (Loveridge and Street 2005, Adam 2005). Rather I will adopt this third perspective on 
values as a way to construct meaning as my basic understanding of how values are involved and 
negotiated in foresight. However, my study does not seek to classify the activities, expressions 
and decisions observed into specific categories of valuational content such as equality or 
progress.
87
 Much more relevant for studying the negotiation of values is to study evaluation as an 
activity.
88
 What is more, meaning is not seen as „drawn from various sources‟, as Sztompka 
(ibid) argues, but as constructed in real time through the ordering of values, which can be social, 
cultural, economic or individual, but do not have stable origins like „sources‟. This is not to say 
that people do not rely on specific references to newspaper articles, reports, communications, or 
scientific findings when evaluating. Rather I draw here on the argument made by Latour (1993) 
about the construction of systems that mix politics, science, technology, and nature, so-called 
„hybrids‟.89 Sources are many, economic value and social values mingle, and in the process of 
instant evaluation the source of a value is not always clear. 
Thus I see the emergence of values via the construction of meaning as also dependent on the 
present moment – represented in the specific constellations of the ethnographic moments studied. 
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 But see, for example, Van Lente (2000) on the use of ideographs such as „progress‟ in the coordination of 
technological expectations. 
88
 Instead of studying values as stable entities, I study how people evaluate, following the idea of a „sociology of 
verbs‟ as argued for in Law (1994, 15). 
89
 The ozone debate is such a hybrid, as are the debates on global warming, deforestation and even the idea of 
black holes (Latour 1993). The same happens in processes of evaluation, in the ordering of values. This is also an 
argument against „pure relations‟ in evaluation and calculation. It is an argument for „impure relations‟ (Callon and 
Law 2005). 
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Present realities become part of the evaluation of future possibilities. Foresight is thus not about 
„making facts‟ that in turn „make values‟ (Law 2004b, 2); rather it employs evaluations and 
expectations about the future based on how people consider present facts.  
Drawing on these theoretical tools I study the creation of scenarios in foresight as a 
coordinating practice in which evaluations of present facts and future expectations are conducted 
simultaneously. In this respect meaning is constructed through various evaluatory activities 
which become materialised into written future scenarios. The value of this process is closely 
linked to the value of the scenarios for subsequent processes such as research programme 
development. By creating written scenarios the involved participants and project organisers 
imbue their understanding of foresight and the context in which foresight is conducted with 
meaning. 
 
3.4 Evaluation and uncertainty 
This basic understanding of values and evaluation processes as a way to construct meaning 
must be connected to the orientation towards the longer-term future and the uncertainties related 
to it. Although foresight is here not seen as „making facts‟ which, in turn, „make values‟ (Law 
2004b, ibid) foresight nevertheless makes realities, and influences realities in specific ways.  
 
According to economic sociologist David Stark (2000), neoclassical economics has defined 
values as counterpoised, outside and distant from calculated value: „... if values are the 
embeddings for value that somehow makes calculation possible, it is precisely because values are 
a kind of anti-matter to calculation‟ (2000, 4). Values are often regarded as purely social, 
expressing normative perspectives developed in specific cultural contexts (like family, business, 
public organisations, etc.). Economic value, on the other hand, can be gained from knowledge, 
technologies and strategies. Stark argues that the traditional boundary between the study of value 
as part of economics and the study of values as a subject of sociology has been crossed by the 
French convention school, especially Boltanski and Thévenot‟s (2006) „sociological theory of 
value‟. They propose that modern economics comprises multiple principles of evaluation, or 
„orders of worth‟. As Stark (2000, 4) argues: 
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Orders of worth are not values counterpoised to value but are constitutive of 
value; they are the very fabric of calculation, of rationality, of value. As 
principles of evaluation they involve systematic associations of ideas – and 
thus have some similarity to culturalist notions – but they go beyond that 
similarity to show how each of the multiple principles of evaluation entails 
discrete metrics, measuring „instruments,‟ and proof of worth objectified in 
artifacts and objects in the material world [italics added]. 
 
STS and ANT scholar Michel Callon and sociologist Fabian Muniesa (2005, 1231) follow this 
line of thinking by questioning the distinction between calculation and judgment. 90 They 
advocate a broad definition of calculation which is not limited to performing mathematical or 
numerical operations, but proceeds from:  
 
... establishing distinctions between things or states of the world, and by 
imagining and estimating courses of action associated with things or with 
those states as well as their consequences. By starting with this type of 
definition (wide, but usual) of the notion of calculation, we try to avoid the 
distinction (also conventional, but too sharp) between judgment and calculation 
[italics added]. 
 
 
Here calculation and judgment become interrelated; one cannot be performed without the 
other. Imagining and estimating courses of action and their consequences imply both calculations 
of risk and an acceptance of a prevailing uncertainty about which of these courses of action 
might prove to be worthwhile. This approach thus questions the customary distinction between 
value and values.  
An orientation towards the long-term future complicates calculative processes, whether they 
are directed more towards economic considerations or social implications. Stark (2000, 3) argues 
that uncertainty and risk are two different aspects of an unknowable future.91 To ground 
evaluations on the value of existing material artifacts and objects can be a way to reduce or 
                                                 
90 
These writers draw on concepts within STS and actor-network theory like, for example, the notion of 
distributed calculative agencies. Calculative agencies are „collective hybrids‟ which are „equipped with instruments: 
the calculation does not take place only in human minds; it is distributed among humans and non-humans‟ (Callon 
and Muniesa 2005, 1236). 
91
 Beck‟s (1992) The Risk Society has been one of the most influential works on how modern society organises in 
response to risk. Stirling (2006, 239) argues that risk and uncertainty are not different understandings of an 
unknowable future but „degrees of incertitude‟. 
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transform uncertainty into risk. Risk is thus calculated future, whereas uncertainty cannot be 
expressed in quantified statements: 
In circumstances of risk, chances are calculable, that is the distribution of 
outcomes can be expressed in some probabilistic terms. Uncertainty, however, 
lacks calculation [...].  Neoclassical economics reduces all cases of uncertainty 
to risk, because theirs is a world of calculation, not of judgment. 
 
 
However, as Stark continues, multiple principles of evaluation, or orders of worth cannot 
eliminate uncertainty either: „In particular, they cannot eliminate the possibility of uncertainty 
about which order of worth [...] is operative in a given situation‟ (ibid).92  
In cases of uncertainty, Stark argues, different orders of worth or principles of evaluation need 
to coexist (2000, 12). Using the example of a Silicon Valley start-up firm designing websites he 
shows how the acceptance of uncertainty produces creative interactions between different 
communities of practice, such as programmers, designers, merchandisers, etc.  In order to stay at 
the forefront of website development, the project members have to accept disagreements about 
possible courses of action as everyday reality, and not end disputation „so much as suspend it‟ 
(ibid). According to Stark, economic value is created when organisations manage to „keep 
multiple orders of worth in play‟. He applies this description first and foremost to entrepreneurial 
new media organisations and global investment banks, which need to be capable of maintaining 
competition between „coexisting principles of evaluation‟. Thus to keep multiple orders of worth 
in play simultaneously and achieve creativity, uncertainty needs to be sustained rather than 
resolved. 
The question about which order of worth is most valuable in a situation of uncertainty is part 
of the complex problem of calculating and evaluating values and value in future orientation.93 In 
scenario development these „orders of worth‟ are reflected in imagined possible and plausible 
futures. Thus even though scenarios are meant to illustrate possible futures without predicting or 
giving preference to one or the other, they are still based on the interplay between calculation 
and judgment.  
 
                                                 
92 On the importance of addressing future uncertainty, complexity and values together see Guimarães Pereira, 
Vaz and Tognetti (2006, 11). 
93
 See also Van Asselt, Mesman
 and van„t Klooster (2007) on dealing with prognostic uncertainty. 
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The Research Council of Norway is not a market-based firm, but a public organisation which 
produces policies and research programmes. These are products in their own right, but they are 
also one step removed from economic production. Nevertheless, the introduction of a new 
approach to strategy development and priority-setting, like the foresight project CREATE, 
represents an attempt to accept and employ the creative potential of uncertainty, rather than 
trying to eliminate it. As I will show in the following chapters, foresight is coordinated through 
interplay between evaluation and uncertainty as well as in recourse to conventions appropriate to 
conducting projects. Sociologist Laurent Thévenot provides here an important perspective on the 
coordination of collective evaluations as poised between uncertainty and conventions.
 
 
 
3.5 Coordination and conventions 
In his work on complex political and moral ordering Thévenot (2002a) looks at the evaluation 
of objects such as the upgrading of a road through the French Pyrénées discussing the question: 
„What is a good road?‟ He argues for the moral complexity of that question by highlighting 
several ways in which the value of this road was ordered. The road was justified as an industrial 
and efficient infrastructure for the future, as promoting local, domestic tourism, as a green, 
scenic route through a beautiful landscape, and so on. Each of these orderings of worth was built 
on negotiations, compromises and public engagement.  
According to Thévenot the evaluation of different values and their consequent ordering is based 
on „how people and things are treated and shaped to qualify for evaluation‟ (2002a, 57). To 
qualify for evaluation Thévenot argues that we work to „create equivalences‟ between people, 
objects or processes. This work he calls an „investment in forms‟ such as „statistical categories, 
job evaluation scales or occupational names‟ (ibid, 56). These investments in form are 
„procedures that treat people and objects in homogeneous ways across contexts‟ (ibid). The 
simultaneous investment in local practices and trans-national definitions of foresight is such an 
attempt to create equivalences and standards between ways of conducting foresight across 
countries, organisations and interest groups. This work needs to be coordinated through 
procedures and events, such as national foresight programmes, international projects and 
conferences.  
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Thévenot connects the question of how objects like a road are evaluated in multiple ways – 
i.e., draw on multiple orders of worth – to the notion of coordination, not as a „lawlike process‟ 
already determined by „forces, constraints and rules‟, but rather „the undetermined, dynamic and 
creative aspects of coordination‟. These dynamic and creative forms of coordination arise from 
„operations of evaluation which actors depend on for the conduct of their actions and their 
selective access to reality. This is the point at which objects [...] get deeply connected with 
morals and politics‟ (ibid, 57). This description of operations of evaluation by Thévenot as moral 
and political performances can be related to Brown‟s (2005) discussion of future values. It also 
resonates with Sztompka‟s perspective on value creation by constructing meaning and with 
Stark‟s description of how to create economic value by keeping multiple orders of worth in play, 
suspend disagreement or consensus and sustain uncertainty to allow for „coexisting principles of 
evaluation‟. 
I want to borrow Thévenot‟s notion of coordination as a means to order values in practice 
when talking about the different ways values and evaluations were ordered in the scenario 
process. Thus while I consider evaluations as collective „constructions of meaning‟, the way this 
is done in practice is dependent on what Thévenot calls „coordination‟. In the process I studied, 
however, coordination depended on instant operations of evaluation and on already-made 
agreements. These explicit or implicit agreements precede the process as well as accompanying 
it; they include things like accepting an invitation to a foresight project based on specific 
preconditions or following an explicit method and suggested approach to the future. 
Coordinating a foresight process is thus acting with values which can rest on social, economic, 
political and moral evaluations both preceding and emerging in the process of scenario creation.  
When I refer to agreements preceding the scenario process, I do not mean that these 
agreements were not coordinated, or that they exist „out there‟ as already established, stabilised 
results of coordination. It is for the sake of discussing a single project that I suggest seeing 
coordination not only as something that happens through instant or emerging evaluation, but also 
as based on implicit agreements not necessarily discussed during the process. These agreements 
have their own history of coordination.94  
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 I started studying the case of foresight in ICT research after the design and recruitment phases had been 
completed. However, I discuss documents and materials related to these phases inasmuch they were relevant to my 
fieldwork observations. 
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Thus I presume that in collective coordinated processes both evaluations made instantly 
during the process and evaluations preceding the process work together to produce specific 
dynamics and results. In foresight, evaluations preceding the collective process of scenario 
development can be associated with certain stages of the process, such as design and recruitment 
(Popper 2008). Instant evaluations as undetermined and creative aspects of coordination emerge 
during the collective phase of generating „new visions and images of the future‟ (ibid, 48). How 
these forms of evaluation interact in practice can yield answers to my questions about how future 
stories are produced between the ideal of authentic stakeholder involvement and the need for a 
result useful to the organisation, and to what degree participants‟ contributions become an effect 
of organising.  
This interaction is both given and politically charged. As Thévenot argues, dynamic, 
undetermined and creative forms of coordination arise from operations of evaluation which 
connect objects with morals and politics, just as evaluations made ex ante influence instant forms 
of coordination. To capture this interaction between different forms of evaluation I draw on 
Thévenot‟s specific perspective on conventions. Rather than employing a broad variety of 
perspectives within convention theory, I concentrate on Thévenot‟s development of convention 
theory as an alternative approach to existing theories of convention and coordination.
95
 
According to Thévenot (2006) convention theory differs from two contrasting views on 
coordination. The sociological one, based on the „structuralist assumptions of Bourdieu‟s critical 
sociology of domination‟ (Vandenberghe 2006, 72), assumes that „powerful collective forces 
determine coordination, either externally through fixed constraints, or internally through stable 
dispositions‟ (Thévenot 2006, 111). The second is „more favoured by economists and opposes 
the collective thrust of the first approach‟ (ibid). Thévenot argues that the economist‟s view of 
coordination reduces conventions to individual preferences, such as shown in the philosophical 
study of conventions by David Lewis (1969). 
Convention theory is, according to Thévenot, an alternative to both perspectives, since it is 
„primarily concerned with the uncertain, pluralist and dynamical production of coordination‟ and 
thus opposes the idea of fixed constraints. In addition, „by contrast to the second [the economist 
approach], it pays much attention to the common forms of cognition and evaluation which 
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 See also Thévenot (2001) and (2007). 
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support conventions of coordination and cannot be reduced to individual preferences‟ (ibid).96 
Yet Thévenot‟s concept of conventions differs from that of other French conventionalists. As he 
argues (2002a, 83) most convention theorists define conventions as agreements which lead to 
consensus, whether explicit or implicit. This, as Thévenot argues, is not necessarily so:  
Instead of considering conventions as mere collective agreements that bring the 
convergence of expectancies, whether explicit in contracts or tacit in customs, I 
would rather look at conventions as more complex coordinating devices that 
deal with the limits of more localized engagements, when there is a need for 
third-party assessment. A convention is not a broad convergence of shared 
knowledge. It is nothing more than a limited agreement about selected features 
people use to control events and entities (ibid).  
 
 
Conventions are thus agreements about „selected features‟ which help to control events and 
entities. This perspective on conventions which sees them not as an instrument for converging 
expectations, but as limited agreements about selected features to control events and entities, is 
useful because it leads back to the question of how to understand foresight as a collective effort. 
Thévenot (ibid) suggests: 
What is most important in the convention is not only a rather negative 
agreement about what is inconvenient but the common acceptance of what is 
left aside as irrelevant. This acceptance is grounded on the common knowledge 
that there is no hope for a more complete alignment (which is assumed in 
classical group collectives) [italics added]. 
 
 
This aspect of convention is interesting because it underlines that there are issues which do 
not become objects of coordination or evaluation because they are collectively considered 
irrelevant, i.e. not worthy of being calculated or evaluated. This leads to the question of which 
conventions are at work when specific issues, values or responsibilities are collectively 
considered irrelevant in foresight. Irrelevance is thus also a question of ordering, or ranking. In 
collective processes towards a „common good‟ (Thévenot 2002a, 54) there is seldom a 
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 The relationship between uncertainty and conventions has been discussed widely in economics, and 
specifically political economy, based on the works of British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946). A 
convention is here the projection of the existing situation (sales, production, etc.) into the near future which 
reinforces the convention itself. While a convention is thus a ‟real world response to uncertainty‟ (Dequech, 1999, 
71) there is less discussion on how these conventions are coordinated among actors, which I see as a third 
contribution of Thévenot‟s perspective, alongside the focus on the collective and the dynamic and undetermined 
aspects of coordination. This is also an important topic in my thesis. 
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completely irrelevant issue, any more than there is an issue which is equally important to 
everyone. 97 Conventions are thus forms of coordination which become useful in contexts of 
„pervasive uncertainty‟:  
Within a context of pervasive uncertainty with respect to the interpretation of 
actions and expectations of actors, conventions merely channel uncertainty 
through a conventional formatting of events (Thévenot 2006, 111). 
 
 
I regard this as a second perspective on the concept of convention which creates a tension 
between an understanding of convention as „uncertain, pluralist and dynamical forms of 
coordination‟ and the perspective on conventions as channelling uncertainty through a 
„conventional formatting of events‟. How should we understand collective processes both as 
uncertain and pluralist while also drawing on conventional formatting?  
I choose to see what Thévenot (2002a, 2006) calls the „common forms of evaluation‟ as an 
important link between uncertain and pluralist coordination and conventional formatting. Here 
the word „common‟ signals both something that is shared among people, such as convictions, 
repertoires or resources, as something they have „in common‟, but also to „act in common‟ under 
specific circumstances, limited conditions, etc. This acting in common does not necessarily have 
to be steered by conventions, but can also be expressions of creativity, of doing something 
different and in a different way. 
These common forms of evaluation can be instant coordinating operations, but can 
simultaneously rely on established conventions within an organisation or within a project. They 
can include rational approaches or negotiations of power and interests, but they are also, and this 
is my main point, directed by perspectives on what is considered relevant and what irrelevant.  
In his work on organising and ordering in formal organisations such as the Daresbury 
Laboratory, John Law writes that „the capacity to make decisions is a necessary privilege for the 
manager‟ (1994, 65). What works in a laboratory producing scientific facts is not so far away 
from organising a participatory scenario process. The process must be managed, organised and 
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Collective processes towards a „common good‟ thus operate with a notion of degrees of relevance and 
irrelevance. This is different for stabilised conventional structures such as Star (1991) describes in „Power, 
technology and the phenomenology of conventions: on being allergic to onions’.  She defines conventions (such as 
the almost inevitable onions in fast food) as technological regimes excluding others: „the sets of conventions are 
never stable for non-members‟ (ibid, 41). 
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brought to a result by those responsible and accountable for the project. Both laboratory science 
and foresight rest on the common acceptance of the uncertainty of the future and the need for 
imperfect decisions in the present. Participatory foresight, however, is carried out involving 
stakeholders from many strata of society in the „laboratory of scenarios‟ (Van der Heijden 2005) 
and thus includes multiple voices and perspectives about the uncertainty of the future and 
possible strategic solutions. On the one hand, the coordination conducted by an organiser or 
facilitator of foresight becomes here even more important than the coordinating operations of a 
manager, because he or she needs to define the „limits of localised engagements‟ in which the 
contributions of stakeholders as a „third party‟ become relevant. On the other hand, the relevance 
of contributions is also shaped by the pre-concluded agreement about who is relevant in this 
future negotiation process, i.e. the Research Council, the representatives of research institutes, 
universities, private businesses and the authorities. The stories that emerge in collective future 
negotiations are thus based on values that can be personal, organisational or collective and affect 
political decisions. This thesis, however, is not an assessment of those values but a study of 
coordinating and evaluating which addresses values, responsibility and uncertainty in foresight 
as they became empirically relevant.  
In the following chapters the application of the scenario method, the coordination of the 
writing process and the evaluations of the project and the scenarios themselves are presented as 
effects with consequences both for the content of the scenario narratives and their final 
application. Having argued for using convention concepts as shaping the future in collective 
foresight processes, I will finally introduce a concept of coordination which I found inspiring 
when analysing the ethnographic moments in which the future was opened through methods 
employed to evoke collective imagination and creativity. 
 
3.6 Investment in non-calculation 
Evaluations, calculations and conventions in foresight processes work in complex ways; attempts 
are made to create situations intended to inspire imagination and creativity and open up 
perspectives on the future to wider horizons. Callon and Muniesa (2003, 197) extend their 
argument on what they call qualculation (simultaneous calculation and qualitative judgment) to 
describe what might be seen as situations devoid of calculation or judgement:  
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It [qualculation] also enables us to understand how situations of non-
calculation can be constructed, for instance by preventing the closure of the list 
of entities to take into account, by facilitating the proliferation of relations 
between those entities, or by paralyzing any attempt at classification. This 
explains why obtaining non-calculability (i.e. the production of situations in 
which calculation is rendered impossible or highly complex) requires heavy 
investments [italics added].98 
 
 
This is an interesting argument when applied to the empirical study of collective foresight. 
Here a receptive approach towards the future requires opening up existing lists of entities, or 
priorities, to regard anew established relationships between science, technology and society and 
to suspend classifications or consensus for the sake of creativity. Creating situations in which 
calculation is rendered impossible or highly complex is thus one way of coordinating the 
production of future scenarios without resorting to consensus and converging expectations.
99
 
According to Callon and Muniesa (2003), to create these situations of non-calculation requires 
heavy investment; they are constructed and they have to be achieved. Thévenot (2002a, 56) 
speaks about „investment in forms‟ as a way to create equivalences between people, objects or 
processes, such as „statistical categories, job evaluation scales or occupational names‟. These 
investments in form are „procedures that treat people and objects in homogeneous ways across 
contexts‟ (ibid). Creating future scenarios based not on forecasting or predicting but on 
imagining possible futures collectively and openly requires us to re-think conventional – i.e. 
already agreed upon – priority lists, relations between society and technology and commonly 
accepted classifications of objects, people and collectives. Participants are discouraged from 
estimating and calculating futures. They are rather asked to imagine multiple futures and come 
up with new associations between possible developments. This requires initially an open list of 
entities to take into account, proliferating relations between these entities and thus avoiding 
classification. It is a way to suspend evaluation and to keep multiple orders of worth in play. It is 
thus an investment in non-calculation. 
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 This text is currently (March 2010) only available in French. The translation presented here is obtained from a 
formerly available English version of the article which has been checked against the French version published 
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Callon and Law (2005, 217) further refine Callon and Muniesa‟s (2003) argument when they 
suggest that creating such situations of non-calculation, or as they call it „incalculabilities‟, takes 
at least as much effort as making calculabilities. They argue that situations of non-calculation 
can be created in two contrasting strategies which they call „rarefaction‟ and „proliferation‟:  
[…] we suggest that rarefaction works by removing the resources or relations 
needed for calculability. Then, with the help of two further examples […] we 
argue that proliferation works the other way round to impede calculation by 
providing an overload of calculative resources. 
 
Rarefaction is thus a strategy to avoid classification, while proliferation, i.e. providing an 
overload of calculative resources, increases uncertainty. In the following discussion of the 
foresight project on ICT research I will use the theoretical concepts and perspective presented in 
this chapter to inquire into the ways futures are opened and shaped in foresight. I will show how 
convention, coordination, evaluation and non-calculation work in practice and are linked to 
issues of value, responsibility and uncertainty.  
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4 COLLECTIVE SCENARIO CREATION 
The core activity of participatory foresight is to generate alternative images of the future 
collectively, often in a longer-term perspective (Popper 2008). These images can include 
possible, plausible, desirable or undesirable images of the future. The main differentiation 
between future images or narratives is between „probable‟ and „preferable‟ futures.100 Probable, 
possible or unlikely futures are often called „scenarios‟. They are created to increase 
understanding of future risks and possibilities.  
According to policy analyst Tom Ling (2002, 127) policy-makers in public-sector planning 
are mostly interested in exploring different possible futures and understanding future risks. 
Scenarios can imply a variety of social and cultural values, but basically none of them is created 
to represent a preferred version of the future. Rather they are meant to stimulate reflection and 
initiate strategic thinking by dealing with the challenges emerging from uncertainty and from the 
complexity of specific issues. Yet the uncertainty of different scenarios can also be seen as 
„politically weak and administratively untidy‟ as they „rarely point unequivocally to one course 
of action‟ (ibid). Preferable futures, on the other hand, are often labelled as „visions‟ and are 
meant to increase collective engagement towards one shared and desired image of the future. 
This approach is frequently used in regional, communal or urban planning processes, under the 
label of „visioning‟.101  
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Scenario development has evolved as the most widely applied method in foresight.
102
 
Scenarios can be more convincing than detailed checklists of possible outcomes because they tell 
stories about what kind of world we might live in some day. Foresight and scenario scholar 
Philip van Notten (2005, 7) writes: 
Scenarios are coherent descriptions of alternative hypothetical futures that 
reflect different perspectives on past, present and future developments, which 
can serve as a basis for action. Scenario development aims to combine 
analytical knowledge with creative thinking in an effort to capture a wide range 
of possible future developments in a limited number of outlooks. 
 
These quality demands associated with scenario development echo the ambitions regarding 
foresight as a whole. They underline the prescriptive pressure on those producing scenarios, for 
not only must they ensure that the scenarios meet certain essential criteria within a limited 
number of short and accessible texts, they must also make the created stories relevant to the 
foresight process they are meant to inform. In this respect, one can think of scenario 
development in literary theory terms as a „mirror image‟ or reflection of foresight in a smaller 
frame, which simultaneously highlights and continually repeats the features and political 
ambitions of foresight as well as the „complexities of its practical implementation‟ (Brown et al. 
1999, 3).
103
 
As with foresight, in the more than fifty-year history of scenario development many 
juxtaposed definitions of it have arisen.104 The different names given to scenario approaches 
highlight the diversity of applications and contexts: „Scenario planning, scenario analysis, 
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 According to a report on future-oriented activities in Norway (Fagerheim 2003) and commissioned by the 
RCN, by 2003 three out of four of the 72 projects used scenarios to create perspectives on the future. Ministries and 
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scenario thinking, and scenario learning‟.105 Scenario planning and analysis are more frequent in 
corporate decision-making, whereas scenario learning is used in organisational, networking and 
policy-making contexts (Ringland 1998, Neumann and Øverland 2004). Van Notten (2005, 24) 
notes that the educational function of scenarios has „gained importance in relation to its function 
as a planning tool of earlier years‟. Today, organisational learning and strategic planning coexist 
in scenario project descriptions. In my analysis of the foresight project at the Research Council 
of Norway, I will use the general term „scenario development‟ to describe the specific process I 
observed. 
Scenarios are not meant to provide a single answer to the unknown yet-to-be. Foresight expert 
Gill Ringland (2002, 2–5) explains that scenarios do not predict the future, „but illuminate the 
drivers of change‟. Drivers of change, also called „driving forces‟, can be already existing actors 
and factors, or emerging ones who or which might gain importance over time and have 
considerable influence on future developments. Building scenarios with the help of driving 
forces can enable managers to „question their everyday assumptions, adjust their mental maps, 
and truly think “outside the box” in a cohesive fashion‟ (ibid). Scenarios in strategy development 
are thus possible views of the world providing a context „in which managers can make 
decisions‟. A range of possible worlds will enable managers to be better informed and „a strategy 
based on this knowledge and insight will be more likely to succeed‟ (ibid). Ringland thus argues 
for a direct relationship between scenario narratives and the ability to make better decisions. The 
choice of driving forces seems decisive in this relationship. I will discuss the concept of driving 
forces and its practical implications further on in this chapter.  
An ongoing debate addresses the question of whether scenario creation should be seen more 
as an art or more as science. Peter Schwartz, author of The Art of The Long View (1996) and one 
of the most influential writers on scenario development, proposes scenario development as an 
art; foresight expert van Notten (2005) sees it as a creative practice; while scenario planning 
experts van der Heijden et al. (2002) insist that scenario planning is a scientific approach. Van 
der Heijden et al. (2002) and Cairns et al. (2004) argue that scenarios are an „experimental 
laboratory, where strategic decision options can be tested for their robustness in a variety of 
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plausible worlds‟.106 They criticise open and constructivist scenario approaches as „simple 
unstructured models‟ and contrast these unstructured designs with „sophisticated highly 
quantified scenario-modelling techniques‟. 107 These writers define scenarios not as texts, but as 
„models‟, „experiments‟ or „laboratories‟, which are there to help people test certain strategies for 
their „robustness‟.108 
Yet according to management scholar Alex Wright (2005), this approach ignores the 
„subjective element of scenarios‟. He argues that „scenarios are not discovered, they are created; 
their very existence is a construction‟ and due to the fact that they are most of the time written by 
more than one person, they are also „social constructions‟ (ibid, 2-7).109 According to Wright, 
seeing scenarios as constructed narratives can contribute to studying how language and 
authorship influence strategic stories: 
The construction of scenarios is not an innocent practice. Scenarios are not 
developed in isolation, but are fashioned against a backdrop of competing and 
shared understandings and history, and geopolitical and cultural practices. The 
role of text and language in the creation of scenarios is under-researched, but is 
recognised as of central importance in the formation of constructions.110 
 
Wright‟s critique provides a starting point for an analysis of scenario development at the 
Research Council of Norway. Asdal (2004, 80–1) argues that a text is „never a neutral 
representation of a given issue‟ but „is defined by the social context in which it exists as well as 
working to define that context‟.111 This argument is made for completed texts. Yet it can also be 
made for the production of a specific text or, as is the case in scenario development, several 
texts. Indeed, I want to argue that whereas completed texts co-produce realities, studying the 
production of specific texts provides insights into realities in the making.
112
 It is here that the two 
questions raised in the introduction become empirically relevant, because stakeholder 
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involvement and the responsibility of the organisers to produce a useful result are most visible in 
the process of producing scenarios. In this chapter I will discuss the practice of scenario 
construction and address responsibility, value and uncertainty as empirical issues emerging from 
my study. Issues of responsibility and value have so far received little attention in ethnographic 
studies of foresight, or (as in the case of uncertainty) have been studied in the context of 
prognosis and forecasting rather than participatory foresight.
113
  
 
4.1 Inviting and coordinating 
In July 2004, two months before the first workshop meeting, the organisers of the foresight 
project sent out an invitation to about forty potential participants: „Invitation to participate in 
UTSIKT – an ICT Foresight exercise directed by the Research Council.‟ The invitation posed the 
questions the foresight exercise intended to address:  
How ambitious should we be regarding Norwegian ICT research, and which 
main research areas should the RCN support in the years to come? How can the 
Research Council contribute to closer cooperation between actors in ICT 
research? How should the new programme VERDIKT be organised? To further 
an open and constructive debate about these questions, the Research Council 
will employ a dialogue-based approach consisting of a Foresight exercise based 
on the scenario method. The project UTSIKT (possibilities for development 
and strategic choice for ICT) is designed to provide us with better insight into 
the challenges facing Norwegian ICT research. 114 
 
  
The invitation implied that the foresight project was not directly about „technology foresight‟, 
involving anticipating the development of certain areas like artificial intelligence or virtual 
reality (Bibel 2005). Its aim was to help define the research priorities to be included in the new 
ICT research programme „placing Norway at the forefront of ICT development and the 
application of ICT-based knowledge to innovation and interaction‟ (ibid). Rather than requesting 
„expert‟ contributions115 the project organisers used broader terms like „competency and 
creativity‟ to illicit the participants‟ expertise.116 In other words, participants were asked not only 
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to talk about ICT but also about their broader aspirations and their evaluation of research issues 
in general. Accordingly, the agenda included a number of strategic topics, including issues like 
which research areas should receive funding and how the new ICT programme could be 
organised.  
The invitation was sent out to representatives of public and private research institutes, 
university professors, business leaders, ministry officials and representatives of public 
institutions, such as the central tax office, the post office and hospitals.
117
 Although there was a 
broad mixture of different areas of ICT-related research, only a few professionals from corporate 
businesses participated in the „scenario group‟, as the project organisers called it. The majority 
were representatives of private and public research institutes. The invited researchers would 
consider the questions posed in the invitation – about national research ambitions, funding and 
cooperation – to be relevant to their vocation and their professional future since ambitions and 
cooperation between researchers were central to their daily work life.118  
I want to argue that the invitation to this process was part of the specific collective assembled 
in the scenario process. It described the form of coordination the process was to take as a 
„dialogue-based way of working consisting of a foresight exercise based on the scenario 
method‟. It asked potential participants (who were in this case defined as possessing relevant 
expertise) specific questions. By asking specific questions and presenting the chosen method, the 
invitation delineated participation and specified how the invitees were expected to contribute to 
this process as knowledgeable subjects possessing relevant expertise.
119 
If they accepted the 
invitation, they would accept becoming part of the specific process, procedures, agreements and 
evaluations entailed in the foresight approach. In other words they would agree to participate in 
the scenario method and to pursue the project‟s objective of providing „us‟ with better insight. In 
this way they became engaged in the process. This also meant that the responsibility and 
credibility associated with the process was extended to them.  
In this sense the invitation itself produced coordination. It worked as a coordinating device 
defining the boundaries for localised engagement. Instead of dealing with the issue of priority-
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setting and defining ambitions within the organisation of the RCN itself, the project organisers 
asked for „third-party assessment‟, inviting ICT experts and professionals as stakeholders to a 
dialogue on national research development. By inviting them, the organisers also wished to 
create a spatially and temporally limited agreement about following the specific approach they 
had chosen to conduct the event: the foresight and scenario method. In this respect the invitation 
contributed to coordinating the process while also functioning as a convention in the sense of 
limiting the engagement of stakeholders to one particular event where they were asked to follow 
specific methods and engage in particular activities.
120
  
 
4.2 Ranking and representation 
An invitation is thus a way of setting up a convention – the agreement that those invited 
would accept the proposed agenda (here in the form of open questions designated by „what‟ 
„how‟ and „who‟), and adopt the particular approach those inviting had chosen to discuss that 
agenda. Accepting an invitation seldom entails questioning the process, unless both agenda and 
approach involve highly controversial issues. However, in this case the invitation not only asked 
participants to agree on an agenda and an approach (dialogue-based) but also stipulated how the 
participants were to contribute to the process. 
The process is intensive and demanding, but will hopefully also be informative, 
fun and a place to foster new and existing networks. Participation in the 
scenario group requires active commitment and the intent to contribute to an 
open and constructive dialogue. We want to specify that the participants of 
UTSIKT should not be regarded as official representatives of certain economic 
or sectoral interests. The participants are there by virtue of their own 
competency and creativity. We plan to arrange a process with 30–40 external 
participants in addition to employees of the Research Council [italics added].121 
 
 
The invitations were addressed to individual professionals – not institutions or organisations – 
who were invited on the basis of their personal experience and knowledge and asked to use their 
„competency and creativity‟ outside the context of their daily professional life, in other words to 
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separate their own individual interests and competencies from those of the organisations they 
were a part of and to simply represent „themselves‟. This specific request by the project 
organisers thus attached a certain social and moral value to the invited experts, implying that the 
participants would contribute value to the foresight process if they behaved as non-
representational experts and professionals engaging with each other in an „open and constructive 
dialogue‟.  
Why would such a request be necessary? It was no doubt made with the aim of ensuring an 
„open and constructive debate‟. Was it to ensure equality, to make sure each contribution was 
considered to be of equal value? Was it to purify the participants‟ knowledge about ICT as 
technology from their social context? Was it to control individual participants‟ possible influence 
or power to shape the resulting scenario narratives and their evaluation? Were the experts‟ and 
professionals‟ sectoral and economic associations irrelevant – or, as Thévenot puts it – 
„inconvenient‟?  
Innovation researcher J.P. Salmenkaita and risk management scholar Ahti Salo (2004) 
describe a foresight process resulting from the Wireless Strategic Initiative (WSI), a project 
sponsored by the European Commission in the Information Society Technologies (IST) area of 
the Fifth Framework Programme. This project began with an open call for contributions, and 
more than 250 experts participated in the ensuing workshop, divided into five workshop groups 
(ibid, 901).122 Here a contrasting strategy was used to deal with participants‟ interests and 
potential influence on the process. The participants were asked to „actively promote their 
interests and viewpoints to identify matching or complementarily interested parties‟ (ibid, 902). 
The authors argue that active networking „helps in the gradual transformation of initially 
independent lists of research proposals into larger and more coherent research agendas‟ (ibid). 
The process was thus „fundamentally meritocratic, based on attracting attention‟ (ibid). Instead 
of levelling participants by making their organisational and sectoral ties irrelevant, issues that 
„lack credibility receive less attention, making it difficult for those who do not receive sufficient 
attention to mobilise resources from others‟ (ibid). The authors admit that such a meritocratic 
process allows only certain actors to make their voices heard in the creation of research agendas. 
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Because of the problems attached to the dominance of representatives from powerful 
organisations, who may „push for their own interests‟, this kind of foresight process should „not 
be ascribed a dominant role in public policy‟ (ibid, 906). The invitation sent out by the RCN was 
thus an attempt to avoid the interference of powerful interests in a process designed to inform 
public research programme development. 
Yet in sending an invitation to a limited number of people the organisers of the process 
implicitly ranked and evaluated the invitees in terms of their institutional esteem. There are 
several ways of compiling such lists in foresight projects. In a European Commission publication 
called „A Practical Guide to Regional Foresight in the United Kingdom‟ the authors suggest a 
„reputational approach‟, which is based on „asking known experts to nominate others who they 
believe to be particularly knowledgeable in specified areas of expertise‟ (Miles et al. 2002, 180). 
Here esteem is produced by nominating particular people as experts, whether on a list or in a 
questionnaire. In „co-nomination‟ the „frequency with which particular people are named as 
experts in particular fields is used for guidance‟ (ibid, 194). Their esteem is thus measured by the 
frequency with which they are named, an action which includes calculation by counting the 
frequency of their naming and thus helps them to get nominated. Coordinating by estimating 
who is more of an expert and who is less also carries political implications.
123
 People‟s expertise, 
competency or creativity is evaluated and compared so as to rank them in a „convenient order‟. 
This shows how calculation and judgement work together in coordinating collective processes in 
which a limited number of people are considered representative participants.  
People representing organisations, authorities or economic sectors hence contribute to social 
ordering both in the way in which they „show their worth‟ (Thévenot 2002a, 70) and in how 
objects (expertise, consumerism, political authority) are represented through them. The better a 
reputation an employee gains, the higher the rank he or she will achieve and the more suitable he 
or she will be deemed to represent the organisation. Ranking is thus also used in the context of 
„an interest in prediction and control‟, whereby high ranking and esteem allow people to wield 
influence in organisations.
124
 Thus status in an organisation leads to ranking – here in the form of 
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a limited list of about forty people judged to be relevant participants in the ICT foresight project 
– based, in turn, on how they are ranked within their respective organisations. The project 
organisers, however, wanted to ensure that the „open and constructive dialogue‟ would not 
become predictable or controlled by certain interests following from this status or organisational 
ranking.125 In this respect the request in the invitation can be seen as an attempt to suspend and 
prevent social ordering and ranking during the scenario process and thereby to open the process 
for unexpected outcomes.  
The request was therefore an attempt to „create equivalences‟ (Thévenot 2002a, 56) between 
the invited participants, their representational ranking and the scenario process underway. The 
organisers invested in an equally valid representation describing the participants as „not to be 
regarded as official representatives of certain economic or sectoral interests, but present because 
of their own competence and creativity‟. This is quite a different type of investment than 
Thévenot‟s „investment in form‟, which makes it possible to „treat people and objects in 
homogeneous ways across contexts‟ (ibid). Thévenot mentions occupational names, statistical 
categories, or job evaluation scales as investments in form which are „costly and demand 
negotiation‟. The return can be the „extension of the investment’s domain within which it is 
accepted‟. The project organisers here invested in creating equivalences between invited 
participants by removing achieved standards, or rankings, within an area of expertise and 
professionalism. The point here was not to extend the domain of a certain norm, but to agree on 
this kind of standardisation in the limited context of the scenario workshops.  
This can also be seen as a situation of non-calculation achieved by rarefying calculative 
resources. Rarefaction works „by removing the resources or relations needed for calculability‟ 
(Callon and Law 2005, 217). Coordinating the process in this manner was thus an agreement 
limited to this specific event and the local and temporal engagement of interested parties. This 
artificially created equivalence between participants allowed coordination during the process to 
become more „undetermined, dynamic and creative‟ (Thévenot 2002a, 57). Closing off certain 
possibilities, such as the representation of specific interests, was intended to enable the range of 
possible ideas about the future to become more open. However, these aspects of coordination 
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were not based on a common or shared acceptance that the participants‟ economic, sectoral or 
self-interest was irrelevant. Rather the participants‟ interests were made irrelevant by the 
organisers‟ request. Controlling and enabling, opening and shaping thus emerged 
simultaneously.  
The request to represent only their own competency and creativity also applied to the ten 
employees of the Research Council itself listed as participants in the scenario group which 
according to the RCN‟s website comprised a total of fifty people (RCN 2004b). Since, however, 
these participants were partly or fully responsible for the success of the foresight project, they 
were always implicitly motivated to serve their own organisation. I will return later to the issue 
of responsibility and how this contributed to the ordering of values in the scenario development. 
Prior to the participatory foresight process certain conventions had thus been established 
which were intended to be in operation during the collective creation of scenarios about the 
future of ICT research. Through the invitation the project organisers had expressed values they 
wanted to prioritise during the process. The participants should behave in a non-representational 
way and should look beyond mere technological advances by contributing ideas about concrete 
organisational issues in the new ICT programme and envisioning new levels of ambition for 
research on ICT. The coordination of foresight through this invitation thus not only showed 
„techniques of domination‟ (Asdal, Borch and Moser 2008, 6) but was also an attempt to use 
foresight as a „tool for public involvement, for democratization, or deliberation, as well‟ (ibid).  
In the following discussion I will show how collective contributions to the scenarios were 
produced. I will discuss the use of scenario-creation tools, such as driving forces and scenario 
axes models, how ideas expressed by the participants materialised into contributions, and how 
value, responsibility and uncertainty interacted in the process. Based on this discussion of 
representation, ranking and evaluation, the question arises whether and how the request for 
participants to be non-representational stakeholders influenced the scenario-creation process. 
This, in turn, will shed light on how scenarios are produced between stakeholder involvement 
and the need for a result useful to the organisation and to what degree participants‟ contributions 
to scenarios are an effect of organising.  
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4.3 What are driving forces? 
On 16 September 2004 the invited participants gathered for the first workshop at Hotel 
Sundvollen, a quiet country resort twenty-five miles outside Oslo. Here they were to spend two 
days discussing the future of ICT research and creating scenarios intended to increase the quality 
of priority-setting in research policy and inform the new large ICT research programme. The 
letter sent to them prior to the event, which explained all the practical details of the workshop, 
had stated that there would be no fixed agenda at the workshop. The two days would consist of 
plenary sessions, group work and some external contributions. The RCN had hired an 
experienced foresight practitioner to lead the workshops and the scenario writing activities. The 
entire proceedings, the letter said, would be led by the appointed facilitator in one big room with 
all participants present.
126
  
Two weeks before the workshop, the foresight project group had invited all potential 
participants to a „kick-off meeting‟ at the Research Council‟s premises in Oslo. Here the 
participants had been given an introduction to planning under conditions of uncertainty and told 
how a specific way of thinking about the future could renew traditional planning processes. 
During the detailed presentation the participants had been informed about how the facilitator 
intended to use „scenario thinking‟ in the process.127 Some doubts had been raised in the 
audience about the usefulness of foresight for this particular process. The RCN employee who 
was the appointed leader of the foresight project had assured the sceptics that these issues would 
be kept in mind and incorporated into the process.128 Thus upon arrival at Hotel Sundvollen the 
participants were well informed about the formal approach chosen by the facilitator and the 
project group: Now it was time to see how this approach would generate the effects hoped for by 
the organisers in practice. 
The two-day workshop was conducted with thirty-seven participants. Twenty-eight of them 
were external participants representing areas of ICT research and business, and nine were 
Research Council employees. The first day of the workshop was dedicated to collecting „driving 
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forces‟, evaluating and sorting them and creating the first scenario drafts. The participants had 
been divided into six groups consisting of about five or six members and asked to decide within 
the group who would collect ideas and who would steer discussions and report to the plenum. 
The project organisers thus created the conditions for a multitude of ideas to be expressed. 
At the beginning of the first day the workshop facilitator announced the rules of the workshop 
and repeated the request set forth in the invitation:  
This is not about gazing into the crystal ball; we are not interested here in 
forecasting or strategies. Please leave your own agendas at home; we do not 
want them here at the workshop.129 
 
The facilitator thus ruled out three different ways of achieving future stories. „Gazing into the 
crystal ball‟ as a phantasmagorical way of imagining the future, detached from reality, could be 
seen as prophesying. Forecasting, on the other hand, was not regarded as sensitive enough to the 
pluralities of possible futures and was also seen as „speaking in place‟ of the future, something 
not to be encouraged in the open and democratic approach pursued by the project organisers. 
Hence this was also ruled out. Finally, according to the step-by-step approach designed by the 
organisers, strategic thinking was to follow the creation of scenarios, but not accompany them.130  
The facilitator hence underlined that this workshop was based on certain perspectives that did 
not allow for prophecies, predictions or ready-made solutions. In this way, he directed the 
participants‟ way of thinking about the future towards the scenario method the project organisers 
had announced in the invitation to the foresight process. He indirectly underlined the particular 
features of foresight as a systematic way of thinking about the future. At the same time, his 
request accentuated his role as facilitator and coordinator, requiring the participants to regard 
him as having the competence and knowledge to approach the future. 
On the first day the participants were asked to collect what in the scenario method is called 
„driving forces‟. Peter Schwartz has called driving forces „the elements that move the plot of a 
scenario‟ (1996, 101). Driving forces are considered by most foresighters and facilitators to be a 
central component in scenario development. Yet what constitutes a driving force, or a driver, and 
how such forces are employed varies between projects. Driving forces are thus open to 
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 All quotations are from the author‟s notes compiled during the workshops on 16 and 17 September 2004. 
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 See Chapter 2, subchapter 2.2. 
82 
 
considerable interpretation and dependent on the context they are used in. To understand their 
meaning and use in this foresight process I will briefly introduce a few representative 
perspectives on the concept.  
Basically, driving forces are described as the „underlying forces‟ which push developments in 
certain directions or which can determine certain trends. For example, both migration and the 
birth rate will have an impact on the size of the future working population. In this respect these 
are driving forces related to the future working population. However, the direction these driving 
forces take (whether they increase, decrease or remain constant) is uncertain: Therefore, in the 
example cited, the size of the working population may vary depending on what direction the 
driving forces take. 
 Many of those writing about or using the concept of driving forces see them as acting outside 
the direct control of those who perceive them.
131
 For example, the consequences of 
environmental damage are often perceived as outside the individual‟s control. However, 
collective actions may nevertheless regain control over the direction some of these 
environmental problems might take. What is perceived as „beyond control‟, „uncertain‟, 
„predetermined‟, „highly plausible‟ or „influential‟ depends on the perspectives of those 
employing the concept and the context in which the scenarios are created. 
Driving forces are thus used to provide underlying conditions for various plausible future 
scenarios. Strong driving forces, for example, are seen as highly probable and as having a 
substantial impact on future developments. Political scientist and social anthropologist Iver B. 
Neumann and social scientist Erik Øverland define driving forces as being on the dividing line 
between „intentional forces‟ and „elements of a clearly non-intentional character‟ (Neumann and 
Øverland, 2004, 267). Terms describing these forces can vary. The foresight method following 
the „actor/factor approach‟ defines actors as „intentional subjects‟, but factors such as 
„legislation‟, „gender‟ or „business ethics‟ as non-intentional (ibid). Writing about scenario 
planning and strategy in business development, management scholars Liam Fahey and Robert M. 
Randall (1998, 10) divide driving forces into „environmental forces‟ and the „actions of 
institutions‟. Environmental forces can be economic, social, cultural, ecological or technological, 
but they lack intention, while the actions of institutions refer to „different types of business 
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 Van der Heijden (2005), Fahey and Randall (1998), Ringland (2002) and Schwartz (1996). 
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organizations, political parties, governmental agencies and regional and international bodies‟ 
(ibid). Here organisations are defined as intentional actors. 
Thus writers on the subject of driving forces locate intentionality and agency in various 
phenomena of the „outside world‟. Whereas Neumann and Øverland emphasise the intentionality 
and agency of individual subjects, Fahey and Randall see intentionality as also residing in 
organisational collectives. This distinction between intentional and non-intentional thus 
presumes that there are also „blind‟ forces at work which can influence the future, such as the 
„unintended side-effects‟ of scientific and technological developments. Yet whether they are 
classified as „intentional‟ or „non-intentional‟, „environmental‟ or „institutional‟, driving forces 
are generally perceived as forces that act independently of what we might wish for the future.  
According to these approaches driving forces act „out there‟, in the „real world‟. These 
notions are based on the particular approach in scenario planning which divides the world „out 
there‟ into three layers, consisting of fundamental „structures‟ (social, technological, 
environmental, economic and political – STEEP), „trends and patterns‟, which overlay structures, 
and finally „events‟ as the top layer (van der Heijden 1996/2005). The metaphor for this order is 
the „iceberg‟, based on the argument that while we can only see the tip of the iceberg (the events) 
we must also relate to and understand the structures underneath to navigate the future safely. 
Trends are slightly different building blocks for scenarios than driving forces. Management 
scholar Franz Liebl (2004, 11) sees the roots of trends not in „objective facts‟ or „causal 
mechanisms‟. He argues that trends should be understood as „social constructions‟ and „mental 
worlds‟ rather than objective facts.132 This does not mean, however, that „facts are irrelevant and 
emerging trends are pure inventions; the economic and technological basis may also play an 
important role. ... to a large extent trends represent mental worlds, attitudes and fantasies shared 
by customers and stakeholder groups‟ (ibid). 
Driving forces, trends and events are thus ambiguous concepts. What is regarded as an 
external driving force or as a mental world is dependent on the perspective of the project owners 
as well as the participants. What is regarded as an intentional actor, or a non-intentional factor 
can be defined from a broader or more limited perspective on agency and intentionality. How the 
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 See also Fuller and Loogma (2009) who discuss foresight methodology from a social constructionist 
perspective. 
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collection of driving forces is used in the creation of scenarios is thus „flexible to accommodate 
the desires of those involved in the processes‟ (Horn 2000, 37–8).  
 
4.4 Coordinating openness 
In the foresight project on ICT research held at Sundvollen in September 2004, the initial 
approach towards driving forces was not predefined by any of the perspectives discussed above. 
The facilitator announced how the participants were to collect driving forces by focusing on 
quantity instead of preconceived definitions: 
Which forces do we think will influence the future? Please take ten minutes to 
come up with as many driving forces as you can. Driving forces can be trends, 
events, factors, big actors, etc. Anything that might influence the future [italics 
added]. 
 
 
In his task announcement the facilitator listed not only actors, factors and events – i.e. forces 
defined as acting „out there‟ – but also „trends‟, which according to Liebl (2004) are social 
constructions. The facilitator thus included both forces considered as acting independently of 
people‟s perceptions as well as mental worlds and attitudes in the domain of future [driving] 
forces. In this respect the facilitator deliberately opened the future to a wide range of possible 
ideas, allowing anything and everything to be collected as equally valued contributions. 
During this first phase nothing was evaluated regarding its probable importance, so 
participants could come up with anything they thought might have an impact on the future. Their 
evaluation concerned only „whether‟ and not „how‟ the collected idea was related to the future. 
However, by being written down, and therefore materialised, any phenomenon a participant 
thought important could become a potential building block for a future scenario. „Anything that 
might influence the future‟ changed thus from being anything into something that got written 
down. Immaterial thoughts became materialised words on paper and thus valued and classified as 
contributions. In this way these ideas reached a new classifying stage they were not part of 
before. They became part of the scenario process and could hence become crucial to the 
narratives about to be produced. 
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These are examples written down on post-it notes in one of the groups I observed during the 
task: 
Fear of technology; international cooperation either increasing or decreasing; 
governmental intervention; fear of terror induces more R&D; pressure coming 
from China and India; less oil profit, Asian influence on digital game industry; 
positioning by patents; increasing demand for efficiency; competence society; 
always online... 
 
 
The driving forces written down on the post-it notes reflected economic, social, cultural and 
political issues the participants thought important in their immediate present. India, China and 
Asia in general were evaluated as constituting growing global competition. The participants also 
mentioned fear of terror and technology, as well as the constant pressure on the individual citizen 
in the form of an increasing demand for competence, efficiency and permanent accessibility. 
These driving forces, examples of many contributions, did not express ideas about the future. 
Rather they were phenomena existing in the present, but which in line with the idea of driving 
forces might become more influential in the years to come. Materialising these ideas on paper 
shows that foresight does not produce facts but can influence present realities by expressing 
certain values and expectations.  
The instruction to write down „anything that might influence the future‟ allowed for a wide 
perspective on possible driving forces. The perspective expressed in these examples was clearly 
both global and national, combining perceptions of global processes with national concerns, 
expressed for example by „less oil profit‟ and „pressure coming from China and India‟. Some of 
the forces assumed to influence the future were unrelated phenomena, such as „fear of 
technology‟ or „an increasing demand for efficiency‟. Others expressed certain causal 
connections between events, such as „fear of terror induces more R&D‟. In this respect the 
participants expressed their values and attitudes by writing down phenomena they evaluated as 
existing independently of their own intentions, but which were assumed to influence present and 
future developments.  
However, the projected openness of the contributions was shaped by certain conditions that 
prepared the ground for ideas preferred by the project owners and organisers. Driving forces 
listed on paper were informed by the facilitator‟s initial instruction to forget about the „crystal 
ball‟, not to engage in forecasting or strategies and to leave all „agendas‟ at home. The 
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participants were thus asked to think of driving forces based on global socio-technological issues 
rather than on expected scientific or technological innovations that might be connected to their 
own area of professional activity. The contributions did not constitute expectations about 
technological or scientific developments, but rather were engendered by the participants‟ 
knowledge of and views on political, social or cultural issues, such as „governmental 
intervention‟, „positioning by patents‟ or „the demand for efficiency‟. By writing down ideas 
related to global and national issues, the participants responded to the invitation‟s initial request 
not to act as „official representatives of certain economic or sectoral interests‟. Thus the collected 
ideas were also shaped by participants‟ distancing themselves from their organisational or 
sectoral – i.e. representational – competency. This contrasts with the very open approach 
announced by the facilitator whereby the scope of driving forces could include actors, factors, 
events or trends. It shows how the participants were to a certain degree aware of the initial 
requests they had received and were willing to follow the proposed agreement limited to this 
particular process. Thus the wide-open future announced when participants were given the task 
of collecting driving forces was at the same time shaped by the requests made in the invitation.  
What Thévenot (2002a) calls „dynamic and creative aspects of coordination‟ are in  these 
ethnographic moments always linked to limited agreements which contribute to controlling 
events, people‟s engagement and the outcome of creative and dynamic processes. Any sectoral 
driving forces that might have a stronger and more direct impact on the participants‟ futures were 
here commonly deemed irrelevant, or in the perspective of the project organisers as 
„inconvenient‟ to the process. In this respect, the collected driving forces were not conceived 
from the participants‟ interest-based visions and expectations. 
 
4.5 Future certainty and non-calculation 
After they had written down as many driving forces as possible the facilitator asked the 
participants to sort out the contributions collectively within the groups:  
Collect post-it notes which all entail the same idea! Look at cause and effect 
and rearrange the information! Clean up your notes, synthesize, look for cause-
effect relationships and rewrite. 
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The group I observed sorted their notes into the following categories:  
Technology: Wireless, ubiquitous and free of charge, e-ID card, always on 
Humans: the cell phone generation grows up, population stops increasing, 
women take over, people retain image of a young person until they are 50 
Attitudes and values: indifferent youth, people focused on self-realisation 
Security: all children under surveillance, Fidel Castro dies, criminal 
organisations 
Individual: Fear of death, seeking experience, increased focus on „the best‟, 
time becomes a currency... 
 
The ordered list of driving forces started out with technology as the first heading, ranking 
wireless and ubiquitous access first on the list, followed by the familiar idea about universal 
electronic identification cards and the ability to be permanently engaged in electronic 
communication. Similarly the focus on youth, individualisation, self-realisation, expertise and 
lack of time are well established cultural outlooks on society as it exists today. Finally, 
participants included the widespread idea of security through omnipresent surveillance on the list 
of expected driving forces which could influence the future. The participants thus collected 
trends, actors or factors already at work in the present. Among these ordered ideas, now 
rearranged under specific headings, certain ideas were more likely to be usable as driving forces 
because they implied a movement, a development, such as „increased focus on the best‟ or „time 
becomes a currency‟. Others were less reflected ideas not clearly perceivable as having an 
influence on future developments such as „Fidel Castro dies‟ or „criminal organisations‟. 133  
These contributions were made following the request to collect „anything that might influence 
the future‟. The underlying assumption ensuing from the participants‟ competency and creativity 
was that every contribution was equally valid. This approach allowed contributions like „all 
children under surveillance‟, „Fidel Castro dies‟ and „criminal organisation‟ to be collected under 
one heading called „security‟. In attempting to order the contributions, the participants 
abandoned the initial criterion of national and global concerns, allowing single items like e-ID 
cards to be mixed with the death of politicians as well as generational or individual phenomena.  
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 For a discussion systematising the quality of ideas in scenario creation see Uotila and Melkas (2007), who 
rank collected contributions either as simple „data‟, as „information‟ (which should at least show a causal connection 
between two ideas) or as „knowledge‟(the highest quality of contributions), which would show causal connections 
and give reasons for specific developments. 
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How valuable were these initially collected and ordered driving forces for scenarios about the 
future of ICT research? A systematic approach to the future carries with it a claim to be able to 
justify the results of a scenario process, whether at the end or at any stage in between. So how 
can these contributions be characterised?  
In the face-to-face, creativity-oriented workshop at Sundvollen, the participants arranged their 
ideas into categories reflecting their understanding of political and social reality at this point in 
time. The list of driving forces and the way they were ordered were effects of different elements 
working together, such as the requests expressed in the invitation, the open approach provided by 
the facilitator, group dynamics and the work of collecting and writing down ideas. This ordering 
of collected driving forces thus represents a miniature example of the messiness of reality.
134
  
Within the context of foresight the activity discussed is described as brainstorming or „brain 
writing‟ (van Notten 2005). Brain writing is also coordinated through time, both as real time 
within the workshop, and as the perspective on time and continuity reflected in the contributions 
collected in the workshop groups. I argue that these contributions are examples of a certain 
randomness of thought, which emerges in collective settings framed by real-time conditions. 
Faced with the pressure to solve this first task within the time limit set by the facilitator, the 
participants in the group I observed were obliged to write down something. This was part of the 
limited agreement, namely, the convention of being participants in this scenario workshop.
135
 
The ability to reflect on their contributions was limited by time and by „the working of the mind‟. 
Sociologist and systems theorist Niklas Luhmann (1994, 377) writes on the working of the mind: 
The mind thinks what it thinks and nothing else. From the perspective of an 
observer – either another mind or a communication system that communicates 
about the observed mind – the mind can be seen as a medium that may accept 
and transmit a myriad of conditions. 
 
Luhmann‟s assertion about how thinking cannot be seen separated from the situation, from 
the particular moment and place it happens in, includes the innumerable possible things the mind 
might produce at a specific point in time. Once ideas are written down, they may reflect the 
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 In his introduction to „Making a Mess with Method‟ Law (2003a, 3) underlines that „the world is largely 
messy… It is also the case that contemporary social science methods are hopelessly bad at knowing that mess. 
Indeed, dominant approaches to method work with some success to repress the very possibility of mess.‟  
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 During my observations, I also encountered a breach of this contract, a participant who had come to the 
conclusion that the workshop was a waste of time and stopped contributing. His argument was that foresight 
exercises for ICT research would only render results if they concentrated purely on technological extrapolation. 
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messiness of reality and hence remain random until they become systematised into lists, 
categories or models. 
The point here is not to declare these first contributions to the scenario workshop as purely 
random ideas, which they clearly were not. Rather I want to draw attention to the temporal 
aspects of the situation in which these contributions were produced. The face-to-face interactions 
in the groups happened within a limited timespan, while the participants were at the same time 
asked to think as broadly and openly as possible, writing down „anything that might influence the 
future‟. Their contributions were produced under prescribed conditions yet were open to 
numerous possibilities. Their particular ideas then became part of the collective material 
produced in the process. 
Under the conditions described above the participants assumed the existence of a „certainty 
narrative‟, so that the ideas collected reflected their assumptions about temporal development as 
an elongated present, including future developments regarded as certain, such as the future 
importance of ICT.
 
In other words, all uncertainties about the future exist in the wider context of 
a „certainty narrative‟ which leaves no doubt about the future importance of „generic enabling 
technologies‟ (Brown et al. 2000, 11).136 
 If we view this as the underlying condition for the workshop, we can discuss the collection of 
these driving forces in terms of „the present unfolding‟ (Risan 2006). Drawing on Whitehead 
(1925) anthropologist and STS scholar Lars Risan argues that the present is not a moment, but 
„duration‟, a larger „chunk of time‟. The present has a certain length of time in which events 
unfold. Risan uses the relatively short example of a train ride in Switzerland, lasting about an 
hour, to speak about the inevitability of the present: 
This present is not a given. It is an achievement, an achievement of the Swiss 
railway system. (In Britain it is not the same kind of achievement, and the 
present is a different thing when travelling by train in the UK.) Doing the trip 
from Lausanne to Geneva was an unfolding of a present. And the present has to 
unfold, as it is not a moment, but a duration...If then, we want to criticise 
technological determinism, we should not criticise descriptions when they 
describe an unfolding of the present, even when that present consists of a large 
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discontinuity in scenario development. As van Notten (2005) argues, explicit requests to come up with ideas about 
unexpected driving forces which disrupt certain developments can create interesting and insightful scenarios. 
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chunk of time, such as, say, twenty years („cars and roads will still be the 
dominant means of transportation in twenty years time‟).  
 
If we follow Risan‟s argument we may describe the real time interactions in the workshop as 
an ordering of values based on the perception of an unfolding of the present. The collected 
driving forces were based on a „certainty narrative‟ about technological and social conditions 
that will still pertain in ten to twenty years. In this respect the collected driving forces reflected 
both collective values and random thought. 
This first activity during the two-day workshop provided the basic material for the scenarios 
intended to increase the quality of priority-setting in research policy and inform the new large 
research programme on ICT. At the same time the number of possible resources for the creation 
of scenarios was increased by asking for „as many driving forces as possible‟. Removing 
resources to distinguish between driving forces made it difficult for participants to decide which 
driving forces could be considered most important owing to the sheer number and variety of 
forces – both in terms of scale and type – which could be written down.  
This kind of coordination can again be seen as a way to remove „resources or relations needed 
for calculability‟ and thus create a „situation of non-calculation‟ through rarefaction (Law and 
Callon 2005, 217). Following Thévenot (2002a, 54–5) this first activity was also already a 
„complex moral and political ordering‟ which expressed values implied both in the organisers‟ 
approach and in the participants‟ instant evaluations of possible driving forces and their future 
importance. This complex ordering created a link between „the good‟ and „the real‟. At this early 
point in the process, almost any of the contributions written down had the potential to become 
important driving forces, provided they were put in a meaningful context – what Thévenot calls 
„a common good or the fulfilment of a planned action‟ (ibid). Thus meaningful and „good‟ 
contributions would be those which helped to fulfil the aspirations of the project owners to come 
up with scenarios relevant for research policy development.  
The „real‟ is what happens when such aspirations are transformed into practice. As discussed 
above, the real was produced by coordinated engagement through certain limited agreements. 
However, as Thévenot argues, qualification for worth needs to be tested (ibid, 61). These 
contributions were to undergo evaluation in the following activities, which reordered 
participants, organisers, texts, methods, approaches and task descriptions. Depending on the 
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outcome of the participants‟ and the facilitator‟s further interactions, some of the driving forces 
written down at that stage could potentially influence which areas of ICT research might get 
funding in the new major programme to last until 2015.  
 
4.6 Employing the scenario axes tool 
In the previous subchapters I have discussed the collection of driving forces in the first phase 
of the scenario workshop. As I argued above, preconditions and elements of interaction were at 
work that led to a specific ordering of values through this particular collection of contributions. 
Within this ordering the future as the point of reference for these contributions emerged as both 
open and shaped at the same time. Now the process had to evolve by systematising and utilising 
the contributed ideas to a greater extent. New elements had to be introduced into the process to 
ensure the relevance of the results for scenario creation. Some of these elements were tools for 
scenario creation intended to help the participants evaluate and use their collected ideas. 
However, this increasingly focused approach did not only involve scenario tools. The 
participants were also asked to consider specific topics deemed important to the foresight project. 
On the first day of the workshop the facilitator reminded the participants at 3pm:  
Do not forget the scope of these driving forces! Think technology, society and 
how research is conducted! How is research conducted to support ICT 
development? We are still talking about driving forces here!  
 
 
The facilitator thus reminded the participants that notwithstanding the open approach to 
driving forces there were certain topics to which these forces were supposed to be relevant. The 
three most important areas the participants were to address were technology, society and 
research. However, by asking participants to focus on how research is conducted to support ICT 
development the facilitator was implying that research had a certain function and should be seen 
as directly related to ICT development. By reminding them not only to think about the areas of 
technology, society and research, but also to tell a story about „how research is conducted‟ he 
asked for specific plot-thinking. Thus not only were certain topics highlighted as relevant, but 
these topics were also arranged by the facilitator in order of importance. Research was deemed to 
be the most important element, supporting the development of ICT. 
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After being reminded of the topics to focus on and the plot in which these topics were to be 
used, the groups were asked to place the driving forces they had collected in scenario models. 
The facilitator presented the participants with a choice of three different models they could use to 
create a first scenario draft. The group I observed during this task chose the „scenario axes 
model‟ because this was a model most of them had seen before and which some of them had had 
experience using. 
According to van‟t Klooster and van Asselt (2006) who have conducted several ethnographic 
studies in foresight practice, using scenario axes is often recommended as „a useful and 
straightforward tool to construct images of the future in a coherent and systematic way‟ (ibid, 
17). Scenario axes can help identify the two most important driving forces in scenario 
construction, that is „those developments that are both very uncertain (and therefore can develop 
in different directions) and may have a decisive impact for the region, the subject, the company, 
etc. In other words, driving forces which serve as scenario axes are those developments that 
score high on both the „uncertainty‟ and „impact‟ indicators (ibid). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: „Scenario axes as a starting point for scenarios‟ as described by van‟t Klooster and van 
Asselt (2006, 18). 
 
Driving force A high 
Driving force A low 
Driving force B high 
Driving force B 
low 
Scenario quadrant 2 Scenario quadrant 1 
Scenario quadrant 4 Scenario quadrant 3 
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In van‟t Klooster and van Asselt‟s description the development of driving forces is 
represented using comparative indicators (ibid, 21). For example, a driving force called „climate 
change‟ can develop into „little climate change‟ or „strong climate change‟. Equally the economy 
as a driving force may take the form of „economic growth‟ or „economic decline‟, thus also 
turning quantitative elements into qualitative change. 
In this study of how scenario axes are applied in practice, the driving forces finally chosen to 
serve as scenario axes were generated following a long and structured debate between scenario 
process participants, involving several expert consultations (ibid). This lengthy and systematic 
process of reaching a consensus about what driving forces to use was thus based not only on 
which driving forces were relevant for the particular scenario process, but also on which driving 
forces were evaluated as the most important forces „out there in the real world‟ by the majority 
of participants in that study. 
Thus a systematic approach is dependent on consensus among participants about which 
driving forces should be considered most important. Van‟t Klooster and van Asselt, however, 
point out that literature on the use of scenario axes assumes there is „an ultimate rationale behind 
the construction and application of the scenario axes... [and] because the scenario axes approach 
is assumed to be a kind of standard method, the choice of the two axes and the actual usage is 
hardly explained in foresight studies‟ (ibid). This, however, obscures any understanding of the 
methodologies used by practitioners, and often hides a „discrepancy between formal rhetoric and 
actual performance‟ (ibid, 19). Nevertheless, they conclude that scenario axes help people to 
think about the future in a systematic way. According to the authors, consensus about the content 
of these scenario axes is not always necessary or possible, but participants involved in scenario 
creation can reach compromises on these issues so that scenarios can actually be produced. 
Finally, combining two driving forces deemed important in such a scenario model is described 
by scenario theorists as an advantage because „seemingly unrelated data can be made 
operationally useful‟ (ibid, 18).137 Thus creating scenario models based on specific driving forces 
is mainly a systematic but also a flexible and undetermined process which depends on the 
context and interests of the creators. 
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4.7 Research as a driving force: value-based scenario axes 
Compared with the systematic and consensus-driven approach to scenario axes described 
above, the project organisers at the RCN were not asking for agreement among all participants 
about which driving forces should be used collectively. Choices about scenario models and the 
driving forces to be used were left to the six groups. In this way the number of possible results of 
this activity was increased. 
However, the participants had been reminded by the facilitator to focus on the three topics: 
society, technology and research, and to consider a certain plot in which research supports the 
development of ICT. Again, as with the simultaneous opening and shaping of the future 
conducted in the collection of driving forces, a similar movement was unfolding. Providing 
space for different choices made it possible to conceive of many different scenario models which 
could be chosen for further development. At the same time, the topics announced by the 
facilitator and the request for specific plot-thinking made it clear that the participants were to 
focus on specific topics for their scenario models. 
When I decided to observe group five they had already settled on using the scenario axes 
model and were about to discuss which driving forces should be used to illustrate uncertain but 
important developments. One member of the group, an RCN employee, asked for research to be 
included as a driving force in the scenario axes. He argued that research would be one of the 
most uncertain driving forces and reasoned: „What is most uncertain is most interesting.‟  
A second participant suggested assigning „values and attitudes‟ to the second axis. Another 
RCN employee claimed that „individuals‟ and „values‟ are connected, and everybody agreed on 
this.
 138
 This conclusion was based not on assumptions about whether these elements could be 
seen as decisive for future developments but rather constituted a limited agreement within the 
group that „research‟ together with „values and attitudes‟ could create an interesting combination. 
Thus, this was less a systematic process of eliminating the other driving forces collected, or else 
an assumption that these two forces could have an important future influence „out there‟. The 
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Values and 
Attitudes 
Scenario 1: 
Trench wars, 
academia ruled 
by OWG 
 
participants of this group were more interested in the creative possibilities of this combination of 
„seemingly unrelated data‟.  
The suggestion to use research as a driving force because its outcome was uncertain was made 
by an RCN employee. His suggestion made research a central subject in the creation of scenario 
models within this particular group. In this respect he shaped the content of the discussion for 
this group, while at the same time carrying out his responsibility as an employee of the project 
owning organisation to ensure the relevance of the participants‟ contributions. 
 
Group five drew this preliminary scenario model:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Scenario axes developed by group 5 during the exercise. From author‟s notes 16 September 
2004. 
 
Research in 
dialogue 
Research for 
research’s sake 
Very sceptical 
about 
technological 
development 
All new 
(technology) is 
good news 
Research 
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While they were creating the model the group discussed the scenario axes related to surveys 
about scepticism regarding research and public understanding of science and technology: „The 
more knowledge people acquire about science, the greater the scepticism,‟ one group member 
explained. The horizontal axis „Values and attitudes‟ was meant to describe people‟s feelings 
about technological development. On the left, the most extreme attitude was being sceptical 
about every new technological development. On the right, all innovations were embraced simply 
because they represented something new. Both attitudes represented possible directions the 
driving force „values and attitudes‟ could take in a research/value scenario. 
Research was defined as a driving force that could develop in two possible directions: 
„Research in dialogue‟ described a reality in which interdisciplinary environments thrive and a 
continuous dialogue is maintained between society, researchers and industry. „Research for 
research‟s sake‟ described an endpoint at which research is conducted in isolation, separated and 
aloof from society. This was a first possible mini-scenario combining two driving forces causally 
and temporally. Following an intense discussion the group managed to fill one of the four 
scenario quadrants with content before they ran out of time. In the lower left quadrant they 
inserted two phrases: „trench wars‟, and „academia ruled by Old White Guys‟ (OWG). The group 
reasoned that if research were to become increasingly fragmented and applied research lost 
funding, at the same time as society became increasingly sceptical about technological 
development and research in general, then research groups would start a trench war against each 
other. The research population would diminish into a homogeneous group of privileged 
professors guarding their own fields and excluding others. 
„But what kind of research are we talking about here?‟ one group member asked: „This 
scenario model is not about ICT anymore, I‟d say.‟ The RCN employee who had proposed 
research as a driving force for the scenario axes asked: „How dependent is ICT development on 
this development in research at all? Is there an obvious connection?‟  
Following the collection of driving forces described as „anything that might influence the 
future‟, the facilitator had asked participants to connect driving forces to technology, society and 
research. He had also asked them to accept a given relationship between research and ICT by 
asking them to imagine possible futures based on the question: How is research conducted to 
support ICT development? As I have shown, group five worked to combine research, technology 
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and social values in a scenario axes model. They linked ICT development with people‟s values 
and attitudes and connected research to the question of how visible research could be in a society 
dominated by such values, and what might happen if research and social development drifted 
further apart. Yet in creating this scenario axes model, the participants found it difficult to adhere 
to the facilitator‟s requests. There was no obvious connection between research and ICT 
development in the model, and so the question emerged what research they were actually talking 
about. Technology, as one participant observed, disappeared completely, thus highlighting the 
question about the role research was to play in this scenario model.  
There was no time left to further discuss the relationship between these factors and their 
potential as driving forces, since at that point the facilitator asked them to start on the next, and 
final task of the day. 
 
4.8 Ascribing collective responsibility 
As the participants were trying to understand what they had created, the facilitator gave them 
the next task, which required them to develop a scenario narrative draft based on the scenario 
models they had created. The six groups were now asked to develop two drafts each, based on 
the driving forces they had chosen. The drafts were supposed to match a range of criteria all 
deemed indispensable for a „good‟ scenario – they were to be „believable, plausible, internally 
coherent, entail some surprise and be strategically relevant‟.  
The assignment of this final task led to discussion among the groups and in the plenary. One 
participant asked the facilitator to explain again the final use of the scenarios to be developed. 
Another participant wondered aloud how to develop scenarios from the models which could 
match all these criteria. A third group member questioned the previously accepted requirement to 
write scenarios covering the topics society, technology and research. He asked the facilitator: 
„How can you so easily connect social development with ICT research? This connection does not 
seem obvious to me.‟ One of the other participants affirmed the validity of this question, while 
another nodded. „Then why did you use them in your scenario axes?‟ replied the facilitator.  
The prevailing uncertainty among the participants about what they were about to create was 
addressed by the facilitator in his final response. The participants had focused on research, 
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technology and social development because they had been asked to do so. The group I observed 
had expressed interest in creating scenario axes which combined research as a driving force with 
people‟s values and attitudes. The facilitator‟s final reply stated that although accepting an 
invitation to this foresight project had implied agreement with the chosen approach and process, 
it was up to the participants to decide on the limits of this agreement. He thus asserted that they 
had been free not to follow the requests and task descriptions. The fact that they did so was their 
own responsibility.  
Based on the initial agreement expressed in the invitation to this scenario process the 
participants were accommodating to the convention of listening to those organising and steering 
the process. The request to include research as a driving force in a scenario model was therefore 
considered as part of this agreement by the participants. Since tasks and requests contributed to 
coordinating the process, they could render other possible perspectives less relevant. This did not 
mean that the participants‟ interests had to be congruous with those organising the process. Yet 
they shared responsibility for the outcome collectively, even if their interests were different from 
those inviting them. Thus the facilitator implied that it was the participants who were now 
shaping the future scenarios. Using elements he had proposed meant agreeing with the organisers 
about the importance of these issues. If they expressed uncertainty, it was not the organisers‟ 
responsibility to convince them of the value of their work. Thus responsibility for the quality of 
the scenario models and the implications for scenarios narratives was transferred to the 
participants.  
The characteristics the facilitator presented as constituting a good scenario draft demanded a 
high level of narrative competence. The scenario drafts to be produced had to comply with a 
certain standard format that foresight professionals had invested in and had thus made part of the 
scenario method the participants had agreed to follow. However, the uncertainty expressed by 
the participants about the coherence and relevance of their scenario models for the scenarios to 
be created was not alleviated by stipulating more criteria for their activities. This proliferation
 
of 
scenario criteria to be followed by the participants was rather an overload of resources to be used 
and thus increased uncertainty about how to create good scenarios.139  
                                                 
139
 See Callon and Law (2005, 217) and this thesis, Chapter 3, subchapter 3.6, on proliferation as a strategy to 
impede calculation by providing an overload of calculative resources. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed ethnographic moments observed during the first participatory 
workshop in which driving forces were collected and ordered and scenario models and drafts 
created by about forty participants, among them nine Research Council employees. My argument 
is that opening and shaping the future happens simultaneously, through the social and spatial 
ordering of heterogeneous materials as well as through temporal conditions such as real time, 
randomness of thought and the perspective on time as elongated present. These coordinating 
activities raise issues linked to responsibility, value and uncertainty. 
Ranking and representation were coordinated through the invitation to the participatory 
workshop. As I argue above, the invitation was part of the specific collective assembled in this 
process, working as a coordinating device which defined the preconditions for engagement by 
stating with whom, why and how the foresight project would be conducted. People representing 
the interests of their professional organisations were selected for invitation via ranking based on 
the esteem they had aggregated. However, in order to create equivalence between participants 
those invited were asked to represent only themselves, so that their contributions could be 
ordered as equally valid during the process and thus produce „undetermined, dynamic and 
creative‟ interaction. 
The collection of driving forces was based on an open approach, asking for actors, factors, 
events and trends, and thus combining forces deemed to act „out there‟ with the individual 
perspectives of the participants. Here I have argued that this is an ordering of values based on 
dynamic and creative coordination during the process but also on agreements made prior to and 
limited to this specific process. Later, however, the participants were reminded that they were 
supposed to use research, technology and social development as important elements in scenario 
models and drafts. In agreeing to contribute to the process, the participants accepted that they 
would incorporate the organisers‟ perspective in their engagement. Uncertainty about the 
assumed connection between these elements was evaluated by the facilitator as an issue of 
responsibility, and he reminded the participants that it had been up to them to employ these 
topics, i.e. that they were basically free to use what they wanted. Uncertainty about the assumed 
coherence of ideas and about the value of the scenarios to be created did not lead to increased 
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creativity and engagement but was turned into an issue of responsibility.
 
As I have shown in this 
chapter, notwithstanding the dynamic „working of the mind‟ in brain storming activities and the 
multiple perspectives on possible driving forces in scenario creation, here the participants‟ 
contributions emerged, though not exclusively, as an effect of coordination. 
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5 WRITING SCENARIOS 
This chapter discusses the writing process in a foresight project, focusing on collective writing as 
an important stage of scenario development. It is here that the collective work on scenarios 
moves from a relatively open approach, mostly conducted through coordination, and enters the 
phase in which concrete results have to be produced in order to achieve an outcome. Thus the 
process increasingly involves negotiating different scenario ideas, ordering them and 
incorporating them in the final texts. The first research question I asked in the introduction is 
especially important here: How does the interaction between stakeholder involvement and the 
need for a result useful to the organisation produce future stories?  
When writing scenarios actors deal directly or indirectly with the features of foresight which 
identify it as an emerging political technology. They are faced with having to address the future 
in a systematic way, to use competence in their approach to the future and to ensure the relevance 
of the scenarios for further or parallel processes, connecting thus forward-looking to forward-
acting. Furthermore they need to be attentive to emerging unintended effects of collective 
scenario development which could be potentially useful as well as defining the relationship 
between technology and society in the scenarios. Attending to all these features in scenario 
development is part of the process of ensuring that foresight constitutes a legitimate approach to 
the future under conditions of uncertainty. The requirement to produce coherence by limiting 
scenarios to a specific number, form and content (van Notten 2005) underlines the complex 
challenges of writing scenarios. 
According to Wright (2005, 7) the role of text and language in the creation of scenarios is an 
area which still receives insufficient attention within social studies of future-oriented processes. 
In the conclusion to his thesis on discontinuity in scenario creation van Notten (2005) proposes 
the writing phase of scenario creation as an issue for further research (ibid, 171). The focus in his 
thesis is on the usefulness of different methods for discontinuity-oriented scenarios. In his 
detailed and comprehensive analysis he defines language, ideas and texts as products of applied 
methods (ibid, 126). The more refined and focused the method applied to the task of creating 
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discontinuity-rich scenarios, the more successful the outcome. Writing scenarios, however, is 
seen as an undetermined and dynamic activity with unforeseeable effects. According to van 
Notten the process of negotiating and writing might have „inspiring or impairing effects, 
depending on other factors‟ (ibid, 124–5). Hence the process of writing future stories remains 
open to opposing interpretations. Since his study was not able to determine whether the writing 
process „diluted‟ the ideas collected in earlier stages or made them more „sophisticated‟, he 
concluded: „It is unclear exactly what the nature of the writing and negotiating process was and 
so we categorise it as a double-edged factor‟ (ibid). However, as I will show in this chapter, it is 
especially during the phase of scenario writing that the potential of a foresight process and its 
relevance to other strategic processes is determined. 
It would appear from my overview of the relevant literature that there has been no qualitative 
case study concerned with the production of scenario texts including the stage at which the 
writing process is negotiated.140 The literature addressing the writing stage of scenarios is mainly 
prescriptive and discusses possible or optimal approaches depending on which areas these 
scenarios are meant to inform, i.e. strategic planning, research policy or public debates on future 
technologies.
141
 Negotiating the writing of scenarios is clearly situated in the concrete context of 
each scenario process. Therefore generic knowledge about this particular stage of scenario 
creation is often only distributed within the organisations concerned and does not reach the wider 
professional and academic research arena.
142
 The contribution of my study is to open those 
moments to investigation.  
Owing to the lack of studies addressing collective writing in scenario development as 
highlighted by van Notten (2005) I have sought inspiration in work analysing processes of 
organising and managing information emerging from ethnographic studies of collective and 
organised writing. The issue of collective writing was addressed by Callon (2002) in his study of 
management tools in tourist and business service organisations. The collective writing and 
rewriting of management tools such as questionnaires and handbooks involves both company 
employees and their customers responding to services. Callon argues that firms today are „faced 
with a tension between greater complexity and simplification‟ (ibid, 192). He states that 
                                                 
140
 For ethnographic studies of foresight in public policy see Dobbinga (2001) and van‟t Klooster (2007).  
141
 Van der Heijden (1996/2005), Ringland (1998, 2002), Gaβner and Steinmüller (2005). 
142
 See the RCN‟s evaluation report on the foresight process (RCN 2006a).  
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encouraging the „exchange of information among increasing numbers of actors‟, „facilitating 
negotiations that lead to compromises‟ and allowing „the possibility of mobilising novel 
resources‟ are all part of what he calls a demand directed at the service sector to „allow 
complexity to proliferate‟ (ibid). In Callon‟s account complexity needs to be „managed and 
controlled‟, ensuring that „actors can be supervised and controlled‟. He argues that the 
complexity of market and customer demands is met by collective writing and rewriting of texts 
which simplify complex demands through „successive adjustment‟ (ibid). Thus while customer 
service needs to be more complex – i.e. more responsive – these complex demands need to be 
simplified by writing devices.143  
In the case of foresight about ICT research at the RCN the requirement for a more complex 
approach towards research policy development was expressed in the suggestion to allow a „wider 
than normal debate about priorities, empowering more parts of society in relation to the national 
research agenda‟(Arnold et al. 2001, 118). Yet the scenarios in the ICT foresight project were to 
be produced as specific texts within a short timespan (about four weeks between September and 
October 2004). Writing scenarios in a group involved both individual and collective action and 
specific coordination. Callon‟s analysis of complexity in collective writing processes is relevant 
here because, like Thévenot, he addresses the „tension between the collective and the particular‟ 
(Thévenot 2002a, 55), what Callon (2002, 193) calls the „conventional dichotomy between 
collective and individual action‟. Callon‟s focus on the work of writing itself, „highlighting the 
collective, negotiated, and distributed nature of the work‟ (ibid), can offer a perspective on how 
and by whom a scenario text is produced.  
While the process of writing future narratives has received little focus in ethnographic studies 
of foresight, several authors within the sociology of expectations have addressed how promising 
stories about the future, powerful „ideographs‟ such as „technological progress‟ as well as 
„breakthrough motifs‟ drive investments in R&D and new product developments (Deuten and 
Rip 2000, van Lente 2000, Brown 2000). These studies address expectations and promises in 
                                                 
143
 In the introduction to Complexities: social studies of knowledge practices, political philosopher and STS 
scholar Annemarie Mol and John Law (2002) contend that there is a long history of reducing complexity by 
simplification. However, they argue, complexity and simplicity are not necessarily opposites, but relate to each other 
in different ways. The main point it that we should not reduce complexity to a single order, but study how multiple 
orders, or „orderings‟ exist alongside each other. This is also an argument made by Thévenot when he talks about 
multiple orders of worth justifying for example different solutions for a road. 
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both written and oral form and are not concerned with the concrete textual products resulting 
from these interactions. What makes Callon‟s perspective interesting for the analysis at hand is 
his focus on the transformations and adjustments of specific texts instead of dispersed 
negotiations of both written and verbal expectations. Thus his perspective contributes to studying 
the shifting allocations of responsibility in a writing process concerned with creating bounded 
and coherent textual material.  
The scenarios had to be relevant for subsequent processes and hence needed to be texts useful 
for organising „action that is both framed and open‟ (Callon 2002, 201). Complexity emerged 
here as the requirement for creating collective scenarios representing the perspectives of the 
project‟s many participants. Complex scenarios were required in order to reflect the participatory 
activities involved in scenario creation, as well as possible socio-technological changes to be met 
in the future. Simplification in this process, on the other hand, was needed to relate the scenarios 
to strategic research development and make them readable and relevant for potential users 
outside the foresight project. Simplification can thus be related to the question of the scenarios‟ 
relevance for subsequent processes such as research programme and strategic development. Still, 
the question about how to ensure strategic relevance of the scenarios was in itself a complex 
issue. In this respect, this particular differentiation between complexity and simplification is one 
way of showing how the future is opened and shaped during the scenario writing process. 
However, particular issues of uncertainty, responsibility and value distinguish these processes 
from the collective writing and rewriting of management tools as described by Callon. 
 
5.1 Collective writing and authorship 
In the preceding chapter I discussed how driving forces and scenario models were created 
collectively in a participatory process involving about forty invited research and industry 
representatives as well as employees of the Research Council of Norway. The process involved 
specific coordination, which created a broad variety of contributions but also specific moments 
of uncertainty. In this respect the two-day workshop was a specific way of performing collective 
foresight. Now, transferring the collected ideas, post-it notes, scenario models and digital texts to 
the writing stage included a reduction of the collective from forty to ten people. This also 
included new ways of coordinating, negotiating and producing scenarios.  
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The new process emphasises the activity of writing rather than collective brain-storming, 
ranking and discussing ideas. Organisation theorist Barbara Czarniawska-Joerges (1992) has 
studied the collective writing of municipal budgets. She suggests distinguishing actors involved 
in collective writing in the public sector from the romanticised view of the author as the powerful 
creator of a work and suggests calling them „writers of texts‟ rather than „authors‟ (ibid, 227). In 
her view, calling public sector employees involved in collective writing authors „blinds us to the 
fact that the world is full of “writers”, who, in writing their “texts” reproduce social reality 
rather than creating it‟ (italics added). Collective writing is teamwork, uniting people in an 
„organised effort‟ (ibid). 
Czarniawska-Joerges thus proceeds from the assumption that a writer in a public institution 
does not create something new even though he or she is an autonomous actor. I want to argue 
that these distinctions are not quite as clear as that. Assuming responsibility for certain writing 
tasks, such as meeting reports for instance, allows the writer to order information in certain ways 
differing from the report of the same meeting written by someone else. Writers can thus also be 
considered creators, whether they act collectively or individually. 
Callon (2002) does not draw this distinction between the writer and the author. In the 
collective writing of stewards‟ handbooks (ibid, 206–7) both employees and customers 
contribute to the text; the customers by evaluating services and suggesting improvements. As 
Callon argues, it is precisely because the customers write that their responses can be taken into 
account (ibid). Therefore no company employee or managing director would claim single 
authorship of the texts.  
When discussing the activity of writing in a group of about ten people at the RCN, I want to 
reopen the question of author versus writer in scenario development. My main argument here is 
that the formal challenge of scenario creation is to avoid reproducing social reality as it is and 
instead to materialise alternative future realities on paper and screen. These collective efforts are 
informed by the workshop material and all the perspectives which enter the discussions on the 
production of alternative scenarios. How different futures are created depends on how the 
scenario writers coordinate and evaluate the collected material and on the different possibilities 
for ordering this material into narratives. Scenario creation thus includes both writing and 
authoring. Re-introducing the notion of the author in scenario writing I want to draw attention to 
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the particular activity of scenario writing, which includes narrative competence, yet which 
produces neither science fiction nor municipal budgets nor service handbooks. 
In the scenario writing process at the RCN the starting point for the creation of a small set of 
coherent narratives was the textual material gathered in the participatory workshop. When 
workshop material was transferred to a writing group the stories to be developed were still meant 
to reflect the collected ideas in a justifiable manner. However, the members of the writing group 
were, if not the source of the texts, actors in their own right. They were transforming drafts into 
stories and shaping the scenario material as they saw fit. Transferring workshop material to a 
writing group thus simultaneously transforms and redefines collective authorship.  
In the scenario process the writing of scenarios was assigned to a core group including RCN 
employees responsible for the success of the project as well as invited participants, some of 
whom had attended the preceding workshop activities. Transferring collective authorship to a 
limited number of scenario writers brought back issues of representation which had to some 
extent been controlled during the workshop by asking the participants not to represent any 
organisational or sectoral interests. This request was not a premise for the writing process. 
Whether the writer here was a RCN employee, a former workshop participant, an external 
consultant or a facilitator was not regarded as an issue for either coordination or negotiation. 
Authorship within the writing group thus implied representation, since requests to disregard 
representative agendas and interests were not made.  
A reason for this disregard of questions of representation and specific influence in the writing 
process could be the assumed value of writing as reflecting ownership (Callon 2002, 207). In any 
respect the Research Council of Norway was the rightful owner of the results of the foresight 
project. This ownership, however, had to be negotiated throughout the writing process to reflect 
the foresight project‟s ambition of including many perspectives and receiving support from 
external stakeholders. 
Callon (ibid) suggests calling writing „a contract that binds three types of actors together: the 
firm, its employees, and its customers‟. He argues that this contract is never complete, but that it 
is a device for coordinating different actors. The idea of an incomplete contract binding different 
actors together is useful when addressing the writing work in the foresight project on ICT 
research. There was a common yet not explicit understanding among all participants about the 
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fact that the scenario drafts collected from the six workshop groups had to undergo revision and 
transformation by a limited number of actors to become fully-fledged scenarios. However, this 
understanding worked only in the context of this novel undertaking, a foresight project organised 
by the RCN focusing on the future of ICT research. In a different context, such as, for example, 
evaluating the strategic relevance of a specific ICT research area, the same actors might have 
resisted or rejected this specific way of coordinating textual production.  
This perspective on collective writing as a contract that is never complete reflects Thévenot‟s 
concept of coordination and convention as a „limited agreement about selected features people 
use to control events and entities‟ (2002a, 83).Within this limited contract specific scenario tools, 
such as important scenario criteria and preferred plots, would become not only writing devices 
but also ensure that the participants contributed to the process, i.e. enrol them in the process 
(Callon and Law 1982). The idea about writing as a limited agreement or incomplete contract 
between different actors can thus serve as an underlying perspective on the ethnographic 
moments I will discuss in this chapter. The discussion will show how competence, responsibility 
and engagement within the writing group were negotiated accompanied by a prevailing 
uncertainty about how to produce relevant scenarios. 
 
5.2 The shift towards different competencies and responsibilities 
On 27 September 2004 eleven people gathered in a meeting room at the Research Council‟s 
headquarters in Oslo. Most of them had participated in the first two-day workshop two weeks 
earlier. Some workshop participants who were not members of the RCN‟s project group had 
been invited specifically after the workshop to help write the scenarios. Present were the project 
leader, the external facilitator and the RCN‟s senior advisor, who had played an important role in 
organising the process. Three more RCN employees represented the areas of ICT research, 
innovation and media and communications. Two workshop participants were present: a 
representative from the Business Association of Norwegian Knowledge- and Technology-based 
Enterprises (Abelia) and a consultant working at ECON, now Econ Pöyry, part of the global 
consulting and engineering company Pöyry Plc. I was present, having been invited to observe the 
writing process following the participatory workshop events. Finally, two new external 
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consultants had joined the project. The facilitator introduced them as „the production personnel 
from the factory‟ who had been asked to help write the scenarios. 
This was a new constellation of people in the foresight project. The participatory workshop 
group of about forty people had been called the „scenario group‟. The group responsible for the 
process of ensuring results was called the „project group‟. The creation of a third group within 
the process of the foresight project implied that now different competencies were sought than 
those that had played a role in the „open and creative dialogue‟ between the RCN and invited 
ICT experts. Among the ten people present (excluding the observer), five were RCN 
representatives who were responsible for the success of the project and/or the development of the 
new large ICT research programme. Some of these employees were involved in existing ICT 
programmes or projects within the RCN. The two workshop participants invited to the meeting 
could potentially verify the legitimacy of the writing process and vouch for the continuity of the 
dialogue between those who had contributed ideas at the workshop and those about to start 
employing these ideas in narratives. The two external consultants introduced at this stage by the 
facilitator were to help create texts from the material collected at the workshop. In the course of 
several meetings during the following weeks, this group was to develop the scenario drafts into 
stories which were to be used at the second workshop in late October 2004. 
This was not only a new stage in the process of creating scenarios but also a new combination 
of competencies. This combination was a result of the need to produce coherent narratives which 
could be used at the second and final workshop where all participants were asked to discuss and 
suggest strategic possibilities based on the scenarios. Now it was important to combine the ideas 
collected at the first workshop into a few scenario suggestions which could be developed into 
finished scenarios, i.e. to move from a complexity of ideas towards a few narratives. Each of 
these texts would be limited to a certain number of pages in which a coherent and relevant 
scenario had to be created. This new collective, responsible for the writing process, would decide 
about scenario content and form and deliver results. Although the project organisers never 
referred to this combination of specific competences as a group different from the scenario group 
or the project group, I have chosen to call this new collective constellation the „writing group‟. 
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5.3 Ordering scenarios 
The facilitator together with the project leader and the senior RCN advisor had had two 
meetings prior to the present meeting in which they had analysed the existing material and tried 
to synthesise the collected scenario ideas. Now the facilitator, leading the meeting, introduced 
the day‟s work: „Today we are going to produce scenarios. We are going to create products!‟ 
One external workshop participant asked: „How are these scenarios meant to be used? Who is 
the target audience for these scenarios?‟ 
Both the facilitator and the project leader answered that these scenarios were supposed to 
inform the new large ICT research programme, VERDIKT. They should address the future of 
ICT research, focusing especially on the question: „How will research be conducted?‟ The 
scenario process should provide general strategic recommendations. The scenarios were 
supposed to be „strategic scenarios for ICT research‟. As another RCN employee confirmed, the 
target group was the RCN organisation, and the scenarios were intended to support „better and 
more long-term decision-making‟. 144  
Assigning this distinct role to the scenarios as tools in strategic research programme 
development shows that the ambitions of the project group were focused on a specific project 
result. The members of the writing group responsible for the success of the project, especially the 
project leader and the process facilitator, declared the RCN their primary target audience. Yet the 
scenarios were not intended to be read just by RCN employees to influence existing ways of 
working within the organisation, but also to contribute visibly to strategic planning and 
programme development. Indeed, the facilitator underlined that the writing of scenarios was not 
as open, creative and process-oriented as collecting ideas had been during the participatory 
workshops, but instead clearly directed towards producing results, creating „products‟. 
The facilitator presented the result of two previous meetings with the project leader and the 
RCN senior advisor in which they had condensed the ideas proposed by the six workshop 
groups. The three project group members had identified five themes from the collection of ideas 
and scenario drafts. Groups 1 and 6 had been evaluated as coming up with the same main idea 
about „surveillance‟ and a „warden society‟ in which the need for security leads to new ICT 
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 All quotes and data from author‟s notes at the first meeting of the writing group at the RCN on 27 September 
2004. 
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solutions. Group 2 was identified as having contributed the idea of a „user society‟ in which ICT 
research is completely user-driven and geared towards entertainment. Group 3 had contributed 
the idea of a „competence society‟ in which research priorities are made on a national basis 
geared towards improving competence among all citizens. Group 4 had focused on the regional 
aspects of social and technological development. Finally, Group 5 had concentrated on 
developing their idea about researchers being out of sync with the rest of society and living in an 
ivory tower, indifferent to social developments around them. In addition to these main themes, 
ideas representing discontinuity had been assembled under the heading „Wild cards/other ideas‟. 
These were, according to the three project members who had systematised the ideas, not relevant 
enough for the creation of scenarios (see Figure 3).  
The scenario drafts developed within the six groups during the workshop were clearly shaped 
around distinctive themes. However, the selection of the main ideas in each scenario draft had 
been made by the three group members centrally responsible for the outcome of the foresight 
project. They had further reduced complexity by merging the ideas from two groups into one 
topic. They not only presented the five main ideas derived from the scenario drafts, but also 
suggested possible ways of combining these five ideas into three scenarios. Thus ideas expressed 
in the participatory workshop by six groups had now been ordered. The main ordering into three 
scenarios was presented on one PowerPoint slide and presented to the group by the facilitator.  
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From many ideas to fewer…
1. Surveillance /warden society (Group 1 and 6): 
fear of terror, surveillance, need for security etc. 
leads to new ICT solutions
2. User driven society (Group 2): user-driven ICT    
research, light version, entertainment, simple   
standards, low cost technology
3. Competency society (Group 3): national priorities 
and special focus on ICT, all ends well!
4. Regional self-preservation (Group 4): Europe    
oriented, regions lead developments, niche   
specialisation
5. Ivory tower syndrome (Group 5): researchers are 
out of step with society’s needs, the ICT industry 
meets research needs in different ways
Wild cards: 
 Data plague develops resistant viruses
 Norway as leading IT export actor (uses oil fund)
 Cancer threat caused by radio waves
 Research funding directly channeled to industry
 No to mono-technology
 EU collapses
• The Spirit of the New ERA
• The eConsuming Norway
• Out of Sync
• Wild cards / other ideas
 
Figure 3: The synthetisation of six scenarios into three, figure developed by facilitator. 
 
The facilitator presenting this ordering of ideas argued that the five scenario drafts could 
easily be compacted into fewer scenarios. His suggestion was to combine the existing scenario 
drafts into three scenarios, called 1) „The Spirit of the New ERA‟, 2) „Infosumption‟ and 3) „Out 
of Sync.‟145 
Elements from scenario ideas 1, 3 and 4 could be combined to create a first scenario called 
„The Spirit of the New ERA‟.146 This was a title the facilitator had come up with in the preceding 
meetings with the project leader and the RCN senior advisor. In this scenario, ICT development 
would become part of a state-governed strategy giving priority to national research. He argued 
that the title of this scenario would create a „marketing effect‟ for the RCN. He called it the „wet 
dream‟ of ICT research policy. 
                                                 
145
 Figure 3 was part of a PowerPoint presentation presented to the writing group on 27 September 2004. 
Unpublished. 
146
 The use of the abbreviation ERA was a word play denoting both the beginning of a new epoch in Norway and 
the European Research Area (ERA) founded by the EU in 2000 – hence the capitalisation. See also 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/index_en.html (accessed February 2010). Böhle (2002) argued that foresight can 
help to define research priorities at the European level and inform the development of ERA.  
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Elements from ideas 2 and 4 could be combined into a scenario focusing on consumerism, 
short-term solutions and applied ICT research. Finally, the facilitator reasoned, elements from 
scenario drafts 1 and 5 could form the basis for a scenario showing the entire ICT research 
community as out of step with social developments and concentrating entirely on basic research 
without considering societal needs. Thus the five workshop scenario drafts were now ordered 
into stories that were assigned different roles in a larger story about ICT research policy. By 
condensing them into three scenario drafts the project leader, the facilitator and the RCN senior 
advisor had given the contributions of the workshop a specific value within the further process. 
Reducing the number of scenarios from the original six into three could thus be seen as a 
mechanism of simplification.147   
This successive adjustment of a broad range of scenario ideas and drafts thus shows a 
simplification mechanism (Callon 2002, 193) necessary to create products. However, 
simplification and complexification emerged at the same time as the writing group became aware 
of the need to create scenarios that would support better and more long-term decision-making 
and inform the new large ICT research programme, VERDIKT. The three group members thus 
also made the original scenario drafts the workshop participants had contributed more complex. 
Even without having observed the meeting in which the three group members conducted this 
work it is still possible to show the underlying understanding which helped produce these three 
scenario suggestions. Making the original scenario drafts more complex entailed creating 
meaning from a spectrum of ideas which would only produce relevance for policy processes 
outside the foresight project in specific combinations. The six original drafts already contained 
elements of well-known policy approaches to socio-technological futures, such as the 
„competence society‟, the „user-driven society‟ and the „security society‟. Yet by combining 
these ideas into three scenarios the texts to be created were given specific value in the overall 
coordination of the foresight project. In this respect Callon (ibid) argues that „the process of 
                                                 
147 The development of three scenarios in foresight is disputed in foresight literature. Whereas some authors 
argue that only a sufficient number of scenarios, at least four, can adequately represent the uncertainty of the future, 
others doubt that more than three or four scenarios can actually provide relevant input to strategic discussions 
because of the sheer volume of ideas included. Futurist and scenario practitioner Joseph Coates (2000, 117) suggests 
working with 4 or 6 scenarios to avoid the „temptation to choose a middle one‟. Policy analyst and strategic scenario 
planner Riel Miller (2007, 344) argues that an ordering of scenario ideas into three different scenarios is one of the 
most popular and widely used approaches in scenario creation. He proposes different rationales for such 
triangulations and discusses whether we can see archetypes of value ordering behind them. One of the three 
archetypes he suggests could also illustrate the differentiation used in the RCN‟s scenario project group. Miller calls 
it: „The good, the bad and the ugly‟ (ibid). 
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complexification and the multiplication of narratives is at least partly a strategy of power that 
cannot be fully understood without exploring the mechanisms of simplification on which it 
depends‟. As I will show in the following discussions, rather than seeing the shaping of scenarios 
as strategies of power I work from the assumption that simplifying and complexifying scenario 
texts are also strategies of responsibility and engagement. 
 
5.4 Negotiating competence, technology and uncertainty 
The three group members‟ suggestion about the ordering and content of potential scenarios 
had to be evaluated by the rest of the group. None of the workshop scenarios was originally 
thought to represent either positive or negative developments. This, however, now seemed to be 
an emerging issue. 
The external participant from the consulting company questioned the central role of the state 
in scenario one: 
Now I am not a technical person and am not qualified to talk too much about 
this. But there is this one scenario that seems too positive – the state intervenes 
and tidies up. Isn‟t this a bit too optimistic? 
 
 
The participant expressed his uncertainty in contrasting ways. On the one hand he doubted he 
was competent enough to challenge this scenario, i.e. possessing enough competence in foresight 
and scenario development. Yet he also expressed his uncertainty about the idea which proposed a 
research policy with one strong actor, the state, as the preferred one. He evaluated it as too 
positive and too optimistic, thus questioning its plausibility. His remark was not discussed 
further, however. The facilitator asked the group to respond to the remaining two scenarios. 
These were eventually evaluated by the group as being „too similar‟. Yet they did not question 
the number of scenarios in relation to their content. Instead, they agreed to work on 
differentiating the two scenarios.  
This was also part of the result- rather than process-oriented coordination of writing work 
which the facilitator had asked for at the start of the meeting. The ordering and combining of the 
workshop scenario drafts into three scenarios with distinct titles clearly indicated which values 
should be visible in the three scenarios and thus reduced the number of alternative arrangements 
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of the ideas collected. The scenario suggestions reflected the interest of the central actors in the 
project group in steering the strategic discussions following the scenario process in specific 
directions.  
The first scenario called „The Spirit of the new ERA‟ suggested positive policy solutions. This 
was expressed by the facilitator‟s remark about a possible marketing effect for the RCN, clearly 
targeting ICT research policy. This scenario received the most resources, incorporating ideas 
from three scenario drafts, while the other two scenarios received ideas from only two drafts (see 
Figure 3). Indeed, having received the most resources and having presented first with a clear idea 
about why this scenario was important „The Spirit of the New ERA‟ emerged here as the 
favourite. In this respect, the writing group was asked to approach scenario development as „not 
only forward thinking but also forward acting‟ within a given order of value materialised in the 
suggested order of the three scenarios.  
The forward-acting feature of foresight was clearly present here. Directed activity, such as the 
suggestion of specific scenario titles and contents, could not be achieved in a collective setting 
involving forty participants. This had to be conducted in a smaller setting in which organisational 
and project interests were more clearly represented. Issues of people‟s ranking and 
representation, such as those addressed in the invitation to the workshop, were rendered 
irrelevant here by the collective yet limited agreement to create products. Thus ideas about the 
future of ICT and ICT research were now being shaped in a certain way. The following 
ethnographic moments show how this initial ordering of scenario ranking, content and number 
was interspersed with prevailing uncertainty about competence, responsibility and engagement 
during the meeting. 
At the start of the writing process, the facilitator had managed to reach agreement about 
concentrating on three scenarios and channelling the resources of the writing group into 
developing these. Nevertheless, various members of the group continued to express uncertainty 
about the writing group‟s competence to create these scenarios as well as about how to represent 
technology in them. Throughout the meeting the group kept coming back to the fact that 
scenarios 2 and 3 were still too similar to be useful as distinct scenarios for alternative future 
developments. One participant suggested producing a new and entirely technology-driven 
scenario. Another asked whether the group should consider the possibility of ICT disappearing 
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completely? The facilitator responded by challenging them to be even more creative: „We need 
ideas which transcend boundaries here. We still have not identified the real changes.‟ The project 
leader wondered: „Maybe we do not have enough imagination? Maybe we need to go out and 
find other people to gather more exciting ideas? Maybe all this isn‟t really technology-driven?‟ 
Although the group had initially agreed to work on three scenarios, two group members now 
suggested new scenarios – one entirely technology-driven scenario, and one in which ICT had 
„disappeared‟. Apparently, the participants were still unsure about the role of technology in the 
scenarios presented, implying that it should either become an issue in its own right in a 
technology-driven scenario, or that a technology-free scenario for the future should be contrasted 
with our socio-technological present. The facilitator, although acknowledging these questions, 
replied that they should work towards improving the quality of the existing scenario drafts. In 
this respect, he redirected the work ahead towards the already established scenario suggestions, 
instead of opening up the process for new and additional scenarios. At the same time he expected 
the writing group to transcend the boundaries of what had already been suggested and enrich the 
present material with ideas „capturing the real changes‟. Although the three scenarios were 
already shaped by certain ideas of relevance, the content of the scenarios was thus still regarded 
as open with the potential for surprises. 
The project leader, on the other hand, expressed uncertainty about the group‟s competence 
and creativity and about whether technology should play a role at all. Most significant here is her 
question about whether they should go out and find „other people‟ to capture „exciting ideas‟. 
Here she even expressed uncertainty about the entire scenario process, wondering whether they 
actually needed a completely different approach with different people. In this respect the project 
leader doubted the investment already made in the process. The group did not discuss the remark 
any further, just as they had accepted without comment the question about the overly positive 
outlook of the first scenario.  
A possible perspective on the lack of discussion of issues such as future competence or the 
need for additional, technology-related scenarios is to see it in terms of responsibility and 
engagement in the project. The project leader‟s doubt about the competence of the writing group 
was received without further comment because the scenario facilitator provided all the premises 
for the process during this meeting. By taking charge of the process and engaging the group 
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members in producing results, the facilitator guaranteed steady progress towards scenarios 
already agreed upon prior to this meeting. Responsibility for securing the process was enacted by 
the facilitator. Therefore basic uncertainty could be expressed by the project leader without 
causing confusion among the group members about the value of the process underway.  
Another RCN employee kept wondering about the status of technology in these three 
scenarios: 
What is the cause of technological advancement? War is the father of all 
technologies. We have to search for this connection: „What drives people‟s 
decisions about making a choice between technologies? 
 
 
Again the question about the status of technology in the scenarios came up but was not 
discussed any further. The facilitator instead reminded the group to use their creativity: „Use 
your imagination. We need more focus on user needs‟. He asked them to work in groups using 
different meeting rooms to accomplish their tasks: „We have some work to do here. Try to 
identify the main tendencies and work on them. Some of these ideas are going in the same 
direction.‟ The project leader concluded the session by saying: „If nobody has any major 
objections, then let‟s all agree that we will work on these scenarios now.‟ 
Clearly, this meeting was based on a limited contract about achieving specific results within 
the context of the RCN‟s foresight project. All the members of the writing group were aware of 
their responsibility to help this project achieve a successful outcome. Still, various uncertainties 
were expressed here. The consensus to concentrate on three narratives was interspersed with 
expressions of uncertainty about the group members‟ competence and about the number and 
content of the suggested scenarios. Also, technology as an important ingredient in all three 
scenarios was felt to be missing, and the participants expressed uncertainty about whether the 
scenarios would be relevant enough to help develop an ICT research programme. These 
uncertainties were dealt with by the facilitator, who assumed responsibility for ensuring the 
continuation of the writing process and whose main focus was on producing results.  
What happened to authorship in these ethnographic moments? The facilitator‟s request to 
contribute „ideas which transcend boundaries‟, to „capture the real changes, use imagination, 
identify the main tendencies, focus on user needs‟ all underlined that the uncertainties voiced 
would disappear once the writing group had made progress in developing narratives which 
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transcended established boundaries. Thus the facilitator assigned responsibility to the remaining 
group members as equally valued contributors to the scenario texts as long as they agreed on the 
suggested number and content of the scenarios. This contract was temporally limited to the four 
weeks between the first and the second participatory workshop. Yet the agreement between the 
members of this group was incomplete because responsibility for the process was constantly 
realigned and redistributed among the group members. In order to come up with the final results 
the writing group members were expected to be forward-acting and to write themselves out of 
their uncertainties.  
 
5.5 Proliferating scenario criteria 
The ten group members were now divided into three groups, each working in different 
meeting rooms on the development of one of the scenario drafts. The group I observed consisted 
of three RCN employees who were asked to work on scenario number 2 called „Infosumption‟. 
The draft presented in Figure 3 had described this scenario as „user-driven‟, where „big consumer 
groups‟ rule the market and industry focuses on short-term user needs.  
The group discussed three main user needs: entertainment, self-realisation and health-related 
services. They exchanged several ideas about the potential users and their needs, but they did not 
write them down. The facilitator eventually entered the room and reformulated the task to help 
them produce the story: „What will 2015 look like? How will we get there? Write this down on 
this white paper roll; remember we need something for the next workshop on 20 October!‟ 
Here the focus on creating products was underlined. „Something‟ would have to be presented 
to the researchers and business representatives three weeks later in the final workshop when the 
scenarios were to be evaluated by the roughly forty participants and used as a basis for strategic 
recommendations. The three RCN employees working on this scenario therefore had to be 
productive, creative and responsible.  
One of the participants found the writing process very challenging. The facilitator explained 
that there were certain criteria for scenarios which could increase their acceptance with the 
workshop participants. He wrote these down on the meeting room‟s whiteboard: 
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 Concrete examples which people recognise 
 Representative and known parameters 
 Causality 
 Parameters which can be compared (to be used in tables later) 
 Use past tense when telling the story 
 
 
 
The three RCN employees were asked to follow these guidelines when writing down their 
ideas on the long white paper roll. The facilitator then reflected on the task he had given them: 
Now I know that you will not be able to do this in one day. But use the white 
paper and write down some ideas. Then we will have a greater chance of 
getting some scenarios out of this. We need a supporting scenario idea; we 
need actors, archetypes and the actors‟ motivations. We need narratives which 
can become PowerPoint notes. The form of these scenarios is very important, 
but also the content. So roll out this paper and start with events, names, etc. 
You can either start at 2015, or describe how we got there. And we need some 
extra information here in a little info-box, about public needs.  
 
 
One of the participants replied: „Ok, but what do you want us to do exactly?‟ 
The facilitator suggested: „You could use storyboards, maybe this technique could help.‟ 
„Yes, ok‟, but what should we do?‟, the participant asked again. 
The facilitator replied:  
Don‟t you have any professional journals? You should write about what a 
researcher‟s everyday life is like, what a user‟s everyday life could be, etc. I 
don‟t know if this is of any help, but we need to have something on 2015, how 
we got there and an extra box with public needs. Are you with me on the main 
idea here? Then make it grand and beautiful!‟148  
 
 
On that note he left the meeting room to assist the other two groups.  
This dialogue shows how the negotiation of responsibility within the writing group was 
closely linked to competence in writing scenarios. In order to help the RCN employees be 
creative the facilitator added new criteria to the production process. These scenario criteria were 
a proliferation of different elements such as narratives, tables, PowerPoint notes, storyboards and 
                                                 
148
 Grand and beautiful! – Author‟s translation of „stort og flott!‟  
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info boxes. Stories were to be produced based on actors, events, archetypes, actors‟ motivations 
and a researcher‟s everyday life. This proliferation of scenario criteria, however, seemed to 
increase the group‟s uncertainty about how to produce. The white paper roll was supposed to be 
filled with ideas matching the criteria laid down by the facilitator. The ideas eventually written 
down on the white paper roll were supposed to reflect the participants‟ ability to follow up on the 
facilitator‟s requests. Yet the repeated questions asked by the group members showed that they 
were uncertain about whether their competencies matched the requested „future literacy‟ (Miller 
2007).  
According to Callon and Law (2005) „situations of non-calculation‟ can be achieved either by 
rarefaction or by proliferation of calculating devices. This ethnographic moment shows that 
scenario development included calculating devices which were added to the process, such as 
representative and comparable parameters or causal narrative relationships driving a story 
towards a presumed outcome. Concrete material elements included PowerPoint presentation 
slides and a long white paper roll on which the scenario was to be presented. Yet what did the 
facilitator‟s proliferation of scenario criteria bring about? Did his suggestions and requests 
exceed the limited agreement among the writing group members to produce specific scenarios? 
The aggregation of scenario criteria was here meant to open up the scenario to new ideas and 
was thus an attempt to introduce undetermined, dynamic and creative forms of scenario texts. 
Proliferating scenario criteria in this situation eventually became an issue of responsibility which 
affected the group‟s work on the scenario.  
 
5.6 Competence and calculation: an unfortunate coincidence 
After the group had started working as the facilitator had told them to, one employee had to 
leave for a meeting with his department. Now there were two RCN employees left. They started 
by agreeing on a time line from 2004 to 2015. 
They rolled out the white paper roll over the entire length of the meeting table, covering about 
three meters and then drew a time line across the entire paper roll. Then they noted down the 
dates and wrote down possible actors at the starting point: 
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Figure 4: Original sketch on the white paper roll, based on author‟s notes 27 September 2004. 
 
One participant wondered: „Maybe we should include the user? Or maybe we don‟t need to.‟ 
This started a discussion between the two RCN employees about national research policy. „No 
government has ever changed research policy‟, the other participant argued. „But we have 
become more user-oriented, have we not?‟ the first replied. He repeated several times that there 
was a user out there whom they should refer to. „The big trend,‟ he said, „is that the user wants 
simple solutions. ICT will become invisible; it is just meant to work.‟  
After a lengthy discussion about the user, and the power of users to influence technological 
development, the two noted down some ideas on the long white paper roll. Half an hour later one 
of them had to leave for another meeting. Now only one RCN employee was left with the task of 
writing a scenario based on the ideas discussed. They had agreed to write about three different 
researchers: from industry, from a university and from a research institution each of whom was 
asking for funding for their particular ICT research area.  
The remaining RCN employee sat in the room in front of the long white roll of paper. I sat 
opposite him as the observer of the process, suddenly confronted with a situation in which I was 
no longer observing a „collective‟ process of writing scenarios, but what my counterpart called 
„an unfortunate coincidence‟.149  
„One should not leave two technologists talking to each other‟, he said to me. „We really need 
someone who can tell a story.‟ 
                                                 
149
 Author‟s translation of „uheldig sammentreff‟.  
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The last RCN representative was thus left alone to continue the work of his group. He had no 
meeting to go to, so he continued writing down ideas on the paper roll while continuously talking 
to himself. I, on the other hand, tried to remain in my role as observer.  
I want to argue that this „unfortunate coincidence‟ was part of the collective process in which 
the scenarios were produced, even though it actually was unfortunate, and apparently neither 
deliberate nor predetermined. Yet it belongs to the undetermined and dynamic aspects of 
coordination which, as Thévenot (2002a, 57) states, „arise from operations of evaluation which 
actors depend on for the conduct of their actions‟. Several elements produced an effect – a single 
participant working on one of the three scenarios to be used in programme development sitting 
all by himself (while being observed in the name of research) and trying to materialise a given 
scenario story based on a plethora of criteria on a long white paper roll.   
This unfortunate coincidence was an effect of the interaction between the assumed 
competences of the participants and the approach stipulated by the facilitator. Coordinating the 
work among small groups and the fact that this work was conducted in the meeting rooms of the 
RCN‟s headquarters – near the RCN employees‟ daily area of work – added to the calculation of 
responsibility conducted by the three group members. When two of them decided that their 
weekly departmental meetings were more important than writing a scenario on a white paper 
roll, they determined their subsequent actions based on their understanding of organisational 
responsibility.  
Writing a scenario about a future „user-driven‟ society, where „big consumer groups‟ rule the 
market and industry focuses on short-term user needs, thus became less important than the 
departmental meeting happening simultaneously. The remaining RCN employee evaluated this 
problem by pointing out that they were „technologists‟, with certain high-level, but bounded 
competences. They were in need of „someone who could tell a story‟, thus expressing doubt that 
he would be able to develop this competence in the short span of two hours. In leaving the group, 
the two RCN employees followed their responsibilities within their organisation, thus moving 
into a setting which was more responsive to their actual competence.  
Following Thévenot (2002a, 57) I want to suggest that the decision of the two RCN 
employees to leave the scenario work in order to attend departmental meetings can be seen as a 
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reaction to the „real conditions for effective engagement‟.150 By presenting a long list of scenario 
criteria the facilitator had tried to mitigate the employees‟ uncertainty about writing scenarios. 
But this had apparently increased their uncertainty, rather than reduced it. At the same time he 
had questioned the group members‟ competence to develop creative, yet coherent ideas about the 
future of ICT research, an area which they would discuss routinely in familiar organisational 
settings. The future had been presented as open. Yet the presentation of the future in a scenario 
required a considerable number of criteria, more than the participants could relate to 
professionally. Thus their subsequent professional and moral decision to temporarily leave the 
scenario work could be seen as openly questioning the conditions for their engagement in the 
process. However, the fact that two of the group members had left to follow responsibilities 
which better matched their competencies was not made an issue of discussion within the writing 
group. It was considered an unfortunate coincidence. 
After another twenty-five minutes, the facilitator and one of the writing consultants appeared 
and started discussing the ideas written down on the white paper roll with the remaining RCN 
employee.  
The main focus of this scenario idea was to tell a story about the ICT user in 2015. The RCN 
employee expressed his uncertainty: „My main doubt about this scenario is that I cannot believe 
the industry is really focused on the consumer. The consumer of ICT today has only limited 
purchasing power. But what do you think, is it possible to write a story about this?‟ 
The facilitator explained: „We will write short stories which illustrate a development. So we 
need to continue to ask ourselves: Are there any important stories we want to tell? Are there 
important events we should construct to communicate an idea? Keep working on your ideas, 
Thomas!‟151 
The facilitator countered the RCN employee‟s uncertainty by expressing continued faith in 
the scenario writing process. „We will write, we need to continue to ask ourselves, we want to 
tell, keep working on your ideas‟ – all these expressions at once underlined the responsibility the 
writing group had to create these scenarios and the belief that as an RCN employee „Thomas‟ 
would invest his individual competence in the success of this process. Thus instead of 
                                                 
150
 Italics in original. 
151
 All real names are kept confidential. 
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responding to Thomas‟ question, he appealed to his potential engagement in the project, asking 
him to find the „important events‟ which could be used to „communicate an idea‟.  
The facilitator‟s request to the participants to continue asking themselves whether „there are 
any important stories we want to tell‟ was meant to help the RCN employee overcome his 
doubts. However, as Thomas argued, he found it „hard to believe‟ that it was possible to write a 
story about the idea presented by the three project organisers in the scenario called 
„Infosumption‟. The ideas did not match his expectations concerning the future of ICT industry 
and user needs. Thus his individual expectations made it difficult to imagine a scenario which to 
him seemed unbelievable. The RCN employee‟s competence, technological experience and 
expectations impeded his commitment to writing a story which might challenge existing ways of 
prioritising research areas and be considered strategically relevant by the project organisers. The 
facilitator‟s reaction to this was to shift the responsibility of the two absent participants onto 
Thomas‟ shoulders. The reduction of the group was dismissed as an unfortunate coincidence 
which was mentioned but not questioned by the writing group. It nevertheless highlighted the 
possible effects of uncertainty on individual engagement in scenario writing. 
In providing this perspective on the process of writing scenarios I do not intend to transfer all 
responsibility for this course of events onto one or several actors, i.e. the facilitator or members 
of the writing group. I rather suggest that these ethnographic moments, which are indicative of 
certain dissonances and contested values, were effects of a combination of many elements, such 
as the need for coherence and relevance of the scenarios, assigned and transferred 
responsibilities, uncertainties about future competence as well as the relationship between the 
social and the technological in these scenarios. Whereas many of these elements are presented 
here in the form of dialogues, these ethnographic moments were nonetheless distinctively 
material as well. The long white paper roll representing the demand for creativity, the list of 
scenario criteria written on the white board representing a certain standard of scenario method 
and the RCN employees leaving the meeting room all influenced the collective writing process 
and contributed to the physical evidence of this negotiation of competence and responsibility. 
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5.7 Increasing credibility by creating equivalences 
The ethnographic moments presented so far in this chapter show that the value of scenario 
work and the investment made in the process were partly but openly questioned. The situation 
described in the preceding subchapter was just one event in a complex writing process involving 
different competencies, responsibilities, interests and agendas. Yet it throws up questions about 
the mutual dependencies between participants‟ competencies and engagement in relation to 
scenario creation, methods and criteria used to ensure relevant results. This does not imply that 
the interests of the three project organisers who had ordered the scenario drafts prior to this 
meeting contradicted those of the rest of the group. However, by ordering the six scenario drafts 
created by the workshop participants into the three proposed scenarios, the question about how to 
ensure strategic relevance of the scenarios was largely predetermined by three people in the 
process.  
Whereas the preceding discussion has focused on the tensions between competence and 
scenario writing, in the following I will focus on the question of scenario credibility. The next 
ethnographic moment shows that the discussion about the number and form of the scenarios was 
based on different perspectives on how to achieve credibility.  
 
The writing group met again on 4
 
October 2004. Later the same week the project group 
responsible for the success of the foresight project was to be presented with the three scenarios. 
At the beginning of the meeting the facilitator underlined the urgency of the work in the writing 
group: 
We do not have much time left. So far we only have three half-finished 
products. We need something definite for Thursday. Maybe we should have a 
4
th
 or 5
th
 scenario, so that the project group can identify better with the results. 
They should be able to choose from what we have created here.  
 
 
Now it was the facilitator himself who expressed uncertainty about the three scenarios. They 
were only half finished, and the facilitator saw their completion as a race against time. This 
expression of managerial uncertainty represented quite an unusual event in the ongoing 
negotiation over the creation of scenarios. So far it had been the participants who had voiced 
their uncertainties. When the project leader expressed her uncertainty about whether they had 
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chosen the right process and the right people, the facilitator‟s focus on creating products had 
ensured that her uncertainty did not unsettle the project underway. Now, however, the facilitator 
himself questioned openly whether the number of scenarios would achieve enough credibility 
with the members of the project group who had not participated in the writing process. It became 
a question of whether they should be presented with additional choices rather than with three 
clearly established scenarios. 
The RCN‟s senior advisor agreed to create more scenarios: „Yes, that sounds reasonable, 
since we are producing as much as we do in advance.‟  
Here the importance of the writing process in relation to the first participatory workshop was 
underlined. The writing group was producing three scenarios which combined different ideas 
collected in the workshop into new narratives. These three scenarios were produced after the 
participatory workshop, but in advance of the upcoming meeting with the project group. The 
writing group was thus faced with a double justification challenge, facing first the foresight 
project group and later the participatory scenario group at the final workshop. One way of 
achieving acceptance might be to increase the number of written scenarios, giving the project 
group the choice of more than three scenarios. The facilitator thus wanted to keep the number of 
scenarios open, somewhere between the „original‟ six and the „negotiated‟ three. This, the 
facilitator argued, could enable the project group to „identify better with the results‟, i.e. create 
equivalence between the work of the writing group and the expectations of the project group.  
However, the facilitator‟s question was not followed up in the subsequent discussion. Again 
the expression of uncertainty about the relevance of the three scenarios was fully accepted as a 
legitimate question. Yet on no occasion did these uncertainties lead to any move to create 
additional scenarios.  
The question of credibility did not stop at the challenge entailed in justifying the number of 
scenarios in the project group meeting the same week and the participatory workshop two weeks 
later. The writing group had to consider a third evaluator of scenario credibility, the Research 
Council, and specifically the people who would be expected to respond to the scenarios by 
including them in decision-making processes. This was negotiated as a question of form. 
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The writing group had started discussing the different formats of the three stories they were 
planning to present. The facilitator underlined the importance of having a visual impression of 
the scenarios.  
The RCN‟s senior advisor agreed but argued that the RCN as an organisation was very much 
based on text. „We need text. This will increase the status of the scenarios with the decision-
makers.‟  
The facilitator replied: „Well, I do not think we should write memos. That would be too 
boring.‟ 
„Of course not,‟ the senior advisor agreed, „we will create something quite different to any 
bureaucratic memo. But those who make the decisions are used to text. They need text as the 
base.‟ 
„Agreed‟, the facilitator replied. „But then we need both, visuals and text. Let‟s use pictures, 
text, and finally a model, something like a multiple scenario axes model to condense the ideas.‟152 
Not only were the scenarios to be evaluated as credible by the project group. The senior 
advisor pointed out that the RCN as the commissioning body was the ultimate evaluator of the 
scenarios. The process of writing scenarios had to be coordinated so that actors outside the 
foresight project could identify with the results, such as the line management of the three 
divisions of the RCN and the three boards overseeing the three divisions (Jenssen 2007, 411). As 
the senior advisor stated, the basic requirement was textual presentation. Thus in order for the 
scenarios to be considered as credible as any other presentations in a decision-making process, 
the writing group would have to invest in textual form. Then the scenarios could qualify for 
evaluation among decision-makers.  
The discussion about the presentation of scenarios between the facilitator and the RCN senior 
advisor shows that opinions about what the scenarios should represent differed between members 
of the writing group at this point. Whereas the senior advisor was anxious to ensure the scenarios 
could be used as instruments in strategy processes, the facilitator saw them first and foremost as 
condensed representations of creative ideas. Whereas the senior advisor emphasised the need to 
ensure the credibility of the scenarios in relation to his organisation, the facilitator also wanted to 
                                                 
152
 The three scenarios were later presented as visual stories on 31 PowerPoint slides (see RCN 2004b, under the 
link: „scenarier‟). 
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ensure their credibility in relation to existing scenario criteria. This also underlines the various 
responsibilities the two group members had to meet. In this case it was the senior advisor 
employed at the RCN who had to assume responsibility for creating equivalences between the 
presentation of the scenarios and the most commonly accepted form of presentation in the RCN.  
At the same time, the text had to conform to scenario criteria established by the facilitator, 
such as recognisable examples, known parameters and discontinuity of expected developments. 
It was within the realm of responsibility of the foresight facilitator to ensure that the scenarios 
complied with a certain standard of acceptable scenario narrative. These different ways of 
creating scenario credibility show that there were different conventions regarding scenario 
relevance in the RCN and scenario credibility within the community of foresight professionals. 
Having agreed to use both text and visuals as credible forms of scenarios the facilitator asked 
one of the two external consultants invited to join the writing group to contribute statistics about 
ICT expertise in Norway.  
 „We need some central parameters organised into tables which show the status for 2004.‟ 
The senior advisor responded enthusiastically: „Yes, that‟s what people would like here in the 
RCN.‟  
So the perspectives of the between RCN employees and the facilitating manager on the 
credibility of scenarios did not necessarily have to be different, they could also overlap. By 
including scenario criteria deemed necessary by the facilitator, such as „central parameters‟, in 
the scenarios, the RCN employees would be able to „identify better‟ with the result of the 
scenario process. Although tables do not represent linear text, the parameters included would 
link the scenarios to the present and serve as concrete examples which people could recognise. 
Parameters showing the status for 2004 could be presented as facts, current knowledge which 
decision-makers could relate to just as well as they could to textual form. 
This discussion about the form and number of scenarios within the writing group shows the 
increasing complexity of negotiating the writing process and the prevailing uncertainty about the 
scenarios to be produced. First, there was uncertainty about the number of scenarios and whether 
they could achieve enough credibility with stakeholders outside the writing group, such as the 
project group, the workshop group and the RCN as the commissioning organisation. Second, the 
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writing group also had to make strategic investments in scenario form to ensure acceptance of 
the scenarios on the part of those who would use the scenarios in processes related to decisions 
on ICT programme development. Furthermore there were the ideas expressed by the workshop 
group of about forty people who were going to read the scenarios at the final workshop. The 
scenarios would have to resemble at least some of these ideas, in order to be deemed credible 
collective achievements. Negotiation about these issues was thus a coordination of elements 
people could identify with: recognisable ideas, known parameters, freedom to choose between 
several possible future developments and textual presentation. In this sense the writing group 
needed to create equivalences between the scenarios to be created and the assumed expectations 
of the RCN employees, scenario group members and workshop group participants. 
  
5.8 Scenario content: strategy versus technology 
Thus by creating equivalences which people could identify with, the scenario work done by 
the writing group could achieve value and credibility with stakeholders, i.e. the people directly 
involved in the process and the decision-makers outside the foresight project. However, deciding 
about the form and number of scenarios was only half of the work the writing group had to 
conduct. Following the discussion on the number and form of scenarios, the facilitator raised the 
matter of scenario content:   
The parameters should really be the central ones; like brain gain, mobility, etc. 
But we also need to use our imagination and not only rely on statistics. We 
should try to show discontinuity of trends and the like. We also need to attend 
to some ideas from the workshop. People need to recognise their work! So we 
need elements from what people did in the workshop. But we need more on 
research and technology. What social needs can be met by technology? The 
scenarios should provide us with a better basis to discuss these things. 
 
Now the writing group was back at the issue of the relationship between ICT, research and 
society in the scenarios. The scenarios were meant to present coherent narratives about research, 
technology and social needs and provide a basis to discuss these relations. The narrative itself 
was supposed to inspire a discussion which could lead to better quality research priority-setting. 
Thus, although strategic thinking was not supposed to be part of the narrative, it was meant to be 
induced by these narratives. How could this be achieved? 
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The RCN senior advisor voiced his uncertainties regarding the content of the scenarios: 
I still find it difficult to be specific in these scenarios. How much strategy talk 
should be part of the scenarios? How can we direct the reader towards what we 
want to achieve?153 We do not write technological foresight. But based on the 
specific characteristic of a scenario we should be able to say something 
reasonable about social challenges and needs. The two questions are: How 
should ICT research contribute to the innovation system? And how can ICT 
research contribute in society? For instance, how can ICT protect intellectual 
property, protect the weak in society and contribute to the flow of information? 
[italics added] 
 
 
The question was now how to order the most important elements of scenario content and 
relate them to each other. Technology was not to play a central role in the scenarios, and if it did 
play a role, then only an indirect one. The challenge was to say „something reasonable‟ about 
social needs. Thus the RCN senior advisor valued social needs as the most important elements to 
be included in the narrative. But these needs should not be met directly by ICT, but rather by ICT 
research. According to the senior advisor, ICT research was to have a central role in serving 
these social needs. He mentioned several examples, such as research on property questions, 
social welfare and the flow of information. In this way he tried to strengthen the focus on ICT in 
the scenarios without writing technological foresight. 
The facilitator replied: „We have had this discussion all along. We have decided to write 
policy scenarios.‟ 
The advisor insisted on his view: „But we should not write scenarios which sound like 
telephone books. We want to start a discussion about how ICT can solve problems! This should 
be our explanation why the RCN should have a big ICT programme!‟ 
According to the senior advisor, the biggest problem about these scenarios was how to be 
„specific‟, i.e. integrate specific content, specific stories into the textual form. This content was 
to be „reasonable‟ and directive at the same time. The scenarios were meant to start a discussion 
about research priorities and at the same time act as a narrative justification for establishing a 
new and comprehensive ICT research programme.  
                                                 
153
 In Norwegian: ‟Hvordan kan vil legge ut lokketråder?‟ 
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In the view of the senior advisor, writing „policy scenarios‟ could lead to an enumeration of 
policy tasks, a long list of priority issues ordered as equally important and equally relevant much 
like reading a telephone book. Such lists rarely inspire discussion among decision-makers. The 
advisor was thus eager to ensure that the ordered relationship: ICT research solving social needs 
and challenges was made clear in the scenario narrative. This ordering of values would make 
sure that the scenarios would be considered relevant for the development of a large ICT 
programme. 
The facilitator, however, disagreed with the focus on strategic content proposed by the senior 
advisor: „That is true, but we also need to work on our technology focus. The focus on 
technology is weak. It needs to be clear in each scenario. Our consultants here have to help us 
with the technology focus.‟ 
In the view of the facilitator, the contributions from many participants working in ICT 
research and industry, had not delivered enough technological focus. To amend this problem the 
writing group could use the hired consultants. The remark made by the facilitator about the 
technological expertise of the two invited consultants throws up questions about the relationship 
between the expertise of the approx. forty workshop participants and the expertise of the two 
assisting consultants in the writing process.  
According to the invitation the expertise of the workshop participants derived from their 
sectoral affiliation had not been sought. This agreement had also ensured that the participants 
could not pursue their „own agendas‟ based on their expert sectoral knowledge during the 
workshop. They had been asked to display their „competency and creativity‟ while ignoring their 
representational status and to make open contributions that addressed the areas of social 
development and research challenges rather than technological areas. Now, however, during the 
writing stage, the uncertainty about the status of technology in these scenarios was to be resolved 
by bringing in consultants especially to improve the technology focus. They were there to „help‟ 
the writing group. This also delineated their role in the process. To help, to assist would be less 
controversial than having new participants ranked equally with those involved in the process of 
contributing their ideas about ICT development based on their sectoral and representative 
interests. The three workshop participants in the writing group were stakeholders in the process 
on a par with RCN employees. Their technology focus was thus not to enter the scenarios 
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directly, since this could be interpreted as pushing their own agendas. If the scenarios needed 
more technology focus, the issue needed to be introduced by external consultants, not by 
potential users of the research strategies emerging from the scenario work. A technological focus 
should thus enter the scenarios by way of consultation and not representation. 
Finally, there was one more important issue on content raised by the senior advisor. He 
pointed to the role of the scenarios as narratives which should lead to organisational insight: 
Strategically the RCN needs to find out where our competencies overlap and 
what we need to focus on. Can we achieve that at all? What do we need to do 
to stay in the game internationally? We need to understand what is going on. 
Right now we have 10–12 different ICT programmes. This is really frustrating. 
The new big programme is supposed to integrate these. How should we think 
holistically? We need to have an overview. We need a strategic dialogue in the 
field of ICT. 
 
 
The facilitator replied that the role of the scenarios was not to talk about strategic issues 
directly. He cautioned the senior advisor: 
 „We should not talk about the RCN directly, only indirectly.‟ 
The advisor, however, repeated his request: „The RCN consists of many talented people with 
specialised competencies, but we are not able to work across our fields. The scenarios have to 
address how important interdisciplinary work is in the RCN!‟ 
The comprehensive foresight project, consisting of five participatory projects on future key 
technologies, had been launched as a response to the criticism raised in the international 
evaluation about organisational work habits in the RCN. The scenarios thus needed to be 
credible in relation to this international evaluation and the subsequent proposal to use 
participatory foresight to renew organisational thinking. In the light of this responsibility to 
answer the challenges raised by the evaluation, the development of the large ICT programme 
VERDIKT was directly linked to questions of how work was organised in the RCN.  
 According to the senior advisor, integration and interdisciplinary work were two important 
issues the scenarios were supposed to address. This request, expressed by the senior advisor, was 
not discussed any further, however, since this meeting of the writing group had come to an end. 
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5.9 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have focused on the process of writing scenarios. This is a stage in scenario 
development which is difficult to access ethnographically because in practical terms it is not 
possible and for most research purposes not interesting to watch individual people writing texts 
or preparing PowerPoint presentations. Here, however, I have tried out a different perspective 
and studied writing as a collective process. The production of a few coherent, relevant and 
innovative texts about the future of ICT research was the main desired outcome of a project 
which had to be completed within a few months. This chapter has been about the selection, 
ordering and transformation of written, printed or digital material that would eventually become 
scenarios with clearly defined boundaries, such as length of scenario text and primary target 
audience.  
Scenario writing differs from brainstorming or „brain writing‟ exercises in participatory 
workshops. In collective writing a large variety of unconnected ideas, preliminary models and 
incomplete drafts are ordered by a small group of actors chiefly responsible for the successful 
outcome of a foresight process. But how is the demand for more complexity in the development 
of research priorities met by scenario writing?  
The material collected in a workshop involving about forty ICT experts from many areas of 
research and industry had to be transformed into scenarios relevant for the RCN as an 
organisation and for the development of a new large ICT research programme. The level of 
complexity aspired to in the creation of the scenario narratives depended on the small group of 
writers responsible for transforming the workshop ideas into stories.  
What this chapter has shown is that the demand for complex, i.e. participatory and creative 
scenarios was an ongoing negotiation of responsibility and engagement within the writing group. 
This negotiation about how to take on responsibility and be engaged in this process raised 
questions about competence, representation and scenario credibility – all discussed under 
conditions of uncertainty about the content, form and number of scenarios.  
Whereas Callon (2002, 214) argues that collective writing is partly a strategy of power, 
dominated by those who have access to the tools of writing, I chose to study the process using 
Thévenot‟s (2002a) ideas about responsibility and engagement. This perspective highlights the 
specific constellation in the writing group, whose members included not only employees of the 
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organisation in charge of the project but also invited participants present on a voluntary and 
unpaid basis, as well as hired consultants. As such there was a mutual dependency which 
required the RCN representatives and hired consultants to assume responsibility for the writing 
process, whereas the invited, unpaid experts were expected show engagement in the creation of 
scenarios. Yet responsibility and engagement were not always evenly distributed. As the 
discussion of the „unfortunate coincidence‟ involving competence and scenario credibility 
showed, the RCN employees involved in the project may also refuse to take on this level of 
responsibility and engagement. In other words, being involved in the project simply by virtue of 
being employed by the commissioning organisation did not necessarily entail using power to 
shape the scenarios in accordance with organisational interests. 
In other words, the writing of scenarios was also an ordering of responsibilities. Three central 
actors in the writing process, the project leader, the facilitator and the senior advisor had pre-
ordered the material from the scenario workshop prior to the first meeting of the writing group. 
Yet the distinctive value given to the three preliminary scenarios by these three actors was 
continually questioned, while uncertainty was expressed about the competence of the group 
members and the credibility of the scenarios. There were, however, no attempts to address this 
uncertainty, which raised questions about the existing number and content of the scenarios, with 
any kind of action. Instead, the uncertainty about the value of the scenarios was dealt with by 
shifting responsibility around within the writing group. Taking, transferring or rejecting 
responsibility for further action ensured that the status quo – represented by the agreement to 
concentrate on these three scenarios – was maintained and that the production of specific pre-
ordered scenarios would therefore continue.  
As the discussions in the writing group showed, the production process was marked by a 
continuous calculation and evaluation of the process in terms of certain standards and certain 
pre-established forms and categories. For example, competence within a field was a presupposed 
standard which was constantly compared with the performance of the writing group. This 
induced uncertainty on both the individual and the collective level about whether the majority of 
the writing group possessed the level of future literacy required (Miller, 2007) for writing 
plausible and credible scenarios.  
134 
 
Thus credibility coordinated the process in which things and people were evaluated with the 
objective of creating equivalences across contexts. Consequently, the scenarios to be produced 
were drawn in many directions. They were to become valuable by indirectly influencing ICT 
research policy, as inspirations for new strategic thinking and as representations of an open 
dialogue between the RCN, the ICT industry and research institutions; in addition, they were 
expected to inspire changes in working practices within the RCN. 
Seeing the production of scenarios as an attempt to create equivalences across contexts can 
also highlight scenario writing as a political issue. Returning to Callon (2002) it seems that 
collective writing is at least partly a strategy of power dependent on mechanisms of 
simplification. The main focus of the writing process had been delineated early on by the 
facilitator, who underlined that the job of the writing group was to „produce scenarios, to create 
products‟. Without this focus collective writing would be much more difficult to manage. It is 
dependent on a contract between several writers about working towards a specific aim, towards a 
„common good‟ (Thévenot 2002a). It is possible to see the selection and ordering of specific 
scenario ideas into three scenario suggestions by the three centrally involved group members as a 
„strategy of power‟ in which the desired value of the different scenarios, their content and 
number were predetermined by only three actors. Yet presenting a workable starting point for the 
writing group was also a prerequisite for delivering a final product, a point all group members 
had agreed on by participating in the group. Thus central actors took responsibility and showed 
engagement in the writing process while at the same time partly shaping its outcome.  
It is thus this paradox in the relationship between responsibility, engagement and power 
which is possibly most visible in the facilitator‟s way of coordinating activities and redirecting 
uncertainties towards a concrete outcome. As the manager of the process he had to rely on the 
participants agreeing to follow certain instructions, suggestions and predefined approaches but he 
also had to perform instant evaluations during the process. This is the point, as Thévenot argues, 
at which objects and people get deeply connected with morals and politics. As this chapter has 
shown, such evaluations and decisions can lead to results even as uncertainties prevail and 
people are temporarily estranged from the process. 
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6 FORESIGHT AND RESEARCH STRATEGY 
As shown in the previous chapters, the writing of scenarios was closely related to the 
development of a programme proposal for VERDIKT, the new large ICT programme. The ICT 
foresight project was expected among other things to help „clarify which research tasks should be 
prioritised in the future‟ (RCN 2004d). Yet the scenarios were created almost simultaneously 
with the development of the programme proposal. This was partly due to the tight schedule, 
which required the foresight project to be finished by the end of October 2004 while the first 
programme proposal for VERDIKT was due mid-December the same year. However, processing 
projects in parallel whereby one is partly dependent on the results of the other is nothing 
exceptional in planning.154 
As these two processes progressed simultaneously the scenarios as important contributions to 
ICT programme development now entered a new context. The process of scenario creation had 
been based on coordinating openness and relevance, with the writing group producing scenarios 
relevant to a number of processes outside the foresight project. Equivalences between the 
scenario texts and other contexts – such as organisational development, research policy and 
credibility among RCN employees – had been sought while the group also strove to comply with 
the narrative criteria of scenario production.  
While the scenarios were still being finished, the project group also had to consider 
developing a programme proposal for VERDIKT. This process involved creating a new text, a 
new material outcome of the process. The project group consisted of five RCN employees and 
five external members. Their tasks were described on the RCN website as:  
… To plan, conduct and conclude the scenario process for the whole ICT 
research field. In addition to that, the project group is expected to develop a 
first draft of the programme plan for VERDIKT based on this process. At the 
same time the group must consider other similar processes, both conducted 
earlier and currently in progress. The work of the project group will be 
delivered to the VERDIKT programme board once it has been constituted in 
December 2004.155   
                                                 
154
 The same synchronous approach could also be observed in a case of municipal visioning. Here the visioning 
process ran parallel to the development of a long-term social plan, which was officially based on the resulting 
visions (see Jenssen, 2010). 
155
 See homepage for the UTSIKT project (RCN 2004b). The tasks of the scenario project group are described 
and the group members listed on the webpage „Prosjektgruppen‟. 
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The project group was thus expected to fulfil several tasks simultaneously as well as adjusting 
and relating the work conducted in both the foresight project and the programme development to 
„other similar processes‟ within the organisation. Since several of the project group members had 
been involved in the writing process, they knew what stage the scenarios were at and could 
evaluate to what extent their current form would be useful in developing a programme proposal. 
But at the beginning of October 2004 the project group was also under considerable time 
pressure, having been given only a month after the conclusion of the scenario process to finalise 
the first programme proposal.  
With the project group responsible for developing a research programme, values other than 
the openness and relevance of the scenarios now became important. As management scholar Per 
Dannemand Andersen and STS scholar Mads Borup (2006, 6) write in their work on strategy 
processes and foresight in research councils and national research programmes: „In the mediating 
arena between politics and research, the managers (both civil servants and council/steering 
committee members) of the research programmes are in a situation where they must secure 
appropriate strategy development for the programme‟. In addition they 
...shall address questions on how the subject area of the programme shall be described 
and understood [...] and [they] must consider which information and areas of experience 
should be employed to develop the strategies, who shall be involved in the strategy 
processes, and which methods and approaches for the strategy developments are 
practically feasible, appropriate, fair and suitable given the programmes and the position 
of the related parties. This also includes questions about how legitimacy and 
accountability for the programme are ensured and about which interests and needs need 
to be satisfied, for example, in order to maintain support for the programme. 
 
Dannemand Andersen and Borup describe here not only the different responsibilities of 
research programme managers and developers, but also the different types of evaluation these 
people have to perform. Within these evaluative processes the specific material outcome –a 
research programme – must meet different demands. In this respect, writing a programme 
proposal – like writing scenarios – is a coordination process in which the actors involved seek to 
create equivalences across the different contexts and task areas. Here, too, methods and 
approaches are applied according to whether they fit certain criteria.  
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After describing the different kinds of evaluation entailed in research programme 
development and research strategy processes Dannemand Andersen and Borup (2006, 2) discuss 
applying foresight activities to the priority-setting of research councils and national research 
programmes. They see research councils as promising places both for taking a dynamic approach 
to setting research priorities and for implementing new ways of discussing these. 
Notwithstanding the potentially positive influence of foresight on prioritising research areas, the 
authors also highlight the widespread uncertainty about how to apply foresight effectively: 
However, there is great uncertainty about how to implement foresight exercises 
within research councils. A lot of reports from foresight exercises collect dust 
on library shelves and a lot of foresight practitioners become frustrated when, 
after finalising comprehensive exercises, they find that their sound 
recommendations have not been implemented (ibid). 
 
Dannemand Andersen and Borup argue that to counter this uncertainty one first and foremost 
needs to apply a broader and more up-to-date understanding of strategy in the development of 
research priorities. They draw on Mintzberg (1994), who writes that strategy is not only an 
activity related to analyses and planning but needs to be seen in a wider organisational context. 
Dannemand Andersen and Borup argue that strategy should include a „learning process or a 
process of negotiation between power and interests‟ (ibid, 5). Thus before foresight can play a 
role in research policy, strategic planning must include organisational learning and transparency 
in negotiating interests expressed by different stakeholders, such as researchers, representatives 
of industry and institutional managers.156 
In line with several other analysts (Rappert 1999, de Smedt 2008) Dannemand Andersen and 
Borup also question whether foresight is really a „decision machine‟ supporting a rational and 
linear approach to decision-making, or a source of unambiguous recommendations for such 
processes. They argue that one should address the linear and rational understanding of policy and 
decision-making critically, pointing out that „foresight processes might be designed to leave 
room for negotiations between interests and powers‟ (ibid, 14). 
Apparently, in these recent discussions the boundaries between strategy, decision-making and 
foresight have become diffused. Instead of considering foresight as an approach which 
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 On transparency and the move from authority to authenticity see Brown and Michael (2002a and b). On 
authority, legitimacy and credibility of foresight see Jewell et al. (2001). 
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introduces open dialogue and participation into a traditionally rational and linear strategy 
process, now strategy and decision-making themselves are expected to embrace these values. At 
the same time, Dannemand Andersen and Borup consider both strategy and foresight as 
processes which should leave room for „negotiations between interests and powers‟ (ibid 5, 14). 
Thus the question remains how foresight contributes to coordinating research strategy and 
developing research programmes? As Brown et al. argued back in 1999 foresight can become 
less significant if its material results (such as scenarios) are not considered vital to priority 
setting, but are merely considered additional information: 
There are assumptions that decision- and policy-makers, if they are rational, 
will gather and use the information produced by Foresight exercises; however 
the observed relations between information and decision-making are not as 
easy or as clear as the classical theories of decision-making predict. Foresight 
as output or as mere information (documents, reports, etc.) can be understood 
as some of the data that decision- and policy-makers need to become more 
informed, and would thus have the same loose relationship with decision-
making that information in general has (ibid, 13). 
 
The optimistic perspective on the role of foresight in research policy presented by Martin and 
Irvine in 1989 has thus been modified during the last twenty years, often with the underlying 
argument that the results of foresight are difficult to evaluate immediately after their conclusion 
(Dannemand Andersen et al. 2007). Rather there are long-term impacts and effects which can 
only be measured from a distance, at which point it is difficult to trace a direct relationship 
between positive effects and foresight as the explicit contributor. This thesis discusses the 
concrete textual outcome of the foresight project on ICT research in the RCN in 2004 and thus 
does not include other results, such as networking effects or long-term influences. The results of 
all foresight activities combined in this project may have produced long-term effects, but to 
analyse those is outside the framework of this study.157 
 
 
 
                                                 
157
 The RCN has initiated and funded several foresight activities following this process, especially in the area of 
regional development (see also RCN 2009c). Large scale strategic foresight focusing on the development of the 
RCN itself, however, has not been conducted since. 
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6.1 Evaluation and convention 
Scenarios are texts produced to „qualify for evaluation‟ (Thévenot 2002a, 57) and the way 
they are evaluated in other contexts again reflects how actors achieve coordination of important 
issues, such as research programme development in the field of key technologies. These 
negotiation processes themselves give thus new insights into the practice of governing public 
research funding.158  
To discuss the evaluation of the scenarios as contributions to the development of the research 
programme proposal, I would like to use a different approach to the practice of research policy 
and strategies than that suggested by Dannemand Andersen and Borup (2006) above. Instead of 
looking at these evaluations as expressions of either rational-analytic responses to foresight, or as 
„negotiations between powers and interests‟ I want to discuss them within the context of 
conventions as coordinating negotiations in policy development. The second perspective on 
conventions provided by Thévenot (2002a, 2006) explains conventions as „channelling 
uncertainty through a conventional formatting of events‟. By drawing on Thévenot‟s second 
perspective on conventions I argue that each coordinating activity also involves acceptance of 
what cannot be considered relevant.159 At the same time this acceptance is part of the negotiation 
process, because not all members of a collective will subscribe to such acceptance immediately. 
It is coordinated but also „grounded on the common knowledge that there is no hope for a more 
complete alignment (which is assumed in classical group collectives)‟ (Thévenot 2002a, 83). I 
want to argue that using the concept of convention as developed by Thévenot shows that 
coordination does not only rest on creating equivalences across people, processes and contexts 
with the aim of producing relevance. It also involves negotiating what is considered irrelevant. It 
is exactly this evaluative operation which both expresses but also recreates conventions, i.e. 
common forms of evaluation in research policy. 
The question for the project group was to what extent the scenarios in their existing form and 
content could be considered relevant for developing the programme proposal. This question was 
                                                 
158
 This specific perspective refers back to Callon (1987, 83) who proposes to study technology not as a problem 
which has to be fixed, but as a tool for sociological analysis, which „would enlarge the methodological range of the 
social sciences‟. The study of foresight can thus not only broaden the perspective on the practice of research policy, 
but also contribute to enlarging the methodological range of the social sciences with the future as an additional 
dimension. 
159
 See discussion of convention theory and Thévenot‟s specific perspective on conventions in Chapter three, 
subchapter 3.5. 
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dealt with in three meetings which will be the focus in this chapter. The project group met on 5 
October 2004 to prepare the first proposal for the new large ICT research programme. This 
meeting took place a day after the second meeting of the writing group discussed in the previous 
chapter. The next meeting, on 7 October, involved the writing group, including the facilitator and 
the invited consultants who were now developing and differentiating the three scenarios further. 
At the last meeting of the project group before the second participatory workshop, held on 12 
October, a consensus about the three scenarios had to be reached.160 This consensus was 
necessary to enable a discussion on research strategies at the final workshop gathering of 30–40 
invited participants, which took place on 21 and 22 October. The way the scenarios and the 
writing work itself were evaluated by the project group shows how the particular expectations 
about the value of the scenarios were met.  
 
6.2 The need to become specific: evaluating relevance 
On 5 October 2004 the project group reassembled to prepare a proposal draft for the new ICT 
research programme. Six people attended the meeting, which was headed by the leader of the 
foresight project. In addition, two RCN representatives from the Division of Innovation, who had 
also participated in the scenario workshops, were present. The three RCN employees were joined 
by a professor from the University of Trondheim, a representative from Siemens and a 
representative from Simula, an ICT research laboratory in which the Norwegian government is 
the principal shareholder. These latter three group members represented the external expertise 
that the project drew on to ensure that dialogue took place between research programme 
managers and the future users of the new large research programme, such as public and private 
research institutions and the industry.  
The project leader opened the meeting by informing the project group that there were only a 
few weeks left to agree on a programme plan. The RCN board needed to have accepted the plan 
by December 2004 in order to meet the deadline for funding applications on 15 February the 
following year. The research communities had already been informed about the final date for 
sending in applications, but they had not yet been informed about what they could apply for. 
                                                 
160
 See appendix 9.1. for overview over attended meetings. 
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Thus while the VERDIKT programme already had a deadline for applications, its content was 
still to be produced and depended on many parallel processes, including the scenario work. 
The project leader announced the agenda of the meeting: 
Today we need an open discussion about the programme. We have the 
scenarios, and we have you as a peer group to help us shape this programme. 
But we need to become more specific. We cannot simply wait for the scenario 
project to deliver results. Today we need to agree on some written results from 
our meeting.  
 
Here the priority was clearly to produce a specific material outcome that day. Delivering the 
programme proposal needed to become the top priority, whatever the final outcome of the 
foresight project. At this point the project leader judged the scenarios not to be sufficiently 
relevant, although she was, of course, aware that they would be improved. This was a calculative 
operation: in order to reduce the risk of delaying production of a programme proposal the value 
of the scenarios had to be disregarded at that point. Given the tight schedule the entire project 
group had an interest in working to produce specifics, rather than focusing on scenarios that did 
not have to fulfil the same criteria. 
The group discussed how to relate ICT research, the core of the programme proposal, to 
policy-related questions. One policy issue was the question of utility. The technology to be 
fostered by research should be useful and widely applicable. This, however, was deemed to 
contradict the requirement to fund basic ICT research exploring new areas and new combinations 
which could later be developed into applied research. The group discussed whether priority 
should be given to basic or applied research.  
„We have to be able to document the general utility of this new programme‟, one RCN 
representative said. „We need to pursue policy challenges regarding new research. This has to be 
a part of the new programme.‟ 
„The tension here is to what degree we can use one technology in different sectors. Should the 
scope of application determine the value of research on ICT?‟ another participant asked.  
„I would think so‟, an external participant replied. „ICT‟s only justification is its being useful 
for something else! There is a big risk in starting a research programme that is too ambitious. 
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However, if we only pursue application then the programme will not be ambitious enough! We 
must also pursue more general challenges.‟ 
So the first value discussed by the group was the usefulness of the programme. Creating a 
large-scale research programme ought to add something new to existing ICT research 
programmes. Policy challenges were, according to an RCN representative, the most important 
justification for the programme, and the first policy challenge mentioned was the usefulness of 
ICT in different sectors. However, this was also posed as a question. Should the degree of 
application determine the value of ICT research? The third participant argued that applicability 
alone would not justify the usefulness of the programme. Instead the programme should justify 
ICT research as useful and ambitious. So both useful ICT research and „more general challenges‟ 
were to be addressed by the new programme. Only then could it be considered meaningful. Here 
at least two values were being kept in play simultaneously, usefulness and ambitiousness, which 
were associated with applied and generic research respectively.  
By contrast with the scenario writing, here the project group addressed policy, strategy and 
ambitions openly, since the programme proposal was expected to reflect their choices. 
Nevertheless, the discussion topics were similar – utility and the social uses of technology. Here, 
however, any uncertainties about how policy and strategy should be addressed in the finished 
text were expected to be resolved. Whereas the RCN senior advisor had wondered how to „direct 
the reader towards what we want to achieve‟ in the scenarios, 161 the programme proposal was 
expected to express priorities discussed and decided upon by the project group members.  
To produce the programme proposal, specific content had to be negotiated. In the discussion 
of the research programme proposal the group members‟ interests were closely related to the 
organisations they represented. The task of defining the „general areas of challenge‟ thus 
appealed directly to the project group‟s various areas of expertise and their organisational 
responsibilities. As such the programme proposal would reflect a combination of individual 
perspectives and the priorities derived from each participant‟s representational expertise. Unlike 
the open and future-oriented scenarios, the programme proposal needed to become a text 
representing the reality of research priorities decided on the basis of individual and 
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representative expertise. The question remained what role the foresight project would play in the 
development of the proposal.  
After discussing generic versus applied ICT research, the group then addressed the question 
of how to ensure democratic participation in the process. An RCN employee wondered: 
„Should we already point towards important areas? Or should we invite people to engage in an 
open process in which they can make suggestions about what might be important in two to five 
years? Maybe that should be a part of VERDIKT.‟ 
An external participant replied: „That means we would have to challenge people‟s 
imagination. That is always difficult. We should not let VERDIKT become a programme into 
which all ICT research is stuffed and then called a “big programme”. We need to find out what is 
to be included and what excluded from this programme.‟ 
Having talked about usefulness and ambitiousness the project group now discussed yet 
another value that was to be reflected in the final programme proposal – participation. One group 
member expressed uncertainty about whether the programme could be justified if the important 
research areas were identified by the group members alone. Representative authority was here 
weighed up against participative authenticity. This was also an evaluation of the work conducted 
in the foresight project. The project group had invited about forty ICT experts from academia 
and industry to contribute ideas about important future research areas in a two-day workshop. 
Here the participants were asked to make creative suggestions, provided they did not represent 
sectoral or organisational interests. Now, however, one project group member considered in 
addition to the participatory process they had already conducted a new „open dialogue‟ to discuss 
a shorter time-span (two to five years rather than ten to fifteen). The idea was that by reducing 
the time-span the participants would become more intensively involved because their 
expectations concerning the future would be more tangible. The second group member, however, 
rejected this idea, responding that to challenge people‟s imagination was a difficult task. A 
further objection was that too many perspectives would make the programme unwieldy, so clear 
boundaries needed to be established. By emphasising that „we need to find out what is included 
and what is excluded from this programme‟ the participant reminded the group of their collective 
responsibility for the task of writing a programme proposal. Assuming responsibility for a list of 
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tasks was an important convention to adhere to. As members of the project group they needed to 
be able to justify their group mandate.162  
This is another interesting move in evaluating the relevance of the foresight project in the 
process of writing a research programme proposal. Following the open discussion of strategy and 
policy issues one group member now regarded an open dialogue as relevant to the question of 
research priorities to be made for the next two to five years. Yet instead of pointing out that they 
had already conducted such a dialogue, investing in its form, in equal participation and in an 
open approach, the group member‟s response was to say that thinking about what research areas 
would be important over the next two to five years would require too much imagination. The 
scenario workshops were not mentioned. The open dialogue conducted in the scenario process 
remained thus outside the collective coordination of the programme proposal. In other words, it 
was made irrelevant. In the context of developing research programmes this was also an indirect 
evaluation of the usefulness of collective long-term thinking.  
The third and final topic in the discussion about developing a programme proposal 
specifically addressed the value of the scenarios for programme development. 
„Let‟s talk about content again,‟ one of the external participants said. „Let‟s look at two 
perspectives:  
VERDIKT is a big umbrella programme with distinctive research areas 
focusing on either application or technology. We have not got any further with 
this discussion. Or: 
 
VERDIKT is a supporting vision, and then we just organise things in an 
efficient way. We already have some visions in written form, for example the 
vision on „Wireless future‟ created by the Telecom Company, or visions 
produced by the EU commission, like „Ambient Intelligence‟ and „Information 
society for all.‟ 
 
„Well,‟ an RCN representative reasoned, „if VERDIKT is to represent an increase in quality, 
then calling it an umbrella programme would not be very helpful. We need to wait for the 
scenario project to come up with results before we can produce a vision. This programme needs 
to be much more than just the sum of everything we have done so far.‟ 
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As an umbrella programme VERDIKT would show clear prioritisation in favour of specific 
research areas. This implied complex negotiations of priorities in the project group within a short 
time-span. If, however, the ICT programme was intended to be a „supporting vision‟, then 
scenarios or visions could become important. But the scenarios being developed by the writing 
group were not mentioned by the first participant. Instead, he referred to other, already existing 
visions based on technology as the driver of social change.  
The RCN representative, however, adhered to the original expectation that the quality 
required would emerge from the foresight project. As a promise of increased quality in priority-
setting, the project was expected to ensure that the programme would become „more than the 
sum of everything we have done so far‟. Apparently, there were clear ambitions and expectations 
about the influence the project would have on the RCN as an organisation as well as on ICT 
research. He called for the proposal development to be kept on hold until the scenarios were 
completed.  
The challenge, however, was to create specific content for the programme proposal within the 
relatively short time-span allocated to the group. At this stage, the scenarios were still unspecific 
about what it was most important to communicate. They did not comply with the convention of 
providing specific content for a programme proposal, even though the second participant saw 
them as potentially producing something beyond what was expected.  
The project group continued by discussing the general utility of ICT research for Norwegian 
society, for example, as a way of making life easier. Because they needed to come up with 
specific results, they discussed producing visions right there during the meeting. One participant 
for example, suggested „a better society‟ as a comprehensive vision. Thus the potential visionary 
elements from the scenario work were abandoned in favour of already existing visions or visions 
produced on the spot.  
 Finally the project leader informed the project group about the progress of the scenario 
writing work:   
We in the RCN have made alliances with a couple of people who are helping 
us write [the scenarios]. We think aloud together. Our facilitator has worked a 
great deal since the participatory workshop. For the next two days we will 
continue to work on the scenarios and then the writers will finish writing them. 
When we meet the participatory group again we will need to achieve consensus 
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about these scenarios within the group. I do hope they will not reject them. We 
need recommendations from this group. If we see any clear lines emerging in 
the scenario work we will incorporate them in the VERDIKT programme. 
 
Another RCN employee involved in the writing process concluded the discussion by saying: 
„The work on the scenarios raises questions about which road to choose. We might not get much 
content out of them, but the scenarios we are working on now are relevant for our choice of 
direction.‟ 
At the end of this meeting the project leader assessed the value of the scenario process for the 
development of the programme proposal. She acknowledged the work of those writing and 
ordering the scenarios, mentioning especially the work conducted by the facilitator and the 
external consultants helping with the writing process.163 The phrase „thinking aloud together‟ was 
a way of describing the transparency and openness between the different members of the writing 
group, but also partly a reference to what was not happening, or hardly happening at these 
meetings – namely, the writing itself. Only a few group members were actually engaged in 
writing the scenarios, among them the consultants who had been asked to help. Most of the 
writing work was done in between meetings at the desks of those who developed the stories.  
At the same time the project leader hoped that the forty participants at the final workshop 
would accept the scenarios and recognise their value. She expressed confidence that the writers 
would create products that would be considered credible outside the writing process. However, 
in order for the scenarios to be relevant for the programme proposal „clear lines‟ would have to 
emerge from the scenario work. As head of the project group and hence leader of the work on the 
programme proposal, her judgement would have a distinctive influence on the final evaluation of 
the scenarios.  
In this respect, her colleague might have made the final comment to imply that the project 
leader‟s demand for „clear lines‟ did not necessarily mean „clear content‟, which he doubted the 
scenarios could provide. Nevertheless, he tried to secure their status as relevant for the 
programme development work by underlining, as the senior advisor had already done, that the 
scenario work was valuable for deciding „which road to choose‟. His evaluation, left open, 
however, how the scenarios should be considered relevant for a choice of direction.  
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 The two external consultants are not listed among the participants of the scenario group assembled at the 
workshops. See list of participants „Scenariegruppen‟ at Research Council of Norway (2004b).  
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This meeting held by the project group to discuss producing a research programme proposal 
indicates a shift from coordinating relevance in scenario creation towards evaluating the 
relevance of the scenarios. In order to qualify for evaluation the scenarios would have to 
contribute to the desired content of the proposal, which had to be both useful and ambitious in 
order to present something new and meaningful in national ICT research policy development. 
As shown in this discussion, the project group members differed in their assessments of the 
value of the scenarios for the programme proposal. Some considered the scenarios irrelevant at 
this stage because they could not provide the proposal with concrete content. This resulted in 
discussions about using other visions, producing visions on the spot, and even suggestions to 
hold a new participatory dialogue about research priorities. Others, however, saw the scenarios 
as „relevant for our choice of direction‟ or as helping the programme to become „more than the 
sum of everything we have done so far‟. Thus the relevance of the scenarios for writing a 
programme proposal was now poised between clear content, clear lines or choice of direction.  
 
6.3 The work of writing 
Two days after the meeting about the programme proposal, on 7
 
October, the writing group 
met again, this time to discuss a first draft of all three scenarios. The facilitator opened the 
meeting, announcing that today they would review what they had got so far and consider new 
ideas. Twelve people attended this meeting: Four of them were RCN employees, – the project 
leader, the senior advisor and the two representatives from the Division of Innovation. Also 
present were the facilitator and one of the external consultants hired to help with the writing 
process. As well as two ICT experts from a telecom company, one of whom was attending these 
meetings for the first time, there were two more external participants who had been involved in 
the workshops. Finally, accompanying me was a master‟s degree student from the Centre for 
Technology, Innovation and Culture who had agreed to assist me in observing the process.164  
The facilitator asked the participants to read the three scenarios consecutively. I have chosen 
to translate as much of the scenario content as necessary in order to provide the context for the 
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subsequent discussions by the group members. 165 The participants started with the scenario 
called „The Spirit of the New ERA‟, which I summarise below. The introduction reads: 
In 2004 Norway was still discussing what to do once oil resources were 
exhausted, but nobody took the discussion seriously; everything was just 
working too well. By 2006, however, Kværner had gone bankrupt and Norway 
had embarked on a national endeavour. This coincided with an increasing need 
for security within the country and in the EU. Here Norway was able to take 
advantage of its assets. International research focused on the EU and we 
learned quickly that not everything can be bought. Competence, for instance. 
In 2015 Norway will be able to boast a number of major ICT successes, 
especially within the areas of security and electronic administration. 
Technology will be everywhere and invisible and the technical possibilities 
ensuing from the national effort have created ethical dilemmas everywhere. 
The industry‟s need for concrete results has created new, converging research 
disciplines and a new research élite is emerging. 
 
(A summary of the scenario)  
Big businesses have retreated from the Norwegian scene and have decided to 
invest in their activities abroad. Unemployment is on the rise, big business has 
gone bankrupt and a passive government is encountering angry demonstrators. 
A national committee led by ICT and policy experts has been founded to 
redefine business policy and come up with policy options which could 
stimulate new businesses, contribute to innovation and finally define what 
should be considered as future value creation in an increasingly knowledge-
intensive Norwegian economy. 
The national security situation became an important topic in 2006. Norway had 
invested in innovative use of ICT for surveillance and national security after its 
engagement in international assignments increased its risk of being a potential 
terror target. This led to a recognition that a national research effort was needed 
in the area of ICT, in order, among other things, to reduce the national threat 
level. 
Four big funds were established, all financed by the continuously increasing oil 
fund: ICT, oil, marine and biotechnology. Each fund was given 50 billion 
NOK166 to ensure cooperation between researchers and commercial interests. 
The funds were also designed to protect researchers‟ intellectual property. 
Norway increased its international and especially European research 
engagement and English became the official teaching language at all higher 
education institutions.  
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 Scenario text as issued to the participants at the meeting on 7 October 2004. Information about the UTSIKT 
scenario project as well as the scenarios: RCN (2004b, 2005b). 
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 50 billion NOK are approximately 5.7 billion euros. 
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The scenario then described a number of new, possible relationships between academia and 
industry based on these financial resources and changed educational infrastructures. These would 
lead to a growth in ICT and in knowledge-based and creative industries such as communications, 
software and games, entertainment, design and media. Norway would offer educational 
opportunities to immigrants, especially those with sought-after skills. Technology would become 
pervasive and invisible, leading to new forms of organisation, interdisciplinary activities and 
value chains. Recent technological developments would raise major ethical and juridical 
controversies about what constitutes a human being (end of summary). 
 
The facilitator had asked the group to postpone discussion until they had read all three 
scenarios. However, some group members wanted to give their opinion immediately after 
reading the first scenario.  
An external participant wondered: „To me it seems difficult to argue for this particular shift in 
the scenario.‟ An external expert concurred: „We should make the crisis much more dramatic, 
exaggerate the situation.‟ Then a RCN employee raised doubts: 
I am a bit at a loss about consistency in this scenario. There are rather too many 
possibilities for „fixing‟ things here. Don‟t invent so many cheap solutions. Is it 
really a credible scenario if we just describe Finnish politics as they are already 
happening? We have to show people that this situation will cost us something. 
 
This criticism had already been expressed at the first meeting of the writing group. The 
scenario included many narrative elements pointing to positive developments following a crisis. 
Whereas the criticism raised in the first meeting of the writing group had questioned the central 
role of the state in the scenario, an RCN employee now saw these positive developments as 
„cheap solutions‟. If a scenario included too many possibilities for „fixing‟ things, here in the 
form of four big money funds, it became less credible. Compared with the initial discussions 
about this scenario, however, the former uncertainty about whether the group was competent 
enough to speak about scenario content had disappeared. The concrete narrative allowed the 
participants to be more critical and to ask more questions about the content and intentions in this 
scenario than during the first meeting of the writing group.167  
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However, the facilitator asked them to stop discussing and to read the second scenario first. 
The following is just the introduction to the scenario: 
The eConsuming Norway 
The foundations for the future of Norway were already laid in 2005. The 
research, authorities and industry cooperated to build an infostructure ensuring 
broadband for everyone. The only thing that remained to be done was to fill the 
net with content. 
The lives of citizens and consumers were increasingly infiltrated by technology 
all the way through the first decade of the new millennium. Public 
administration has become available online, elections are conducted 
electronically, the PC has taken over the functions of TV and the church is 
offering an online bereavement concept. The main thing, however, is 
entertainment. Sugar intake is on the rise, activity levels are slumping. The user 
is the centre of attention. „Time to Market‟ is getting shorter all the time and 
many products and companies flop shortly after being launched. 
There is a digital divide between those who use ICT exclusively for 
consumption and for satisfying their immediate needs and those who see ICT 
as a means for personal development and creativity. Apparently these groups 
live in harmony with the rest of the Norwegian population, but conflicts are 
simmering below the surface. 
Many ICT researchers have become part of a support network for the product 
development departments of various businesses. These, on the other hand, have 
taken over most of the R&D activities of those businesses. Basic research is 
only conducted in a few odd areas and Norwegian research funding is 
channelled through the EU. Nobody sees any point in general basic research 
anymore: After all, all our needs are covered. 
 
Here several participants remarked that politics was almost invisible here. „We should 
underline that politics is not an actor in this scenario. The public sector is completely passive.‟ 
The project leader was worried about the way users were presented in this scenario: „This 
scenario claims that user needs are developing in the wrong direction. This sounds strange to me. 
How can user needs be something negative?‟  
„What kind of scenario has this become anyway?‟ another RCN representative asked: „I 
remember that at the participatory workshop at Sundvollen we wanted to turn this into a kind of 
“couch scenario” in which the user would control everything from the sofa!‟ 
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Several evaluations were expressed here. Unlike the first scenario in which the state was a 
central actor, „eConsuming Norway‟168 did not involve any public politics. Instead, consumers 
decide about social and normative values. An „online church‟ is one of their consumer demands; 
so is entertainment and short-lived consumer products. The project leader was therefore 
concerned about the implication of the scenario that user needs could be evaluated as „wrong 
user needs‟. According to the last commentator the original scenario idea had gone through a 
considerable transformation and no longer represented the ideas of the workshop group. In other 
words the scenario had become an expression of user values such as entertainment and personal 
development rather than offering a view of technology as enabling overall control. 
These aspects were not discussed any further at that point, however, since the facilitator asked 
the participants to turn their attention to the third scenario. While the participants were reading 
the story, the representative from a business association whispered to his neighbour: „Who 
actually wrote this?‟ Whereupon his neighbour, one of the writing consultants replied: „Many 
people. I have written something, and so have Magnus, Jon and Karl.‟169 
This question, raised quietly by one of the former workshop participants, underlines the 
implicit agreement that questions about who wrote what between the two participatory 
workshops were not addressed as an issue in the process. The agreement to work together on the 
scenarios constituted a contract limited to this process whereby the creation of the scenarios 
would exclude any discussion about who had written what and why. Writing shared between 
more people and thus more collective coordination would have required more investment from 
the rest of the group, investment in time and engagement. This could also have been a reason 
why the remaining participants did not insist on being directly involved in the actual writing of 
the texts.  
After the short discussion about the second scenario described above, the participants were 
asked to read the final scenario, which focused on the role of research and researchers in Norway 
in 2015: 
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Out of Sync (From the introduction) 
Restless times are creating a vacuum. The supranational authorities and 
institutions are going through hard times and the market is increasing its 
influence in a shifting world. This is creating new monopolies in ICT industry 
and research. 
The oil fund has been consumed by the social security agencies, and the effort 
to invest in ICT was doomed to fail. Increasingly, research funding is being 
allocated directly to industry and this creates a divide between publicly and 
privately employed researchers. Very little groundbreaking research is being 
conducted in Norway. Big, multinational companies educate their own people. 
This has produced research super stars with 5 million dollar incomes, and an 
army of groupies who have to do the boring work. At the same time, this 
development is being criticised by researchers, who have created a counter 
movement and are building alliances with organisations such as Attac and 
Adbusters. 
In 2015 people are sick of news and technological babble. Unlike in the final 
decades of the twentieth century, ICT is no longer regarded as an 
uncontroversial area of activity which politicians, researchers and users can 
agree about. Most of the population accept surveillance through the new 
„Ambient Intelligence‟- technology, and are mostly interested in functional 
solutions which satisfy short-sighted personal needs. Industry responds to those 
needs, and those researchers who join this development can live well in 
Norway. 
 
An RCN employee raised his voice: „I was one of the people at Sundvollen who created this 
scenario in the first place. I believe this is a very important scenario which we should put to use. 
But there are a couple of discrepancies here again. We should not be so negative; this ruins the 
whole scenario.‟ 
An external participant wondered about the relationship between ICT and research:  
This is clearly a scenario in which the Research Council loses all its influence 
and funding. Well, Norwegian basic research in ICT is already almost 
completely irrelevant for industry today. Do we really need ICT research if it is 
just supposed to be applicable in every context? This scenario attempts to 
describe a paradigm shift in which research quits being governed publicly and 
ICT has become generally integrated. What can ICT researchers do themselves 
to influence developments? I suppose the scenario could become interesting if 
we could say anything about that. 
 
The facilitator argued: „We were trying to keep the RCN as invisible as possible in these 
scenarios.‟ 
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The representative replied: „I was talking about research communities, not the RCN.‟ 
This scenario was deemed useful for discussing the value of generic research on ICT and the 
possibilities researchers might have to influence developments. Again, as in the second scenario, 
public policy was invisible and not given any agency. The facilitator wanted the RCN to stay 
invisible too and not protrude as an actor. Public research funding would cease to play a role, yet 
the external representative saw this as a chance for researchers to consider their role as strategic 
actors. Owing to the envisioned policy vacuum this scenario could turn into a story which could 
attract discussion about the value and relevance of generic and applied ICT research in Norway.  
Yet in the process of writing, the problem about how to distinguish sufficiently between the 
second and third scenario emerged again. The representative from the business association who 
had quietly asked his neighbour who had written the scenarios now wondered aloud: „I think this 
scenario is again very similar to the second on e-consumerism. What is really out of sync here? I 
do not understand.‟ 
The facilitator replied: „It is the same writer – that‟s why it is similar.‟ 
This comment was not taken up as an issue for discussion. The second and third scenarios had 
been developed further by the senior advisor who had worked on increasing the distinctions 
between these two scenarios. Apparently, these distinctions were still not apparent to everyone. 
The group therefore continued to discuss how to keep the scenarios different. Finally an RCN 
employee warned: „We must avoid a situation in which the RCN creates a scenario that it does 
not wish to promote.‟  
„I agree,‟ the facilitator replied. „We need a fine balance here, but the scenarios must deliver 
enough content to initiate a discussion about policies at Sundvollen!‟ 
The way the writing work on the scenarios was assigned highlighted a challenge that the 
group had been negotiating since the beginning of the process. The two scenarios which had 
initially received less in the way of ideas from the workshop than the „Spirit of the New ERA‟ 
were still coping with the problem of being too similar.170 However, there were specific narrative 
elements which could influence the reception of the scenarios in the context of research policy. 
The project leader‟s unease about the second scenario presenting short-lived consumer needs as 
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negative implies a hesitation about turning scenarios about the future of ICT research into 
moralising stories because this could threaten the credibility of the scenario work. 
The third scenario was faced with an even bigger balancing act. On the one hand, it could 
contribute not only to forward thinking but also forward acting if researchers, both during the 
foresight process and beyond, engaged in a discussion about its research policy implications. On 
the other hand, it questioned the role of public research policy and thus the role of the RCN as a 
strategic actor in the field. This was certainly a future situation the RCN would like to avoid. In 
expressing his concern, however, the RCN employee may have interpreted the role of scenarios 
as narratives to be either promoted or rejected, rather than to induce strategic thinking in a more 
complex manner. The workshop participants might thus be encouraged to discuss strategies 
which would avoid this kind of scenario, and recommend courses of action which would 
strengthen the RCN‟s role as a strategic actor. This, however, could also lead the discussion 
away from considerations of the alternatives for the future of ICT research and research policy. 
The facilitator, however, insisted that scenarios needed to be created which would inspire 
discussion rather than stifle it and thus was more prepared to accept unexpected effects in the 
reception of the scenarios at the workshop. 
At this particular moment of the coordination process the value of the scenarios for the 
discussion of strategies at the final workshop was negotiated. One way of looking at this is to see 
it as negotiating power and interest in foresight (Dannemand Andersen and Borup 2006). The 
RCN held the property rights to the final scenarios, since it had commissioned the project. The 
four writers, each of them engaged differently in the writing process, were transforming the 
collected workshop material and all the suggestions made by the group into narratives. Yet 
because the scenarios as texts were so open, there was sufficient space for individual 
perspectives and values to be expressed, a circumstance which might influence the final 
discussions about the scenarios in the project group.  
Yet it is also possible to interpret this as coordinating the collective writing and rewriting of 
texts by simplifying complex demands through „successive adjustment‟ (Callon 2002, 192). The 
writing of scenarios was successively adjusted from the workshop group of about forty 
participants to a group of ten people responsible for creating scenario narratives. Among this 
group four members were mainly responsible for producing text, and of these four one person 
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developed two of the three scenarios further based on the material gathered at the workshop and 
the comments of the writing group. This type of coordination of the writing process was possible 
because the writing group had implicitly agreed that there were different responsibilities, degrees 
of engagement and competencies within the group. Some members of the writing group were 
thus more involved, i.e. had a greater stake in the process, than others. Responsibility was in this 
respect closely connected with engagement. And engagement again reflected representation.  
The issue of representation, however, was never made explicit here. This demonstrates an 
important difference between the workshop collective and the writing group collective. It shows 
that production of the scenarios included issues of representation which stayed implicit. Another 
point here is to see it as collective activity towards a „common good‟ (Thévenot 2002a). The 
common good was the scenarios, the desired outcome of the process. The group needed a limited 
agreement on what was irrelevant to the discussion, since there could not be a more complete 
alignment between writing and equal representation in this group.  
Thus the writing tasks were openly allocated at the end of the meetings but only among those 
who were already involved in the writing process. I want to argue that the question of who was 
writing what during the process did not become an issue because it fitted into the order of 
responsibilities and engagement. As an RCN employee, the senior advisor was one of the group 
members organisationally responsible for the success of the project. The facilitator and the two 
consultants had been recruited because of their expertise in foresight and in producing narratives 
and they were thus professionally interested in achieving a successful outcome. My point is that 
the action of writing scenarios can be studied focusing on its coordination and evaluation. 
Thévenot calls these connections between evaluation and realistic conditions for effective 
engagement „pragmatic regimes of engagement‟ (2002a, 76). In this sense, the various 
preconditions set by the project group for the process, along with the coordinating process during 
the different stages of the scenario work, could be seen as particular pragmatic regimes of 
engagement. The concept of a „regime‟, however, suggests a stable structure in which the whole 
process was embedded. This notion again removes agency from the involved participants, 
making it more difficult to analyse the dynamic evaluations conducted by the participants during 
the process and to ascertain which contributed to the particular outcome. Therefore I choose to 
retain the concept of „convention‟ as a limited agreement based on a common acceptance of what 
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should be left aside as irrelevant. Here the need to create specific content was met by assigning 
the bulk of the writing work to the participants most responsible for the project as well as those 
representing central stakeholders such as the RCN. 
The facilitator‟s response to the criticism that two of the scenarios were too similar to one 
another was thus a transparent description of what was happening between the meetings. Only a 
handful of people were writing the texts, and the similarities might therefore have been the result 
of identical authorship. Nevertheless, this engagement matched the degree of involvement in the 
process as well as the individual and genuine engagement of particular people, such as RCN 
employees or those recruited specifically for this project.  
 
6.4 Making scenarios specific 
On 12 October, a week before the final meeting with the workshop participants, the project 
group met for the last time to discuss the scenarios and their use at the participatory workshop 
which would be held to discuss strategy and ICT programme content. Now the project group was 
presented with the scenarios that had been revised and rewritten since the last meeting in the 
writing group. The project leader declared: 
It is important that we think these scenarios can give us what we need for the 
final gathering at Sundvollen where we are supposed to develop strategies. 
Another question is what should we do after the last workshop gathering? How 
should we follow up on the process we have started here? 
 
Rather than following up on these initial questions one of the external group members pointed 
out that the RCN had published a policy document in which the strategies of the Research 
Council were outlined explicitly.171 „It seems like a good document‟, he remarked, „but also 
already a rather definite one. It is already very detailed. How are we to influence this?‟ 
Strategies are produced at the RCN all the time, and the project group had been asked to take 
note of and consider the relevance of other processes, both processes that had already been 
concluded and ongoing activities. The external participant, however, expressed his uncertainty 
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 The RCN had released a strategic policy document regarding ICT research prior to the foresight project 
entitled „The will to invest in ICT: Research in information and communications technology 2003–2005‟ which 
outlined visions, ambitions, goals and measures for research development (RCN 2004e). 
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about the value of the scenario work compared with a policy document already published, which 
outlined the strategies of the RCN explicitly. This policy document seemed to be everything the 
scenarios were not: definite, detailed and explicit. 
The project leader replied: „We have not done any work on this document for a year. There is 
no final agreement about the text. It is an internal document. But I am not sure how foresight is 
supposed to change any of this.‟ 
The participant asked again: „But doesn‟t this document by and large reflect the RCN‟s 
present understanding?‟ 
„Yes,‟ the project leader replied, „but this is an internal document. It is „we‟ who did the 
thinking here.‟ 
Thus not only did the external participant in the project group express uncertainty about the 
value of the scenario work, the project leader also doubted whether foresight could influence 
strategic development in the RCN. Nevertheless, she thought the scenario work was valuable 
because it possessed certain features the specific policy document lacked, like, for example, 
including external perspectives. 
During the discussion one of the external experts had to leave. Now only two external experts 
were present who had not read the scenarios before. The facilitator had arrived to present short 
versions of the three scenario texts. He asked the participants to read them, but not to take more 
than five to ten minutes to do so. The two external participants familiarised themselves with the 
scenario texts while the remaining two RCN employees and the facilitator waited for them to 
finish reading. They then turned to discuss the scenario „Spirit of the New ERA‟. 
One of the external participants who had not been involved in the scenario work commented: 
„I do not understand the word „convergence‟. Hasn‟t this lost its importance? And what about 
this new term: „ICP – information and communication processes‟? I cannot say I understand this 
either. There should be a better explanation for this kind of term, since it really is not anything 
new. Apart from that there are only minor mistakes. What is this about MIT and the University 
of Trondheim entering into contracts? What is this all about?‟ 
An RCN employee defended the idea of including MIT in the „Spirit of the New ERA‟ 
scenario: „We need names so people will feel these scenarios are trustworthy.‟ 
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His colleague agreed: „We want to show that Norwegian universities have become attractive 
for internationally important partners. If we have proper funding regulations this could lead to 
even more cooperation.‟ 
The scenario writers had included the use of such contracts simply as an illustration of 
Norwegian universities becoming attractive to internationally important partners. However, as 
the external expert informed the rest of the group, precisely such a contract had been entered into 
between MIT and Trondheim University the previous week. Thus, what the writers had assumed 
were illustrations of probable future developments had already taken place in reality. To the 
external participant therefore this became a useless element in the scenario narrative. 
Finally the discussion of the first scenario turned towards other elements the external expert 
viewed as undesirable in the scenario. This time it was not a question of a narrative element 
already existing in reality but of a development within teaching institutions which this group 
member did not approve of: 
 „Another thing I do not like about this scenario is that existing teaching is cut down and is 
moved down to Vestfold.‟ 
The other externally invited expert exclaimed: „Vestfold? I‟d say Stavanger is more 
probable!‟ 
„Do we need to make this scenario probable now?‟ a RCN employee wondered. 
The first external participant warned: „Be careful the scenario does not lose its credibility.‟ 
 „If everything becomes very probable,‟ the project leader argued, „then this is going to be 
pure extrapolation.‟ 
„No,‟ the external expert replied, „if we suddenly get many highly educated teachers that 
would be far away from today‟s reality.‟ 
Thus the discussion had become a negotiation about whether what was probable was also 
credible. The external participant did not like the idea of moving teaching institutions south to 
the region of Vestfold. He did not discuss whether this was probable but simply expressed 
unease about the idea. In his view, this idea compromised the credibility of the scenario. The 
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project leader, however, evaluated probability as pure extrapolation, and thus not as the type of 
future scenario they were trying to create.  
The facilitator finally intervened in the argument:  
The point about these scenarios is that they should illustrate something 
unexpected, yet not entirely unimaginable. If you all say you don‟t believe 
there will be a university in Vestfold in 2015 then we need to find a balance 
here. As the project leader has already said, we have to be a bit outside today‟s 
reality. Let‟s finish this discussion now. Maybe we should move this university 
to Agder if that seems more plausible to you, but this is only a small building 
block in a big picture, this should not disturb the whole picture. We need some 
surprising elements, we have to demonstrate some form of dynamics... see ...   I 
have already erased „Vestfold University‟ here and put in „Agder University‟, 
so things happen fast here. 172 
 
The external participant‟s critical comments had a major impact on the meeting, with the 
facilitator eventually evaluating the situation as if everyone had agreed that the idea of having a 
university in Vestfold in 2015 was implausible. The compromise to move the scenario university 
to Agder instead was evaluated as „more plausible‟. Nevertheless, the facilitator assured the 
group, this was only a small building block in a big picture. Thus the first scenario, which 
described successful public governing of research policy and development and hence differed 
from the other two, was here evaluated critically in terms of its credibility and plausibility – 
especially by one external group member representing academia and thus an important 
stakeholder in the development of the new ICT research programme.  
In this last meeting of the project group before the second workshop with external participants 
the question of scenario content finally became the focus of evaluation. The project group had to 
reach at least a preliminary consensus about scenario content so that the scenarios could be 
evaluated and discussed by the approximately forty participants in the second workshop about 
strategic recommendations. Now the negotiation of scenario credibility according to specific 
criteria became important. This discussion targeted most of the criteria necessary for scenarios as 
presented by the facilitator during the first participatory workshop. He had defined good 
scenarios as being „believable, plausible, internally coherent, entailing some element of surprise 
                                                 
172 The former college of Agder was formally established as a university on 1 September 2007, three years after 
this scenario process. It is the youngest university in Norway. 
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and strategically relevant‟.173 Here the external expert from a public research institution 
questioned the use of specific terms and ideas, saying some of them were out of date while others 
did not add any innovative value to the scenario. The discussion thus shows how individual 
preferences and criticisms can turn into evaluations of scenario credibility and plausibility and 
ultimately affect the content of the scenarios. 
 
6.5 Conclusion: conventions and credibility 
In this chapter I have described a shift in the activities conducted in the foresight project, 
moving from coordinating collective ideas and negotiating scenario content towards an 
evaluation of the scenarios as relevant for research programme development. While the writing 
group was still working on the content of the scenarios, their relevance and usefulness for 
programme development was already being assessed in meetings of the project group, which had 
been given the task of writing a research programme proposal. This can be seen as a movement 
from coordinating relevance to evaluating relevance. 
The scenarios were thus still hovering between relevance and irrelevance for research 
programme development. The lack of „clear content‟ was seen as both a drawback and an 
advantage. The scenarios were not a conventional form of document, and their content was still 
unresolved. Since they were not finished their potential value was still uncertain. Yet within the 
context of developing a programme proposal they were evaluated in terms of the need to become 
specific, to create a concrete text with strategic content within a limited time-span. One 
convention was thus the expectation that texts should have specific and coherent content, not 
only in the context of research policy, but in general. The scenarios were poised between 
representing alternative futures and informing the strategic present and thus outside the 
calculability of concrete content. Yet the ultimate objective of the foresight process – to produce 
a research programme proposal presenting explicit research priorities – was always implied. In 
this way, the prevailing uncertainty about the relevance of the scenarios was channelled through 
a „conventional formatting of events‟ (Thévenot 2006, 111), that is the need to become specific.  
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Coordinating the writing work between four writing group members was not so much a 
negotiation of power and interest as an implicit agreement within the writing group that those 
members with the most responsibility for the success of the foresight project should be most 
engaged in the writing of the scenarios. This limited agreement created a link between 
„evaluation and realistic conditions for effective engagement‟ (Thévenot 2002a). Rather than 
understanding these links in terms of „pragmatic regimes of engagement‟ (ibid), I interpret them 
as conventions of engagement within the context of responsibility for successful outcomes. The 
question of representing specific interests was consequently not made an issue in the writing 
group. It remained a limited and implicit agreement based on a shared acceptance that certain 
aspects of collective scenario writing should be considered irrelevant. It did, however, raise the 
unresolved issue of achieving three inherently different and meaningful scenarios. 
Finally in the third meeting, a preliminary consensus about the content of the scenarios had to 
be reached. The discussion about specific terms and events in the first scenario became an issue 
of scenario credibility. Here one external group member influenced the content of the first 
scenario because he did not like its implications. In the bigger picture, these small changes would 
not influence the overall character of the scenario. Yet the negotiation of this change shows how 
interests and influence could be played out in the need to create specific scenario content. 
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7 COLLECTIVE EVALUATION 
In the preceding chapters I showed how collective scenario work and the writing of scenarios 
involve coordination of openness and relevance, and how evaluating scenarios for research 
programme development also involves deciding what is irrelevant. This chapter discusses the 
collective evaluation of the scenarios at the second participatory workshop, which again involved 
about forty participants. By this concluding stage of the foresight project the written scenarios 
had reached a definite material form. Rather than negotiating uncertainty about form, number 
and content, the participants were now evaluating the scenarios as material outcomes of the 
foresight project. After all the workshops were finished the project group would evaluate the 
finished scenarios with respect to their relevance for the ICT research programme proposal. Thus 
the empirical questions in this chapter are: What forms of evaluation did the second participatory 
workshop engage in? How did the finished scenarios influence the proposal for the large ICT 
research programme? 
Compared with the evaluations conducted in the project group and by those writing the 
scenarios, the final workshop was to evaluate the scenarios in a more uncertain, pluralist and 
dynamic way. First of all, in contrast to the meetings held to write a research programme 
proposal, the final workshop with external participants was not about producing one specific 
document. Rather the organisers asked the participants to contribute strategic recommendations 
for future ICT research. Second, the implicit agreement (and limited contract) not to represent 
sectoral or professional interests became valid again. In view of these preconditions the 
narratives were expected to offer „directions‟ rather than specific content.  
Rather than opening this chapter by discussing collective evaluation processes in general I 
have chosen to present the different evaluations in more detail to show the diversity of dynamic 
evaluations but also to show the limits of the contract which had shaped the contributions of the 
participants during the process of scenario creation.  Then I describe how the scenarios were 
finally evaluated within the foresight project group and discuss the negotiation of the value of 
scenarios as a question of change versus progress. 
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7.1 Understanding scenarios 
On 20 October 2004 the workshop participants met again at Sundvollen to discuss the 
scenarios and to contribute strategic recommendations for future ICT research. The two-day 
workshop included several activities designed to connect the work on the scenarios with strategic 
thinking. The first day was dedicated to achieving collective acceptance of the scenarios. Here 
the participants were assigned to several groups and asked to work to „increase understanding 
and acceptance of the scenarios both individually and in the group‟.174 Later in the day the 
participants were asked to imagine the three scenarios as reality in 2015. They were to pretend 
they were the decision-makers and generate „a set of strategic actions between 2004 and 2015‟ 
(ibid).  
This time there were only thirty-two participants. The project leader welcomed them and 
informed them briefly about the work that had been done between the two workshops. Then the 
facilitator introduced the three scenarios: 
These scenarios are the testing ground for the strategy discussion. We will ask: 
„If this happens, what does it mean for ICT research in Norway?‟ We need a 
broad range of ideas from you, we do not need consensus. First you need to 
understand the scenarios. They are very information-rich, and thus not very 
easy to understand. Second, you might perhaps want to improve them a bit. 
The common understanding for these scenarios is that they tell us something 
that might happen and that they challenge the existing rules of the game. 
 
 
As in the first workshop, the facilitator asked participants to take an open approach in order to 
produce a variety of ideas rather than to arrive at a consensus. The task of understanding 
scenarios presupposed that they were now ready to be regarded as coherent narratives about 
possible social, technological and research-related developments that might have taken place by 
2015. The facilitator also asked the participants to share a „common understanding‟ of the 
scenarios as a precondition for further work. The participants‟ contributions were to be based on 
evaluating the scenarios as both probable and challenging. To improve the participants‟ 
understanding before the group activities the facilitator showed scenario axes models intended to 
explain the scenarios. He also showed further graphics illustrating the dynamics between forces 
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 Agenda second workshop („Opplegg samling 2‟), a document explaining the agenda of the second workshop 
sent to all participants on 15 October 2004.  
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and counter-forces.175 After that, all three scenarios were presented in one go, and the facilitator 
asked the audience not to comment on the scenarios in the plenary session. „I want you to work 
in groups to increase your own and your group‟s comprehension of the three scenarios. You can 
decide how to organise your group work. Now I have talked long enough. Are you with me on 
this?‟  
 
7.2 Making scenarios realistic 
As the groups started to form I chose to observe several groups during the exercise in order to 
get an overview of the different understandings of the scenarios. I started with Group 6, which 
included four external experts who had taken part in the first workshop, one of them having also 
been present at some of the meetings of the writing group. The four participants discussed the 
„Spirit of the New ERA‟ scenario. One participant was surprised about how well the scenario had 
been developed since the first workshop. The industry representative who had followed the 
writing work agreed: „Yes, I thought it worked out fine. We commented on the rough drafts. 
Now none of these scenarios describes anything we have today.‟ 
 „These scenarios are really very interesting,‟ a second participant observed. „There are clearly 
not two negative ones and one positive one.‟ 
„But which of them can we believe?‟ a research institute representative asked. „In my opinion, 
the “Spirit of the New ERA” is the most realistic one. Here we see a crisis and deep social 
change.‟ 
„Yes,‟ the first participant agreed. „This reminds me a lot of Finnish efforts following their 
crisis. But can we imagine such a crisis here in Norway?‟ 
„Well, if oil is discovered in other places that could deepen this crisis,‟ the researcher replied. 
„But couldn‟t we do something more realistic here?‟ a third group member asked. 
In this discussion comprehension emerged as an evaluation of what the group could believe 
and which scenario would be most realistic. The scenario describing a national development 
already experienced in Finland was evaluated as the most realistic and credible. The group 
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discussed enhancing the realism of the first scenario by making the social and economic crisis 
depicted in the scenario more dramatic. The scenario earlier described as being too positive and 
containing too many possibilities for „fixing things‟ was now seen as the most realistic one. The 
second and third scenarios were thus implicitly evaluated as less credible since they were less 
realistic than the first. Thus the group ordered the scenarios in terms of what they believed to be 
realistic.  
 
7.3 Clear versus fuzzy scenarios 
The next group discussed the second scenario, entitled „eConsumerism‟, which they had 
difficulty understanding. „Perhaps we‟ll be able to understand it better if we concentrate on what 
is missing from the scenario,‟ a representative from a business association suggested.  
„We need more focus on the needs of industry as an important driving force for the whole 
scenario‟, an ICT entrepreneur argued. „Even though this scenario is consumer-driven it does not 
mean that industry is completely passive. There is not enough focus on wireless and mobility 
here.‟ 
The group approached the task of „understanding‟ the scenario by focusing on what they 
thought was missing – mainly technological aspects, such as wireless and mobility. By 
establishing what was missing from the scenario they thought they might be able to improve it. 
The ICT entrepreneur, however, argued that the problem of the scenario went beyond what was 
missing from it. He raised questions about the connections created between ideas in the scenario: 
 We should have a diagram here with lines describing different possible 
developments, such as strong political governance, strong value creation, etc. I 
think the whole scenario is just too fuzzy.176 There are just a lot of different 
aspects gathered together, but no real connection. My guess is that the scenario 
is confused and unclear on purpose, and it does not answer the questions 
clearly enough. 
 
 
„I agree, the scenario has to be clear,‟ another participant agreed.  
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„But we do not know what will happen, therefore we need to be able to invest in many 
different things,‟ a third participant argued. 
„If we make the scenario any clearer,‟ another group member objected, „then it will become 
more improbable and thus less acceptable.‟ 
In comparison with the first scenario, which had been viewed as most realistic and thus most 
credible, making the „eConsumerism‟ scenario clearer would make it less probable. By being 
fuzzy, the entrepreneur declared, the scenario did not „answer the questions clearly enough‟. 
Another participant argued that the openness of the scenario showed the need to invest in „many 
different things‟. Thus, by keeping ideas in the scenario unconnected or fuzzy, one could show 
the multitude of ideas needed to meet the lack of knowledge about the future. A „clearer‟ 
scenario would not allow for that openness.  
This demand for a „clear‟ scenario was different from the first group‟s attempt to increase 
realism discussed above. The realism in the „Spirit of the New ERA‟ scenario was based on 
parallels with the already experienced economic crisis in Finland. Here, however, the group 
members had varying opinions about whether a „clear‟ or realistic scenario would answer 
questions or retain the necessary variety of ideas to address the lack of knowledge about future 
challenges. A fuzzy scenario could serve two purposes: it could provide the range of ideas 
necessary to find out „what to invest in‟ in the future; and by being vague it could be interpreted 
in various ways and thus be more acceptable than a „clear‟ scenario.  
 
7.4 Distinguishing between the scenarios 
After the discussions about the scenarios in groups the whole workshop gathered again for the 
plenary discussion, and three people responsible for collecting all the comments presented 
summaries. 
First the RCN senior advisor who had collected comments on the third scenario „Out of Sync‟ 
summarised the replies: „People still think the difference between „eConsumerism‟ and „Out of 
Sync‟ is not clear enough. We should either modify or strengthen the scenarios.‟ 
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The industry entrepreneur interrupted the presentation: „I have to criticise the form of these 
scenarios. They are all still too fuzzy. I simply do not understand them.‟ 
 „None of these scenarios gives space for free ideas, free thinking,‟ another participant 
remarked.  
„Well, then I must have misunderstood completely,‟ a researcher replied. „I thought that „Out 
of Sync‟ was the scenario of free ideas, only the ideas have become marginalised.‟ 
 „We really have to make these scenarios clearer,‟ another external participant declared, 
„because they will not be happening anyway.‟ 
This discussion showed that the workshop participants evaluated the narrative content of the 
scenarios differently. Now that the number of scenarios had been limited to three, content and 
form were evaluated according to whether they were clear or fuzzy, realistic or credible. The 
lack of difference between the second and third scenarios was still an issue among the workshop 
participants. These three comments – the lack of difference, the fuzziness and the lack of free 
ideas – seemed to be evaluations of the scenario narratives as texts, as stories. The fourth 
comment, however, focused on the implications and message of the scenario „Out of Sync‟. The 
participant interpreted the idea that in 2015 research would be „out of sync‟ with the rest of 
society as the „marginalisation of free ideas‟.  
Thus not only did the participants evaluate the scenarios in different ways, they also engaged 
in different kinds of assessment, some evaluating the scenarios as narratives and others 
interpreting their implications. The final comment thus argued for clearer narratives, 
„accentuating‟ the stories to increase their strategic value, because as alternative futures they 
were not seen as very probable. In other words, there was little risk that they would be taken too 
literally, as Dietz and Forfang had warned earlier (2003, 33).177  
Openness and uncertainty had been elements of the foresight method and approach and had 
also emerged as effects of attempting to ensure both creativity and relevance. They were now 
reflected in the evaluations of the finished scenarios. These comments, even though they 
represent just a few I collected in different groups and plenary discussions during this stage of 
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the workshop, illustrate the difficulty of finding a common understanding of the scenarios as 
„something that might happen‟ and as „challenging the existing rules of the game‟. 
 
7.5 Including strategic actions in the scenarios 
Following from this collective evaluation of the scenarios, the participants were now asked to 
work with strategic recommendations. They were to address each scenario and assume this 
scenario actually taking place in 2015. On that basis they were asked to imagine themselves as 
decision-makers and to generate a set of strategic actions (between 2004 and 2015) with the aim 
of „increasing the value of society’s investment in ICT research‟ (italics added).178  
The strategic actions to be discussed thus already had a collective goal: to create connections 
between value, investment, society and ICT research. Society could be seen as an actor who 
needed to invest more in ICT research, or, in another possible reading of this task, the value of 
investment already made in ICT research needed to be enhanced. In either respect, the goal of 
these strategic actions clearly implied social and economic growth. 
Rather than deriving strategic actions from what the scenarios implied, the participants were 
asked to incorporate these actions in the scenarios themselves. The facilitator specified the task:  
The whole point of this exercise now is to increase the number of actions in the 
scenario. Afterwards we will look at what these actions are directed at and 
finally, we will look specifically at the areas of action which concern the 
Research Council. Then we will pick out these actions from across the 
scenarios. 
 
 
Even though the scenarios had not been changed since the previous discussion about their 
content, the facilitator implied that they were now different enough to include specific strategic 
actions.179 All the participants were asked to start with the scenario „Spirit of the New ERA‟, 
arguably the one with the clearest narrative about national policy-making. 
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I joined one of the groups to listen to their discussion. A female participant who had long 
experience with scenario processes in her organisation wondered aloud: „There is already too 
much about policy actions in this scenario. It makes it hard to think for oneself.‟ 
Another participant remarked: „This scenario is really the bonanza of Norwegian ICT 
research.‟ 
„But why is there so much about security in this scenario?‟ another participant asked. „ICT is 
everywhere and in everything. What then is the programme for ICT research?‟ 
„Well, the second participant replied, „it is the crisis which has created unrest in the research 
world.‟ 
 „But according to the scenario the crisis will be over by 2015,‟ the first participant objected. 
 „There is already a lot about priority actions in this scenario,‟ a representative from a public 
organisation said. „It is clear that the RCN will experience a kind of renaissance in this scenario. 
They will be responsible for administering the oil fund and putting the money into prioritised 
research.‟ 
According to the first participant, the scenario was already policy-oriented, with strong state-
governed funding of public ICT research. Here, as the last participant remarked, the RCN was a 
strong actor. However, the role of ICT research was unclear, since ICT was ubiquitous and used 
to provide omnipresent security. According to this particular group at the workshop, the scenario 
did not leave enough room to incorporate more relevant strategic actions. 
The ethnographic moment presented here was taken from the first part of a series of tasks 
focusing on the development of strategies. Later the participants were asked to allocate strategic 
actions to different actors, such as research institutes, universities, industry and the public sector. 
As the short example suggests, the strategic discussions were influenced by the earlier 
evaluations of the scenarios as realistic, too fuzzy or improbable. In the scenario discussed a 
strong research supporting policy was juxtaposed with an ambiguous role for research in a 
society where ICT had become invisible and ubiquitous.  
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7.6 A scenario to be avoided  
On the second day of the workshop the participants were to discuss the RCN‟s strategic 
choices. They were to identify situations in which the RCN would face important decisions and 
discuss the risks related to these choices. They were then to give recommendations, including 
recommendations about timing.  
„I want you to discuss the different strategic decisions the RCN will have to make, the 
facilitator asked. „Concentrate on the main lines of thinking and use two minutes to discuss the 
strategy. Discussing the risks or the pros and cons of the strategy is optional.‟ 
The strategic choices of the RCN were to be informed by the objective „to get the most out of 
research in Norway‟. I joined the group which included an RCN representative, a university 
researcher, two representatives from industry and two participants from research institutes.  
„Now, should we have free basic research?‟ the RCN employee asked the rest of the group.  
„Well, I think all research includes aspects of application, but this can happen over a period of 
ten years,‟ a research institute representative replied. 
„Should we think short-term or long-term research? And where is the long-term research 
supposed to be conducted? At universities, at research institutes, in industry, or in a combination 
of these?‟ asked a female representative from the economic sector. 
 „Are we still at the stage where we‟re asking questions?‟ the RCN employee wondered aloud.  
„Well,‟ a researcher replied; „we have to come up with an answer about what we think is 
important. We definitely need to avoid the „Out of Sync‟ scenario. To avoid this scenario we will 
also need user-driven research, not only long-term research.‟ 
Discussing strategic choices required participants to find a common context for these choices. 
Gradually, the third scenario „Out of Sync‟, came to stand for a development which should be 
avoided. The strategic choice suggested was to include both user-driven and long-term research 
as had also been proposed in the meeting of the project group held to discuss the new ICT 
research programme. This in itself did not represent a new strategic action. This short example 
from the many dialogues that took place that afternoon shows that the participants had returned 
to discussing the basic challenges of Norwegian research policy. These basic challenges had 
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been highlighted by the scenarios. However, the discussion presented here did not imply that the 
scenarios had helped to see these challenges in a new light. 
These evaluations and discussions conducted in the workshop involving thirty-two 
participants represented forms of coordination different to the evaluations that had taken place 
during collective writing and later during the project group‟s discussions of the scenarios‟ 
relevance for programme development. The participants were now carrying out the tasks set by 
the workshop agenda – namely to „understand‟ and „possibly improve‟ the scenarios and later 
discuss strategies and strategic actions related to these scenarios. Their evaluations, which arose 
out of the different tasks set, opened the scenarios to different possible interpretations, but also 
implied a specific ordering according to the strategic value of the scenarios. In the discussions 
presented above the „Spirit of the New Era‟ was considered the most policy-oriented scenario 
and „Out of Sync‟ was the scenario to be avoided. Finally „eConsumerism‟ was viewed as the 
most „fuzzy‟ scenario; it was seen by one participant as „unclear on purpose‟ with no clear 
technology content but many different, unconnected ideas. This specific characteristic, however, 
could also be valuable precisely because it allowed for many perspectives and interpretations. 
Thus instead of trying to create equivalences across contexts or deciding what was irrelevant, 
here the collective evaluations led to a new opening of the process in terms of how the scenarios 
could become useful in the following strategic discussions at the RCN. 
 
7.7 Concluding the collective process 
In the concluding plenary session the participants were asked to contribute final comments on 
the development of the new large ICT programme. An external participant from industry 
remarked: „Many of us have requested that priorities be set according to thematic areas.‟ 
„That is a good suggestion,‟ a RCN employee replied. „But how can we get there? We will 
need a good process.‟ 
„Why not establish the main outlines of a research programme and leave the priority problem 
to those taking the decisions about the programme?‟ a representative from a research institute 
suggested. 
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These last comments started to reflect the interests of the invited participants, who until then 
had been asked to „leave their agendas at home‟. But now that they were discussing the 
programme development and specific thematic areas their own research or commercial interests 
potentially became relevant. Yet in order to reach consensus over which areas should be included 
in the programme, the group „would need a good process‟, as the RCN employee observed. This 
remark echoed the proposal made at the meeting of the project group in which one RCN 
employee had suggested inviting people to an open process in which they could make 
suggestions about possible research areas to be prioritised in the new research programme. 
Referring to other open processes while many important stakeholders were already assembled at 
the workshop indicated that the foresight project was not seen as an adequate arena to discuss 
these questions. Setting priorities according to thematic areas was not an easy task, so a third 
participant suggested leaving the „priority problem‟ to those making decisions. The first 
discussant might have wanted to address this issue at the workshop, yet his request was not part 
of the workshop agenda and thus not taken up in this setting. 
The facilitator asked the plenary assembly to comment on the strategy process so far. The 
response he received was not so much about the strategy process, but about how the participants 
had been asked to contribute to the project. 
„Why have we not talked about technological development at all?‟ one participant wanted to 
know. „Why have you not taken advantage of the competencies of these participants?‟ 
„The RCN decided early on to create policy foresight,‟ the facilitator replied.  
 „Why should we develop strategies here when there are already strategies published by the 
RCN?‟ a second participant asked. 
„Because those are grey and boring; we want to be exciting,‟ the facilitator declared. Then he 
rounded up the discussion: „The scenarios will be used as contributions to the development of the 
research programme. During the next few days there will be discussions in the RCN about new 
meeting places after this process. But I am not going to promise much‟.  
During the two two-day workshops, involving about forty people from ICT research, industry 
and the public sector, the participants had agreed to accept the preconditions for the foresight 
project specified by the invitation. By following the invitation they had accepted the convention 
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to regard foresight and collective scenario development as a limited agreement about „selected 
features people use to control events and entities‟ (Thévenot 2002a, 83). The uncertainties 
expressed during the collective evaluations were not only related to the scenario texts, but in 
some instances also to whether the tasks set matched the material they were to work with. These 
uncertainties did not, however, raise further or more widespread objections during the process 
because the participants had been engaged in the process.180  
Yet, as the workshop drew to a close, the agenda of the meeting had been fulfilled. This 
released the participants from the limited agreement about following the suggestions made and 
tasks set. Now questions were raised among the participants about the relationship between the 
foresight project‟s goals, their competencies and the role of strategic recommendations. These 
questions highlight one challenge specifically: What does it mean to create policy foresight? I 
will return to this question in the conclusion to this chapter. 
Finally, the foresight project leader summarised the process of the project with all participants 
present: 
There have been many opinions and meeting places in this process. It has been 
an exciting process, especially concerning group dynamics. I hope we have all 
become wiser regarding foresight and its relation to strategic processes. But of 
course we are not finished. Now we have to establish a frame here, but you can 
all be active and contribute to this process; on a voluntary basis, of course. We 
are going to produce two reports, one internal one and one showing the results 
of this process. The scenarios will be used more extensively in different 
contexts. Next April we will conduct a conference which will summarise all 
foresight projects carried out at the RCN. After all, we are spending some 
money and time on this, and that should be visible. 
 
 
Then she gave a short overview of the next meetings concerning the development of the new 
big ICT programme. 
„Our main focus over the next few months will be the development of the VERDIKT 
programme,‟ she announced. „Unfortunately we already have to decide about the main structure 
of the programme by 1 December. But that‟s the way things are.‟ 
A female representative from industry expressed her reservations: 
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 See footnote on the extended meaning of „engagement‟ in French (Thévenot 2002a, 81), Chapter 1, 
subchapter 1.5. 
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„Now we have to be careful VERDIKT doesn‟t turn into a small and hurried affair. The 
success of this process will be measured by how the scenarios are incorporated in the VERDIKT 
programme!‟ 
„The application deadline has already been postponed by two months,‟ the project leader 
replied. „I would really like to thank you all for giving us your time, competency and energy!‟ 
Finally she acknowledged the work of the facilitator: „Many of you were sceptical at the 
beginning. But I can see that your scepticism turned into support during the process.‟ 
Thus the final note in this process was a reminder of the relationship between the foresight 
project and the reality of research programme development. The project leader informed the 
participants that there was very little time left to ensure the integration of the scenarios in the 
programme development. Yet the success of the foresight project, as underlined by one 
participant, would be measured in terms of the influence the scenario work had on the 
programme development. The project leader‟s first priority, however, was to keep to the 
prearranged time schedule. 
 
7.8 The value of scenarios: change versus progress? 
What role did the scenarios finally play in the project group‟s negotiations about the large ICT 
research programme proposal? Once the participatory scenario process had finished, the writers 
edited and finalised the three scenario texts.181 The project group, consisting of RCN employees 
and external ICT experts, then reassembled in four meetings to discuss the completed scenarios‟ 
significance for the goals and possible research topics of the new ICT programme. For personal 
reasons I was not able to attend these meetings, but I have reconstructed the discussions with the 
help of internal reports and personal interviews.  
During the first meeting on 24 November 2004 the project group agreed to write two short 
documents, one on possible future ICT research topics and one based on a broad visionary 
approach.182 Both documents were to deliver ideas which, according to the external ICT experts, 
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 For a short version of the scenarios, see appendix 9.2. The complete scenarios (in Norwegian) at RCN 
(2005b). 
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 Meeting report of the UTSIKT project group 24 November 2004, unpublished. 
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would satisfy the ambitions of the new programme regarding future technological developments. 
The external experts argued that there was not enough information on technological 
developments in the scenarios and one of them thought the scenarios should be supplemented 
with technology foresight. Several RCN representatives agreed with this view. The RCN senior 
advisor argued, however, that the scenarios were examples of possible roads towards the 
„network society‟.183 As he explained a year later, in an interview conducted in January 2006:  
The network society has much deeper implications than ideas of wireless 
communication or mobile phone users of the future. The others adopted the 
term network society willingly, but their associations were wireless 
communication and mobile phones. Yet that was not what I wanted to discuss. 
Nevertheless, the group agreed that network society could be used as a 
comprehensive term for the goal of the new programme.  
 
 
The external experts, however, maintained that the programme needed to focus on expected 
technological challenges and aims. Since the scenarios had not delivered this kind of focus, input 
would be needed from other sources. For the second meeting on 9 December 2004, two 
documents were presented. One was a vision of Norway as a „living lab‟. The second included a 
list of priorities for ICT research for the next ten years. These included core technology, micro-
technology, infrastructure, distributed applications and business models as well as rules and 
regulations.184  
In response to this list of priorities, the RCN‟s senior advisor offered to write a document 
discussing strategic options and dilemmas based on the implications of the three scenarios.185 His 
paper discussed radical ideas about the possible situations in which ICT research might find itself 
in 2015. The writer suggested that the exclusive technological or technocratic understanding of 
ICT would have disappeared by then. In his view, the strength of the scenarios was that they 
showed that technology not only enabled more effective production processes, faster 
communication or increased wealth and prosperity but in addition that 
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 The RCN‟s senior advisor based his understanding of the network society on Castells (1996). 
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 Meeting report of the UTSIKT project group 24 November 2004, unpublished. Vision document „living lab‟, 
unpublished. Document on possible research topics of VERDIKT, unpublished. 
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 Strategy document written by the RCN senior advisor: „Hva vil vi med VERDIKT? Noen strategiske 
lærdommer fra UTSIKT‟ (What is our ambition for VERDIKT? Some strategic lessons from UTSIKT), 
unpublished.  
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ICT will shape society and changes will occur in unpredictable ways. ICT will 
cease to be a research field, and will emerge instead as a social force field.186 
New competences will be needed, even though the need for basic mastery of 
ICT will not disappear. The real innovation potential might not be where the 
ICT sector is looking today. Therefore more reflection is needed on the 
emergence of the network society.  
 
 
The advisor thus highlighted the message the scenarios were supposed to be delivering, 
namely that choices had to be made. Not all ICT research could succeed in Norway, so some of 
it, basic, applied or industrial, would have to be scaled down or organised in a different way. 
New combinations of research to foster innovation, as well as novel social contextualisation 
should move to the forefront to meet the challenges written into the scenarios. According to the 
senior advisor the scenarios were meant to induce changes in thinking – changes in thinking 
about ICT research, the future and strategy.  
The report from the third meeting on 11 January 2005 acknowledges that this strategy 
memorandum had sparked off a debate about the focus of the new research programme. The 
group members reminded each other that the scenarios were not literal descriptions of the future, 
but were intended to train the mind to think about „strategic possibilities‟ and to develop „sound 
practical measures‟.187 Yet because the scenarios did not contribute ideas on technological 
development, the stories sounded unconvincing to the ICT experts. Their strategic interests were 
first and foremost competence growth and progress, not choice and change.  
The scenarios thus set in motion a new „production line‟ of additional documents competing 
to define the position of the scenarios in the programme discussion. Roughly speaking there was 
a dividing line between advocates of qualitative future change and advocates of quantitative 
future demand. This rough definition is by no means meant to assign all positive values to the 
first and derogate the intentions of the latter, but simply to find a way of describing the 
difference in the perspectives of the two sides in the debate. Thinking about the production of the 
additional documents in terms of qualitative change and quantitative demand corresponds to 
some extent to the narrative structures of the different documents. Whereas the ICT professionals 
contributed lists of possible research topics and necessary priorities, the RCN‟s senior advisor 
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 Meeting report of the project group, 11 January 2005, unpublished. 
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produced a pamphlet-like memorandum challenging a technocratic understanding of ICT and 
questioning the role of the new large-scale programme as based on core technologies. As objects 
of intervention, the scenarios thus led to the production of documents distinctly different in their 
textual structures. However, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative does not explain 
the differing perspectives completely. It works only partly as a possible reading, since the ICT 
professionals also wrote a document based on a specific vision, adopting ideas from the first 
scenario.  
The fourth meeting on 28 January 2005 concluded that ICT must be based on research which 
contributes to progress in ICT. All arguments about why ICT research is necessary should be 
based on relevance.188 The project group finally agreed to apply a „dynamic definition‟ to ICT. 
The argument was that all aspects of ICT applications are constantly changing and we really 
cannot answer the question: „What is ICT?‟ The programme proposal, published in spring 2005 
was described as follows:  
The programme VERDIKT– core competence and value creation – invites 
projects within basic as well as applied and industrial ICT research which 
relate to the focus of the programme: ICT competence for innovation and 
cooperation in the network society. The programme will give priority to 
research developing generic ICT knowledge. The planned annual budget for 
the programme is 18 million euros.189  
 
 
In the first programme proposal the future was thus linked to today’s values, such as core 
competence, value creation, innovation and cooperation as well as the development of more 
generic ICT knowledge. The senior advisor‟s term „network society‟ – intended to change the 
way people think about change – was also included in the same text, albeit alongside the list of 
priorities, which represented a compromise rather than a challenging perspective on the future. In 
the end the scenarios were not considered relevant enough to inform the research programme 
proposal. In an interview conducted in January 2006 the project leader explained why:  
We wanted to push the limits of ICT research for this programme into the 
social realm, but not too far, because then the programme would have ended up 
in applied research. It was important to include the aspect of generic ICT 
                                                 
188
 Meeting report of the project group, 28 January 2005, unpublished. 
189
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research in order to push the whole research field and contribute to progress in 
ICT research.  
 
To underline her argument about the importance of including generic research, the project 
leader stated that other programmes financed by the RCN had already dealt with ICT 
applications, such as in the oil and energy sector as well as in health and medicine. In her 
opinion, the scenarios had had little influence on the programme.  
The scenarios themselves reappeared in external presentations in other regions of Norway and 
were mentioned in Nordic foresight activities. In the programme proposal for the large research 
programme on ICT, however, they were deemed irrelevant. 190 
 
7.9 Research policy foresight: irrelevance or intervention? 
In this chapter I have addressed the final stages of the foresight project on ICT conducted in 
the autumn of 2004. The first part of the chapter described the collective evaluation of the three 
scenarios in the final workshop on developing strategic recommendations. Here some of the 
uncertainties which had emerged during the writing stage and the first evaluations in the project 
group resurfaced during collective discussions, while the scenarios as the material outcome of 
the process were now subjected to more dynamic and pluralist evaluations. In this respect, the 
process became more open again as the scenarios could now become relevant, not so much 
because of their specific content, but rather in terms of their implications for directing strategic 
thinking either as strong policy scenarios, scenarios to be avoided or „fuzzy scenarios‟ open to 
interpretation and various ideas about future research investment. 
However, the final stage of the collective scenario process also showed that with the 
workshop agenda completed, the limited agreement between foresight organisers and 
participants about following specific methods and approaches and accepting preconditions, 
ceased to apply. Now the participants raised questions about the role of their competencies and 
the value of their strategic recommendations in relation to already existing policy documents. 
According to the organisers the goal had been to „create policy foresight‟ instead of technology 
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 For a comprehensive evaluation of all five foresight projects under the umbrella project CREATE see 
Research Council of Norway (2006a). See also a reference to the results of the foresight project on ICT in 
Dannemand-Andersen et al (2007, 39–42).  
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foresight. The idea of creating policy foresight had given shape to the preconditions stipulated by 
the invitation, as well as the open and all-inclusive approach to driving forces, and the constantly 
repeated request to the participants to create (new) relations between ICT, society and research. 
The project was thus partly shaped by decisions taken prior to the participatory workshops about 
how alternative futures should be created. The foresight process itself became a political 
technology to achieve exactly this balancing act between the ICT competencies of the 
participants and the policy-oriented objectives of the project group. 
The final meetings of the project group, in which the programme proposal needed to be 
produced, passed through similar stages to that of the scenario development process. Here the 
relevance of the scenarios was again negotiated, evaluated and finally assessed in relation to the 
first proposal for the new large ICT research programme. Now, however, in the project group 
consisting of ten members, half of them external experts, and the other half RCN employees, the 
representative status of external members from industry and academia once again involved their 
ICT expertise and revived the previously contingent status of technology. This resulted in 
activities that the groups had sought to avoid during the scenario writing stage, namely the 
creation of additional texts beside the three scenarios. Whereas the coordination of responsibility 
during scenario writing had ensured a result within the available limit of time and engagement, 
now new texts on visions, research priorities and strategic challenges supported, challenged or 
replaced the existing scenarios. 
In this respect, the scenarios, although regarded as not relevant enough for the research 
proposal, nevertheless produced a certain level of intervention during the discussions on the new 
research programme. Different perspectives and positions in the project group materialised in 
new texts. The need was expressed to coordinate the research programme according to present 
conventions such as lists of research areas to be prioritised, the relationship between those areas 
and specific ways of classifying and ranking them. Thus the creation of research priorities in the 
scenario group was based on evaluation and calculation, and on the authority of those agreeing 
with this viewpoint to insist on the realisation of these priorities. According to Callon and Law 
(2005, 720) the power of calculation depends on elements like lists of entities, the number of 
relationships between them and how they can be classified, manipulated and ranked. In addition 
Law (ibid) argues that this also implies the capacity to calculate, i.e. the material apparatus (here 
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in the form of interrelated texts, such as already existing policy and strategy documents, tables 
etc.). I argue that it also involves authority to decide about priorities and create lists of them.191 
The discussions in the project group show that some group members had more authority on the 
subject of research priorities than others. Their authorship prevailed based on their understanding 
of technology as progress. 
In this respect, we can see the development of the research programme proposal as a form of 
calculation to reduce uncertainty.192 In comparison the scenarios expressed what cannot be 
calculated. However, a situation in which calculation is „rendered impossible or highly complex 
requires heavy investments‟ (Callon and Muniesa 2003, 197). The request expressed by the RCN 
senior advisor to reconsider the relevance of the scenarios and to base the research proposal on a 
notion of change rather than progress was clearly considered too risky an investment. 
A final question arises then about the initial goal of the ICT foresight project to create „policy 
foresight‟. Saying that the objective of the foresight project was to produce „policy foresight‟, it 
seems, may have been a strategy to avoid reducing the discussion of priorities to issues of 
technological progress and development, and to include notions of change. 
Yet according to the project leader, it had been especially important to highlight the aspect of 
generic ICT research in the research proposal, in order to „push the whole research field and 
contribute to progress within ICT research‟. The research programme itself was meant to take 
account of societal issues but not to „end up in applied research‟. The original objective of the 
foresight project on ICT, with its broad focus on socio-technical speculations rather than 
technological extrapolations, in this respect presented something of a quandary. The scenarios 
created were meant to contribute to „increasing the quality of research priorities‟, but the need for 
generic and basic ICT research was not to be excluded from this process. In this respect, the 
foresight process discussed in this thesis shows the difficulty of relating the future value of 
technologies to changes in social relations and today‟s decisions on investment in research 
priorities.   
One could conclude that the value of the scenarios for developing research priorities had been 
decided based on a linear understanding of innovation. Political geographer and STS scholar 
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Andrew Barry explains this linear understanding as the idea that „commercially successful new 
products resulted from innovative technology, which in turn resulted from advanced scientific 
research‟ (Barry, 2002, 152). Applied research, studying present and potential uses of technology 
and how these could be incorporated into different social contexts, could be seen as a 
counterweight to this linear understanding of innovation. These diverging perspectives on 
technology can be found in many institutions occupied with the regulation of science and 
research policy, for example the Directorate General for Science, Research and Development of 
the European Commission (previously DG XIIA) (Barry 2002). Yet to reduce these different 
viewpoints on socio-technological development to a discussion of change versus progress would 
not do justice to their complexity, a complexity which certainly deserves further research, in 
general as well as in the context of foresight and future orientation. 
 Producing limited lists of research priorities deemed important is a dominant way of dealing 
with policy issues, prevailing over the production of future scenarios as rhetoric repertoire. The 
complexity of possible futures, however, is doubtless more effectively captured in stories than in 
short points.193 Ultimately, what effect such scenarios have is likely to depend on their quality as 
narratives, and on who is willing to read them and use them to think about strategic possibilities 
beyond limited lists, established relations and classifications.  
Present priorities and future values belong to different worlds which may be brought closer 
through foresight if it contributes just as much to opening as to shaping the future. The story of 
the ICT foresight project at the Research Council of Norway is the story of an attempt to achieve 
such an opening, in a particular way and in a particular context. In this respect, it resonates with 
similar efforts to govern the social, technological and political on different scales – institutional, 
national, and international. This thesis has focused on discussing an example of foresight in 
practice and on showing the challenges it produces as a new way of governing between 
uncertainty and convention. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
The aim of the conclusion is to underline some of the arguments made in this thesis, to explain 
how my perspective developed during the study and to ask which questions it might be worth 
pursuing further. Since I have studied a single case I am wary of trying to deduce universal 
lessons about foresight practice. I nevertheless believe there are some issues concerning foresight 
and research policy-making as well as participatory processes in public institutions which this 
case study has brought to the fore and which I would like to highlight in this conclusion. These 
issues include responsibility, uncertainty and the value of collective future orientation. Therefore, 
while seeking to avoid „conceptual closure‟ (Flyvbjerg 2006) at the end of this thesis, I would 
like to suggest a few concepts that might be pursued further when studying foresight, public 
participation in policy-making or „communicative planning‟ in regional and local government 
(Pløger 2001, Hagen and Asmervik 2003). 
First I will discuss a few analytical strategies I adopted while studying foresight as a process. 
Second, I will revisit the five features of foresight which I consider as enabling foresight practice 
to travel between different contexts and locations. Third, I will recap my theoretical approach 
and highlight the relationship between theoretical concepts and strategies found in foresight 
practice that support my understanding of foresight as driven by two forms of coordination, 
convention and non-calculation. Fourth, I will discuss the concept of foresight as power, 
returning to the scenario writing phase as an important part of the whole process. Here I will 
argue for further research into the „conventions of engagement‟ at work in collective foresight 
and other participatory processes. Finally, I will look beyond foresight and the questions raised 
in this thesis and ask more speculatively what might make a difference in the creation of futures. 
 
8.1 Foresight as process: opening and shaping the future? 
In this thesis I have discussed a case of participatory foresight in research policy and 
programme development. My aim was to show how the future is opened and shaped collectively 
through coordination and evaluation. Opening the future is the term I used to describe 
coordinating activities aimed at including multiple perspectives on a particular issue and thus 
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seeking to tap the unexpected, creative and new. Shaping the future was the term I used to denote 
evaluations used to sustain the relevance of the process with regard to its original objectives. 
Opening as an activity was thus related (mainly though not exclusively) to participation, while 
shaping was related to relevance. Using these terms in a contrasting manner to describe 
participation and relevance was an analytical strategy that emerged during my study. It enabled a 
topic to be discussed that is high on the foresight agenda and also on that of other formally 
future-oriented activities. Stakeholder inclusion, citizen participation or user involvement are all 
pertinent issues at the intersection between social, political and technological concerns. Here, 
however, participation referred not simply to the involvement of external stakeholders, but to the 
collective effort engaged in by project organisers, facilitators, invited participants, hired 
consultants and employees of the institution responsible for the project. Taking the focus away 
from the demarcation line between external and internal stakeholders was an analytical approach 
which allowed the foresight process to be studied not as a negotiation of differing interests 
between project organisers and invited participants but rather as a collective engagement in a 
common concern. Using this approach I argue that foresight is not necessarily about aligning 
different perspectives but about coordinating participation and relevance, which raises paradoxes 
and challenges of its own. 
Studying how the future is opened and shaped collectively was the task I set myself at the 
beginning of my investigations. As my study proceeded it became more of a guiding line for 
exploring the relationship between three issues emerging during my observations: responsibility 
for, uncertainty about and the value of foresight. This also meant shifting the focus more towards 
the coordinating activities of the project organisers and looking at what they achieved during the 
process.194 Yet these issues were not separate from the collective engagement in the project; they 
emerged during the interactions between invited participants and organisers. Here it is important 
to underline that responsibility was initially unevenly distributed and was redistributed during the 
process – not only among employees of the RCN, the initiating organisation, but also among 
organisers, project owners and invited participants. While there was a clear formal allocation of 
ownership assigned to various representatives of the RCN and the project group responsible for 
conducting the project, the process shows how attempts were made to make ownership and 
responsibility collective.  
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Asking specific research questions at the beginning of my study of foresight was a second 
analytical strategy I adopted to put a certain distance between me as the researcher and my object 
of study, the participatory foresight project on ICT. Here I draw a distinction between critical 
distance and relational distance. Critical distance to a study object implies that there is already a 
pre-adopted position, a critical view of the object which may in some respects predetermine the 
results of the study. This viewpoint can also be partial, in the sense of taking a critical view of 
certain aspects of the study object – e.g., its political implications or actual implementation – 
while being more open or favourably disposed towards other aspects of its realisation. Most 
social research will ultimately point out shortcomings, challenges or potential improvements and 
thus contribute to a certain critique of existing realities.  
Relational distance, on the other hand, additionally acknowledges that the study object is also 
re-enacted through the way it is represented in a study, i.e. that a study does not convey a 
representation of the study object but a relation. Relational distance does not assume that the 
studied object is a stable and real thing located spatially and temporally „out there‟, but that it 
becomes something new and different by being studied. This distance is not something that 
comes naturally or automatically. It has to be achieved. It entails selection of data, prioritising of 
questions, reflection on perspectives and the weighing of theoretical and methodical tools and 
their relevance for the investigation. My study conveys this relation first and foremost in the 
selection of a limited number of ethnographic moments from the many notes collected and in 
relating the public sources of information about the project and its context to the observations 
discussed here. In that respect, a researcher has two responsibilities: first, to highlight the 
specific relational distance which has been achieved by re-enacting the research object; and 
second, to provide an account of her critical distance to the research object and to describe how 
this was pre-adopted or emerged during the study. 
Two questions guided my study: How does the interaction between stakeholder involvement 
and the need for a result useful to the organisation produce future stories? To what degree are 
participants‟ contributions to a particular story about the future an effect of coordination? While 
initially I thought these would enable me to uncover the multiple challenges and issues of 
participatory foresight, in some respects they became increasingly problematic. Doubtlessly, the 
scenarios were produced to help develop the RCN‟s research policy and establish priorities in a 
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large ICT research programme. However, what does it mean to involve stakeholders in this 
process?  
Practice shows that involving stakeholders is not only a matter of recruitment and design, but 
is also shaped during a foresight process. Organisers and project owners need to establish mutual 
trust with the stakeholders if their contributions are to be sufficiently valued. Yet this 
requirement must be balanced against the need to create specific texts to meet the organisational 
and political expectations associated with a foresight project. My study shows that there were 
strategies to open the process, e.g., by removing frames of reference in the collection of driving 
forces or by proliferating choices of scenario models or necessary scenario criteria. This did not 
always increase creativity and openness, however, but also created uncertainty about the 
participants‟ individual and collective competence for achieving coherent stories and about the 
strategic relevance of fictitious relationships between technology, society and research.  
The second question was to what degree the participants‟ contributions to the scenarios were 
effects of coordination. During my observations of the different stages of scenario development I 
realised that contributions are never brought into the process by the invited participants‟ 
competence and creativity alone. They are shaped by process objectives and design and by the 
ways participants are recruited and methods and approaches applied even before the start of 
participatory workshops and collective scenario creation. In this respect, participants‟ 
contributions to a foresight project are always an effect of organising.195  
So how are futures opened and shaped in participatory foresight? Futures in foresight are not 
the „real futures‟ awaiting us in the decades to come, but places to explore different possible, 
plausible, preferable or undesirable outcomes of present realities, activities and decisions. 
Presenting the future as a political and economic state of affairs a decade away from today‟s 
concerns produced specific uncertainties about how to evaluate what should be relevant or what 
it might be important to include in the scenarios. These uncertainties in themselves raised 
political and economic issues during the process. In this respect, the future was not only opened 
and shaped collectively but also simultaneously, by keeping several options open throughout the 
process of achieving relevance. 
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 See also Jenssen (2009) on how pre-defined stakeholder images shape contributions in municipal visioning 
processes. 
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Does this perhaps mean that there is no difference between opening and shaping the future? 
Are there other coordinating activities at work which remain hidden or are rendered irrelevant by 
focusing on opening and shaping the future in a foresight process? 
At this point I have no answer to these questions, but I see them as important. They point back 
to the requirement stipulated by researchers to look at the future in order to distinguish between 
foresight‟s rhetoric and the complexities of its practical implications (Brown et al. 1999). 
Openness, transparency and authenticity are issues that are repeatedly debated in participatory 
processes at the intersection between society, technology and politics (Brown and Michael 
2002a), just as relevance, result orientation and effective coordination are important issues when 
it comes to the capacity of policy institutions to make responsible and reflexive decisions about 
collective futures (Beck et al. 2003). In this sense my study has shown that the rhetoric of 
foresight is part of its practical implications. Rhetoric cannot be separated from practice; it must 
be understood as part of practice and outcomes. Studying foresight as a process has hopefully 
contributed to the collective academic endeavour to look at the future and to explore how the 
future „as a temporal abstraction is constructed and managed, by whom and under what 
conditions‟ (Brown et al. 2000). While research questions and analytical tools are always 
incomplete they can nevertheless increase an understanding of complexity and induce curiosity 
about how it might be different. 
 
8.2 Foresight as technology: the unstable field of practice 
In the emerging health and life sciences in which old barriers between science and technology 
are receding (as for example in bioengineering), innovation concepts are increasingly being 
shaped by expectations and promises, and „competitive pressures‟ are forcing social action to 
„increasingly occupy future positions of advantage‟ (Brown and Michael 2003, 6). The 
exploitation of future opportunities is now driving development and has displaced the passive 
mode of expecting the future to be based on established routines and habits (ibid). 
These arguments, which roughly represent the cornerstones of the sociology of expectations, 
have enabled us to take a new approach to science and technology studies by highlighting the 
importance of including the future as a research object. Compared with the „expectations as 
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drivers‟ perspective I have here investigated future orientation as tightly linked to organisational 
issues and established policy activities. In this respect I have sought to increase understanding of 
formalised future orientation and „of the ways in which shared understandings actually emerge 
and about how they can be sustained‟ (Berkhout 2006, 307).  
I have approached foresight as being characterised by five features forming its „immutable 
content‟ which enables foresight practice to travel between different contexts and locations. First, 
the requirement for a specific competence about how to make sense of the future; second, the 
understanding that foresight is above all a systematic way of thinking about the future; third that 
it should be both forward-looking and forward-acting. By including a fourth feature concerning 
unintended effects in my analytical framework I wanted to pursue the question of whether 
foresight as a relatively recent approach can generate effects not already established in objectives 
and methods and whether these effects may be valuable and worth preserving (Brown et al. 
2001). The fifth feature, which deals with creating futures between social priorities and 
technological possibilities, is often related to the demand to include a broad variety of 
participants in foresight processes, similar to a „democratisation of science‟ as envisaged by 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) in their call for extended peer communities on policy-making 
issues. Participants should not only be scientific experts, officials and professionals but also 
stakeholders with hands-on experience of certain policy issues, such as dealing with epidemics or 
environmental hazards.  
In my study these five features represent the ongoing negotiation of the credibility of foresight 
as both a systematic and a democratising approach to future challenges, and the legitimacy of 
foresight as an adequate set of rational approaches to policy-making, which include scientific, 
managerial and deliberative tools for steering and governing. In the foresight project studied here 
these features had implications for design, recruitment and process and generated specific effects 
during the process as well as influencing the eventual outcome of the project. For example, the 
demand to be both forward-looking and forward-acting created a mode of production which 
subjected the process to organisational routines and time management and eventually highlighted 
uncertainties about how to discuss strategies based on the three scenarios, each of which were 
perceived differently by the participants who had created their original content.  
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The feature concerning unintended effects proved to be the most evasive and analytically 
ambiguous. What can be perceived as intended or unintended effects is not always clear. Besides 
creating scenarios there are a number of other objectives associated with foresight such as 
fostering new networks between participants, contributing to collective discussions of the future 
not necessarily included in scenarios and learning about the potential and limits of foresight 
through practice. These intended effects also played a role here, but they were not part of my 
study and thus have not been discussed as effects of the foresight project. The effects I observed 
during the concrete coordination process of creating scenarios were rather expressions of 
uncertainty about the project, signalling the need for further research into the practice of 
foresight in order to better understand the intended and unintended effects of coordination on the 
concrete results for policy- and decision-making. 
This thesis is thus also a study of political practice. By including foresight in the range of both 
steering and deliberating technologies characterised by these five features, I argue that foresight 
has definitely left the anteroom of politics and has taken a seat beside other planning instruments 
in the high office of governance. However, whether it is influential in the corridors of power, is 
regarded as a legitimising prerequisite for other processes or produces entirely different effects 
can only be understood by looking at each case individually. 
 
8.3 Foresight as convention: connecting practice with theory 
One question which connected my case study to the field of foresight practice was that of the 
value of foresight in policy-making. What does it mean if a specific formal approach to the 
future is regarded as valuable for coordinating policy processes on the national, transnational, 
regional and institutional levels? How can this question be approached from the point of view of 
a single case study rather than from a taxonomy of different practices of foresight? How can 
value be studied in practice, in the socio-material activities of different actors? I have chosen to 
regard the creation of value as an activity – as evaluating – and evaluating as part of the 
coordinating activities of the foresight project. 
First, my intention was to study foresight practice in the light of several theoretical 
perspectives. In the first chapter of this thesis I advocated applying STS and recent actor-network 
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approaches such as the use of the collective, to the study of foresight. However, using STS and 
recent ANT more extensively raised a problem. The temporal limit of a specific short term 
project did not correspond productively with discovering and imputing patterns (Moser 2003) or 
modes of ordering (Law 1994) observable after a longer period of ethnographic research. Rather 
than using patterns I therefore chose to discuss ethnographic moments. Although the creation of 
texts about social and technological change seemed to correspond well with STS concerns about 
materiality, agency and complexity, I saw a need to include theoretical tools that could enable a 
discussion of scenario development based on dialogues and collective task performance over a 
short time-span of a few months. 
The sociology of expectations provides examples of ethnographic approaches and single and 
multiple case studies. It also includes STS perspectives and shows how technological 
developments are negotiated through future orientation. Increasingly, however, the problem 
emerged that this specific approach focuses on expectations as actors and drivers of 
development. Whereas in Chapter 2 I identified specific expectations connected, expressed and 
acted upon within the ICT foresight project, I found that in order to use the observational 
material collected I needed to focus my attention more on the actual interactions within the 
process than on the expectations framing the project or randomly expressed during the project. 
Rather than being drivers of the project, I found that expectations were synthesised during the 
project, in the sense that attempts were made both to merge them and to make them synthetic or 
artificial, in other words „formalised‟.196 Yet what I wanted to do was to find out what moved this 
project forward. Expectations did not play a central part in this coordinating process. While 
initially offering a multitude of inspirational perspectives the sociology of expectations in the 
end did not play as prominent a part in my study as I had expected.  
Another theoretical approach I initially intended to follow but then abandoned was to discuss 
the process in terms of reflexive modernisation and reflexive future orientation (Beck et al. 1994, 
Lash 1994, Beck et al. 2003, Latour 2003, Lash 2003, Voß, Bauknecht and Kemp 2006). This 
included reflexive approaches (Woolgar 1988, Wynne 2002, Bruun Jensen 2005, Cañellas-Boltà 
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 See Berkhout (2006)  and Salo et al. (2004) for different perspectives on the „synthetic‟ in foresight. I have 
used these perspectives as a basis for discussing synthetic expecations  at „Expectation–building and innovation 
processes‟, 17–18 September 2009,  Zürich. 
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and Strand 2006) and reflexive design in governance and organisations (Cunliffe 2003, 2005, 
Grunwald 2004, Grin, Felix and Bos 2004). However, although I found that reflexivity can be a 
fruitful concept when studying documents and analysing interviews it became less useful for a 
study of face-to-face interactions. The discourse on reflexivity, its productivity and its limits did 
not sit well with my observations of dialogues and task performance and the dynamics of 
undetermined aspects of coordination. As a social theory reflexivity became at once too 
comprehensive and too specific.197 
Eventually it was Thévenot‟s perspective on conventions as complex coordinating devices 
that deal with the „limits of more localised engagements, when there is a need for third-party 
assessment‟ that became the way I chose to connect coordination and evaluation to the question 
of value in foresight. Nevertheless, when I followed Thévenot‟s discussion of conventions 
through several publications (2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2006, 2007), the idea that, on the one 
hand, conventions include undetermined, dynamic and creative aspects of coordination (2002a) 
and, on the other, that conventions „channel uncertainty through a conventional formatting of 
events‟ (2006) seemed to produce a contradiction. How could conventions be discussed as both 
„undetermined and dynamic coordination‟ and „conventional formatting‟? Rather than seeing this 
as a paradox, I tried to make use of this tension by using „common forms of evaluation‟ as the 
connecting link between these two perspectives.198  
In this way I have tried to highlight that there are two different forms of coordination which 
become influential in foresight practice. Arguing for these two forms of coordination is also a 
way to combine my use of STS and ANT resources with the inspirations I received from 
convention theory. The first contributes to opening the future through non-calculation (Callon 
and Muniesa 2003, Callon and Law 2005). Achieving non-calculation is done through two 
different strategies, rarefaction and proliferation. Both emerged in the process of inviting 
participants, creating scenario ideas and writing scenarios. As I have shown, they involved an 
entanglement of different elements, such as material, human, conceptual; and produced multiple, 
often unexpected effects. Both were meant to produce creativity and to address the future in an 
open way, i.e. through removing participants‟ representational status, removing frames of 
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 However, it was a fruitful approach in the study of a vision project in a Norwegian municipality (Jenssen, 
2010). 
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 See Chapter 3, subchapter 3.5. 
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references or offering a multitude of important criteria to relate to. As I have shown, they also 
produced uncertainty, for example about competence, relevance and credibility of the foresight 
process.  
The second form of coordination is based on conventions, in the broad and complex 
understanding represented by Thévenot‟s work. Two strategies in particular contributed to 
shaping the future and producing results of the project relevant to the project owners. The first 
was the attempt of the project group and the writing group to create equivalences across contexts 
to justify the production of scenarios about ICT research in 2015. The scenarios would have to 
be qualified for evaluation in different contexts and thus had to be aligned with certain 
conventions of documents used in policy contexts. 
The second convention was the collective coordination of evaluating what was considered 
irrelevant. What I experienced as most striking in following these two strategies in practice was 
how they produced specific silences. Certain questions remained unanswered, specific situations 
were not commented upon and proposals were expressed without being followed up. These 
silences however were necessary to ensure producing specific texts, which could inspire strategic 
thinking, assign a certain role to ICT research and maybe even produce unexpected effects.  
Recapitulating and summarising the most important theoretical concepts in this way I want to 
underline that these forms of coordination are something which I both detected and imputed in 
my fieldwork material (Moser 2003). I found them compelling because they helped me to gain a 
certain understanding of value in foresight, and collective coordination of value in general. They 
also made me attentive to the issue of responsibility, how engagement relates to responsibility 
and how we can understand uncertainty in practice. These forms of coordination, non-calculation 
and conventions, do not exist separate, but  influence and condition each other. This means that 
conventions alone cannot explain coordination under uncertainty. Non-calculation can be used as 
a complement and counterpart to its explanatory potential. However, as with all concepts used to 
discuss empirical material, these are subject to revision with each new context and location 
visited and observed. They have highlighted particular challenges of foresight in research policy 
while restricting the discussion of other issues. 
As a contribution to the field of science and technology studies and recent actor-network 
studies, I want to argue that using convention theory can add a specific sensibility to issues of 
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responsibility and particular its relationship with engagement. As Thévenot (2002, 75) observes: 
„Will a symmetrical treatment of human and nonhuman beings, and the conception of their 
relationship as a network, lead us to get rid of the notion of responsibility, a central category in 
moral issues?‟ That the answer to that is negative has been shown by much STS and ANT work 
in recent years and this study of participatory foresight in research policy is meant as one 
possible contribution to this endeavour. 
 
8.4 Foresight as power: writing relevant scenarios 
My thesis has focused specifically on the writing phase in scenario creation. Following 
Wright (2005), who sees scenarios not as innocent practice but as social and collective 
constructions, I argue that it is during the writing process that the ambitions of a foresight project 
emerge as explicit negotiations of scenario content, number and form. It is here that the 
credibility and relevance of scenarios are coordinated and competences performed. I followed 
this process in Chapters 5 and 6 and showed how writing was coordinated by distributing 
responsibility and creating equivalences across contexts. My point is that the action of writing 
scenarios can be studied fruitfully as a form of collective coordination and evaluation. Whereas it 
is for most research purposes not interesting to follow the individual activity of writing, this 
approach enabled me to study how scenario ideas, drafts and texts are selected, ordered and 
transformed in collective processes. 
The question I wanted to target is how writing is distributed in scenario creation and how 
responsibility and engagement can be understood in relation to power. This is part of a broader 
question about the distribution of responsibility in foresight projects. Having studied the EU-
funded ForSociety ERA-net project, which was designed to enable coordination among the 
national foresight programmes of fifteen countries, STS scholar Mikko Rask (2008, 1163) 
explains: „Most of the foresight programmes/activities analysed were structured around a core 
group of key actors with the responsibility for choosing topics treated, scenarios written and 
recommendations given.‟  
Such high-level coordination processes raise questions about who is able to influence the 
outcomes of foresight processes. My approach has been to link the question of responsibility to 
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that of engagement. In my view, including engagement brings out issues of collective agency 
which would be left out if responsibility were simply to be defined as being accountable for a 
process and result. This makes the question of power in participatory foresight processes more 
complex, because engagement without responsibility can influence outcomes just as assigning 
responsibility can be met by disengagement, both regardless of the status of the participant in the 
project.  
Participation in writing scenarios is thus responsibility coupled with engagement, which 
distinguishes scenario writing from, for example, responsibility for distributed writing in service 
companies (Callon 2002) or the collective writing of budgets in municipalities (Czarniawska-
Joerges 1992). In particular I want to argue that it highlights the activities of those writing the 
scenarios as being between writing and authoring. People collecting, ordering and transforming 
multiple scenario ideas, sketches and models into coherent narratives are responsible for 
representing collective ideas in a justifiable manner and creating relevance to multiple contexts 
both within and outside the foresight project. In addition to that, notwithstanding the collective 
effort involved in creating representative scenarios, narrative competence and individual 
perspectives interact and allow certain ideas to become more prominent during the writing 
process. It is an expression of my critical distance to this observed phenomenon that I do not 
regard this just as the everyday necessity of process management but as an important aspect of 
scenario writing and foresight practice which deserves further investigation.  
I want to argue that this is an important but also difficult area of research. How can this 
question be studied further? Economic priorities in the development of national research 
strategies work as an underlying legitimation for foresight processes geared towards scientific 
and technological advances and for a distinctive role of research as enabling progress. In this 
context, all distribution of responsibility can be interpreted in the context of working collectively 
towards a common good, by involving necessary competences and relevant stakeholders and 
assigning process coordination to institutions with the authority to make decisions or at least 
contribute with influential recommendations. 
This context or frame of working towards a common good is linked to the certainty narrative 
that assumes the „inevitability of the development of particular technologies‟ (Brown et al. 2000, 
4). Yet it is also linked to the assumed existence of universal values which everybody can agree 
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upon without reflecting on „what the good values are and whether planning should be an activity 
at the service of good‟ (Hagen and Asmervik 2003, 5). The difficulty for the analyst is that „we 
cannot place ourselves outside the world of expectations as if we were objectively disinterested 
observers‟ (Brown et al. 2005, 3). I want to argue that a good way of studying foresight practice 
is to look at the process as an observer and reflect on this particular frame of collective 
engagement in a common good. I suggest that further research might investigate the conventions 
of engagement at work in these coordinating practices and see conventions both as limited 
agreements and formatting devices. This seems to be a perspective which could uncover wider 
implications for the practice of participatory processes. The experiences collected in this study 
and similar public future orientation projects suggest that the concrete coordination of such 
processes is often taken for granted and thus not regarded as an issue.  
 
8.5 The value of futures 
According to STS scholar Andrew Webster (2007, 469) foresight methodologies adopted by 
most government agencies remain „extremely limited in their tie-in with innovation dynamics‟. 
He argues that: „Foresight is primarily a form of futures thinking that serves the interests of 
various social (including economic) elites and does little to include other voices that might ask 
whether the priorities chosen serve broad social values.‟ Foresight thus involves specific social 
groups largely responsible for the creation and distribution of knowledge conventionally seen as 
legitimate for informing research and development priorities. There are other forms of 
participating in future orientation which are more open and include social stakeholders such as 
consensus conferences or citizens‟ hearings.199  
Perhaps the challenges of foresight highlighted in this thesis can be explained against the 
background of existing and stable innovation networks (ibid, 468) consisting mainly of 
academic, government and industry representatives which are difficult to change or expand, even 
if a „wider than normal debate‟ is one of the requirements for a foresight project. Yet rather than 
looking for explanatory resources that might rank this case of foresight practice in terms of 
success or failure, I want to ask how futures thinking might be valuable as a form of engagement 
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Bruun Jensen (2005) for a case study of citizen projects and consensus building. 
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which makes a difference. This question goes beyond foresight as a relatively established 
approach to policy-making and looks instead at the broader field of participatory future 
orientation. However, it also presumes that the future of foresight is not settled (Brown et al. 
2001, 3) and that its potential is therefore dependent on contexts and on the ambitions of those 
employing it. In this respect I follow Moser‟s argument about ordering and opening and argue 
that the potential of foresight to make a difference remains open precisely because it needs to be 
„enacted anew in every instance‟ (Moser 2003, 299). The question remains what this difference 
might consist of. 
Doubtless the demand for broader participation and inclusion of multiple perspectives is part 
of this question of potential, but should not be reduced only to this. Openness, as I have argued, 
is coordinated in collective foresight through different strategies of non-calculation and 
investment in creative uncertainty, including participation, but also through specific methods of 
scenario creation or coordinating policy discussions. In each process of future orientation we can 
ask what these forms of openness are meant to achieve. Following Callon and Law (2005) I have 
tried to show that various strategies of non-calculation, i.e. opening a process, can have different 
social, political or moral effects.  
Both the demand for specific forms of openness and the confirmation of relevance are deeply 
embedded in our understanding of participatory processes. This leads me to ask: Can we think 
about creating futures (verbal and written) which make a difference in this continuous quest for 
openness and relevance? Can we think outside this framework for our futures at all and does this 
have any practical, political (or social, or cultural) value? Should collective creations of future 
scenarios in public organisations produce a sense of estrangement from our material and semiotic 
present?  
According to science fiction writer and theorist Samuel R. Delany, linguistic distortion used 
in science fiction is „neither allegorical nor satirical in its essence‟ but the result of „random 
combination and orderly recomplication‟.200 In this respect, participatory scenario creation, which 
involves collecting and ordering numerous scenario ideas and making them more complex 
through writing, is not so different. Yet collective foresight is meant to say something relevant 
about our future(s) and take the implications of various future stories seriously, while science 
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fiction uses the future simply as one of a number of linguistic strategies to create entirely 
different universes.  
The role of the future in foresight and scenario development has been questioned, since 
foresight could just be seen as „management and resource allocation methodology or strategy 
development under a different name‟ (Staton 2008, 64). As Borup et al. (2006, 296) argue, 
scholars should now combine looking at the future with looking into the future and thus assume 
responsibility for the possible implications of analytical investigations of foresight and other 
future-oriented practices. What the future could, should or should not be is part of the value of 
participatory future orientation and perhaps requires us to think about the future in a more 
unconventional way, both as foresight practitioners and foresight analysts. 
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9 APPENDIX  
9.1 Attended meetings and workshops of the foresight project on ICT at the RCN 
2004 18 & 19 
September  
27 
September  
4 October  5 October  7 October  12 October 
morning 
12 October 
afternoon 
21 & 22 
October  
Meeting 
(whole day 
meetings) 
Scenario 
workshop 
on drivers, 
models 
and drafts 
Writing 
group 
Writing 
group 
Project 
group 
Writing 
group 
Project 
group 
Project 
group 
Scenario 
workshop 
evaluating 
scenarios 
and 
discussing 
strategies 
Participants* 37 10 10 6 10 6 5 32 
Agenda Collecting 
driving 
forces, 
creating 
scenario 
models, 
collecting 
ideas for 
scenario 
narratives 
Reaching 
consensus 
about 
merging 
scenarios, 
Develop 
three 
scenarios 
further 
Discussing 
the format 
of the 
three 
scenarios, 
texts, 
visuals 
and 
models 
Discussing 
the content 
of the new 
ICT 
programme 
VERDIKT, 
discussing 
use of 
scenarios 
for the 
programme 
Discussing 
the written 
scenarios, 
developing 
them 
further, 
collecting 
ideas to 
differentiate 
scenarios 
Discussing 
the content 
of the 
scenarios 
in detail, 
evaluating 
them 
according 
to 
programm
e relevance 
Presentation 
and 
discussion of 
programme 
NORDITE 
in relation to 
VERDIKT 
Material not 
included in 
thesis 
Increasing 
actions in 
scenarios, 
collecting 
„strategic 
actions‟, 
suggesting 
strategies/ 
policies for 
the RCN 
Facilitator Yes Yes  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
 
*The author (or – as in three meetings– the author + assistant) as observer is not included in the 
count. 
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9.2 Short summary of the three scenarios 
The following text is a translation of a short overview of the three scenarios produced in the 
UTSIKT project. It is taken from the report on the UTSIKT project (RCN 2005b, 26–7) which 
also includes the complete scenario texts (ibid, 41–65). Both the overview and the complete texts 
are originally in Norwegian. 
 
Three ICT scenarios 
eConsumption 
By 2015 Norway has become richer than ever because of oil resources. This prosperity has 
stimulated greater consumption, and Norwegians are curious about innovations in ICT. ICT 
development is user-oriented. Users are both active and passive but can in both cases be difficult 
to satisfy. Some use ICT first and foremost for entertainment and leisure; others regard it as a 
means of personal development. The focus in the research effort moves from hardware and 
software to user ware. A clear boundary emerges between technological research and research on 
ICT applications. Basic research is mostly about enabling user-friendly solutions. Norway relies 
on basic research in the EU, and major components of research funding are now channelled via 
Brussels. Norway becomes a test lab for ICT innovation in the EU. ICT plays a key role in the 
private sector as a „business enabler‟. The possibilities for launching new ICT services are good, 
but the market is tough. The time-scale is generally short, and interest in the development of 
long-term competence and new challenges linked to converging technologies like nano-bio-
cogno is marginal. Concerns about high technology consumption are tacitly ignored.  
 
Out of Sync 
In 2015 many people have lost patience with ICT. People are sceptical about technology 
which often steals time and complicates everyday life. ICT has become omnipresent; even if it 
allows patients with digital implants to be monitored precisely and effectively there are obvious 
disadvantages. Nobody really knows what might happen to the enormous amounts of surplus 
information generated. ICT has contributed to removing the boundary between technology-
generated and human-generated functions. For this reason important social groups have major 
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reservations about ICT, and ICT research is regarded as a problematic area of investment. 
Advanced ICT has come to be taken for granted as part of everyday life and few citizens need to 
worry about having the necessary skills to use it  Academic ICT research experiences lean times. 
In a world full of unrest and failing international cooperation, the big global market actors take 
over most of the initiative in ICT development. The Internet falls apart and is replaced by a 
regional splinter-net. The leading Norwegian talents wind up in „Corporate Universities‟ owned 
by companies like Microsoft-Novosto. The European research cooperation encounters 
difficulties, except for one interesting area: There is a strong demand for new surveillance 
systems to strengthen European security. 
 
The Spirit of the New ERA 
This scenario starts with Norway being thrown into a crisis caused by Kværner201 going 
bankrupt. Norway witnesses the worst unemployment since the thirties. Industry moves abroad 
or is decommissioned. Out of this crisis a new awareness arises that the country needs new 
innovation policies based on a more wholehearted understanding of the knowledge society. Tax-
neutral policies are abandoned. The oil fund is used to establish a research fund worth 30 billion 
kroner and these resources are channelled into a new infrastructure, modernisation of the public 
sector, and competence development. Norway becomes even more actively engaged in European 
research and innovation cooperation and takes the lead in working for a European software 
policy. Norway tries out innovations and starts a systematic recruitment of foreign researchers 
and people with special competencies. In 2015 a number of Norwegian research communities 
start to flower, and internationally successful small- and medium-sized ICT companies emerge. 
Competition within academia is fierce, however. The knowledge society offers a broad variety of 
economic and cultural possibilities. Many citizens start finding it difficult to keep pace in a 
society in which there is a constant demand for learning and readjustment. 
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